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JPWC SERIAL PAPERS

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SECRETCOPY NO. 1December 7, 1942STATUS OF JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE PAPERS

A - FOR ACTION

Number	Subject	Status	Reference
(1) J.P.W.C. 45/D J.P.W.C. 45/1 J.P.W.C. 45/2 J.P.W.C. 45/3	Functions of O.S.S.	To J.C.S.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 17.
(2) J.P.W.C. 50	Proposed Directives from J.C.S. to O.S.S.	Included in Item #1.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 30
J.P.W.C. 49	Examination of Re- cent Procedure in Psychological Warfare.	* * * Included in above.	* * * - - -
(3) J.P.W.C. 37	Military Personnel for O.S.S.	Table of total allotments to be submitted by O.S.S. after decision on Item #1.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Oct. 14
J.P.W.C. 37/2/D	* * * Militarization of O.S.S.	* * * Included in above.	* * * - - -
(4) O.S.S. Memo.	Clarification of O.S.S. Status.	Included in Item #1.	J.P.W.S.C. Mtg., Sept. 18.
(5) J.C.S. 83/1 J.P.W.C. 21/2/3d Draft	Functions of O.S.S. - Organized Sabotage and Guerilla Units.	Included in Item 1.	J.P.W.S.C. Mtg., Sept. 18.
(6) O.S.S. Memo.	Communications with France.	Awaiting British reply re availa- bility of 6 vo- dettes.	J.P.W.S.C. Mtg., Sept. 15.
(7) J.P.W.C. 40	Propaganda to Portugal.	J.P.W.C. approved; detailed plan be- ing considered by J.P.W. Advisory Committee.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Oct. 5.
(8) Memo from JCS	Special Operations in France.	Awaiting report from O.S.S.	J.P.W.S.C. Mtg., Oct. 14.
(9) J.P.W.C. 46	Proposed Convention for Extradition of Axis War Criminals.	J.P.W.C. referred to Advisory Com- mittee.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 30.
(10) Memo from Requirements Division, SOS	O.S.S. Construction Project at West Point, Va.	J.P.W.S.C. ap- proved; awaiting approval of S.O.S.	J.P.W.S.C. Mtg., Oct. 30.

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(11) J.P.W.C. 38	Coordination of U.S. and Brazilian Psychological Warfare.	J.P.W.C. referred to Advisory Committee.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 30.

B - FOR INFORMATION

(12) J.P.W.C. 44/2d Draft	Planning Requirements for Psychological Warfare.	J.P.W.C. approved; referred to OSS for preparation of Basic P.W. Plan.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Oct. 26.
(13) J.P.W.C. 43 J.P.W.C. 43/2 J.P.W.C. 43/3	Critical Materials for International Broadcasting.	COMPLETED: J.P.W.C. recommendations sent by JCS to Bd. War Com'ns.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 2.
J.P.W.C. 43/1	Radio Equipment for O.W.I.	* * * Included in above.	* * *
(14) J.P.W.C. 47	Dissemination of Communication - Intercept Intelligence.	J.P.W.C. approved; referred to J.P.S.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 9.
(15) J.P.W.C. 48	O.S.S. Communication Services.	J.P.W.C. approved; referred to J.P.S.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 9.
(16)	Publication of Complete Casualty Lists.	COMPLETED: Withdrawn by M.I.S.	J.P.W.S.C. Mtg., Dec. 1.
(17) J.P.W.C. 51 J.P.W.C. 51/1 J.P.W.C. 51/2	Joint American-British Plan of Psychological Warfare for Italy.	COMPLETED: J.P.W.C. approved; sent to J.C.S.; letters sent to agencies involved.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Nov. 30.
(18) J.P.W.C. 52	Procurement of O. Equipment.	J.P.W.C. approved; referred to J.P.S.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Dec. 7.
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		J.P.W.C. approved, subject to S.O.S. approval of material required.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Dec. 7.
		J.P.W.C. approved subject; sent to J.P.S.	J.P.W.C. Mtg., Dec. 7.

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- 51/1 November 6, 1942 Joint American-British Plan of Psychological Warfare for Italy
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- 51/2 November 10, 1942 Joint American-British Plan of Psychological Warfare for Italy
- 52 November 9, 1942 Implementation and Supervision of Execution of Psychological Warfare Plans
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19. Coordination of Military Propaganda with Office of War Information
20. General Plan for PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE (3 drafts)
- ~~20/2~~ Functions of OSS in Relation to Secret Operations and Schools.
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Filed in OSS - PW FOLDER

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W.D.

SECRET

100 - 2
(J.P.W.C. 86/D)

December 7, 1942

COPY NO. 1

100
(1) J.C.S. 159

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

JOINT ARGO-AMERICAN PLAN FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR JAPAN

Exposure is 1/25 @ f.6.3

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J.P.W.C. 56/D

December 7, 1942

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

JOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN PLAN FOR
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR JAPAN

Note by the Secretary

The Enclosures have been forwarded to this Committee
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for report and recommendation.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE - AOFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
WASHINGTON

December 2, 1942

Major General George V. Strong
 Military Intelligence Division G-2
 War Department General Staff
 War Department,
 Washington, D. C.

My dear General:

Last April, when I was still with the Coordinator of Information, we began together with the Political Warfare Executive of the British Government to draw up a joint Anglo-American general policy outline for psychological warfare against Japan, with the idea that the British would follow our general lead in the Pacific war on a basis of coordinated policy.

A further meeting on this plan was held in Washington on August 21st. The plan then went to London where it was approved by the Foreign Office and the British Chiefs of Staff.

I now have the honor to submit this plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval as to its integration with military policy. The plan is so general and deals with such obvious basic issues I cannot believe that it contains anything controversial. I believe that approval of this plan will facilitate the joint efforts of ourselves and the British here in the United States, in Australia and in China, where representatives of this office cooperate with both the Ministry of Information and the Political Warfare Executive.

Sincerely yours,

Robert E. Sherwood
 Director of Overseas Operations

- 1 -

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1st Ind.

CCB/da

A. C. of S., G-2, War Department, Washington, D.C., December 4,
1942. To: Secretary, Joint U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

1. Recommend that the attached general plan for
propaganda against Japan be forwarded to the Joint Psychological
Warfare Committee for a report and recommendation.

GEO. V. STRONG,
Major General, U.S.A.,
A. C. of S., G-2.

1 Attach. - General Policy
Outline.

ENCLOSURE - BSECRETJOINT ANGLO-AMERICAN GENERAL POLICY OUTLINE
FOR JAPAN AND JAPANESE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES.

1. The aims of political warfare against Japan are:-

(a) To weaken the foundations of the Japanese war machine, military, economic, political and psychological - wherever and however we can attack them.

(b) To encourage continued resistance in all territories occupied or threatened by Japan.

(c) To decrease cooperation and increase friction between Germany and Japan.

2. Specifically, propaganda into the Japanese Empire shall have the following policy goals:

(a) To interfere with Japanese military operations and to injure Japanese morals.

(b) To weaken and slow down the Japanese war effort.

(c) To discredit and overthrow the Japanese military authorities.

(d) To split Japan from her allies and neutrals.

3. OBJECTIVES:

(a) (Military) - to Aim (a).

(1) To depress and confuse Japanese armed forces wherever they are, and to create friction between Army and Navy, different loyalties, different armies, different cliques and different ranks.

(2) To maintain, stimulate and direct passive and active resistance on the part of our allies, occupied people and irregular forces at suitable times.

(3) To encourage and assist agitation and revolt in Korea, Manchuria and parts of Japanese Empire.

SECRET

(4) To create conditions real or feigned which will force the Japanese to maintain and increase the present dispersed condition of their forces.

Note: This objective can only be pursued as and when directed by military authorities.

(5) To create conditions real or feigned which will increase administrative strain on occupying forces.

Note: To objectives (2) and (3): Timing method and division of and responsibility for such operations are to be decided by continuing consultations.

(b) (Economic) - to Aim (a).

(1) To increase difficulties of exploitation by Japan of resources acquired by conquests, particularly oil.

(2) To increase the strain on Japan's external communications and transportation.

(3) To increase consumption hoarding dispersion and wastage of Japan's resources.

(4) To reduce production particularly in oil, shipbuilding and aircraft industries in and for Japan.

(5) To discourage non-Japanese workers from going to or working for Japan.

(6) To confuse and depress Japanese monetary and credit system at home and in occupied countries.

(7) To hamper or destroy Japan's economic relations with her allies and neutrals.

(8) To provoke or exploit commercial rivalry between Germany, Italy and Japan in the Far East.

SECRET(c) (Political) - to Aim (a).

Note: Important to decide, while no disagreement on matters of principle is foreseen in this group of objectives, they have to be handled in joint consultation so as to avoid taking conflicting lines. On the other hand any such divergencies may sometimes be desirable.

(1) To create amongst the people of Japan a feeling of distrust of their present regime by calling attention to its usurpation of power and its departure from "Imperial Way".

(2) To create fanatical opposition by individuals and by secret groups.

Note to (1) and (2): This theme is as delicate as it is important and requires very careful handling by methods to be determined in advance. All attacks upon the Imperial family must be avoided.

(3) To create divisions and conflicts amongst the ruling classes and different types and grades of legislative, administrative and police bodies, and within the regime in general.

(4) To create similar conditions between Central and local Governments in Japan, her possessions and occupied territories.

(5) To create similar conditions within each local Government; or alternatively, to consolidate and strengthen it when by so doing we will further the objective (4).

(6) To align popular economic and military power behind divisions aimed at in objectives (3), (4) and (5).

(7) To enlist other Allies and help remainder against Japan.

SECRET

(3) To hamper or destroy Japan's political relations with her allies and neutrals.

(9) To increase the burden on administrative machinery at home and abroad.

(d) (Psychological) - to Aim (a).

(1) To create general despondency and even terror.

(2) To create doubt about principles which guide and sustain Japan (see Political objectives (1) and note to it).

(3) To create doubt and fears about the future.

(e) (Objectives) - to Aim (b).

(1) The following objectives are presented with specific reference to China. They may have to undergo modification in order not to conflict with the propaganda objectives of the National Government of China.

a. To reassure the Chinese people of continued and maximum aid by all possible routes. This, with due consideration for Soviet relations with Japan, should stress Russia's importance as a member of United Nations and as a supply route to China.

b. To convince the Chinese people of the certainty of victory of United Nations.

c. To convince the Chinese people that Japan will be defeated within a reasonable time.

d. To convince the Chinese people that Britain and America realize as well as they do the menace of Japan.

SECRET

a. To convince the Chinese people that Britain and America recognize the military achievements of China.

(f) (Objectives) - to Aim (b).

(1) Referring to occupied peoples of Asia in general:

a. To explain Japanese tribalism as a force which rules out interests of any other people.

b. To explain shintoism and show how greatly at variance it is with religious practices in other parts of the Far East.

c. To instruct occupied peoples in the best techniques of resistance, sabotage and revolt and to prepare them to revolt at the proper time in conjunction with an Allied military offensive.

d. To convince occupied peoples that Japan will be decisively defeated within a reasonable time.

(g) (Objectives) - to Aim (c).

(1) By keeping to the fore and making tangible present and eventual conflict of interests between Japan and Germany.

(2) By creating conflict and friction over opposing racial theories and ideologies of the two peoples.

(3) By stressing all evidence of German intentions to sell-out Japan.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 52

November 9, 1942

W.D.
COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

IMPLEMENTATION AND SUPERVISION OF EXECUTION OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE PLANS

Note by the Secretary

The Enclosure, a memorandum from the Members of the Joint Security Control, dated November 6, 1942, is circulated for consideration and discussion at the Committee's next meeting.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREJOINT SECURITY CONTROL
Washington, D. C.

November 6, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE:

Subject: Actions Joint Security Control regarding
Propaganda for TORCH Operation.

1. A copy of C.C.S. 103/11, dated October 19, was received by the Senior Member, Joint Security Control, on October 22, 1942. To initiate basic planning by Office of War Information, a copy of this paper was given to Mr. Shorwood on or about October 24.

2. On October 24, a message was received from General Eisenhower directing preparation of an outline propaganda plan for South America. This plan was prepared in conjunction with OWI and Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and the draft submitted to General Eisenhower on October 26. The draft was approved with certain amendments by General Eisenhower, returned to this office, and submitted to CIAA and OWI on November 1.

3. OWI received notification from London on October 24 by Cable 24130 that eight plans were being prepared in London. These were the General French Plan, the French Working Plan, Annexes for Timing and Coordination, Italian Plan, General Plan for all Countries, Appreciation of General Plan, Spanish Plan, and Portuguese Plan. Of these, Joint Security Control received the General French Plan, the Working Plan, the Annexes for Timing and Coordination, and the Italian Plan. A cable summary of the draft Spanish and Portuguese plans was received on November 1. A cable summary of the General Plan for all Countries was received on October 30. Further information was received that the plan for propaganda to the Far East was being prepared in London but has not reached this office to date. On November 4, a message was received from London that the Appreciation of the General Plan had been cancelled.

SECRET

4. The French text for General Eisenhower's broadcast to be used following that of the President was received on November 5. The English and French texts of the joint American-British declaration was received on November 5.

5. The directive of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff on the Implementation of Psychological Warfare Plan for Italy was received on November 4.

6. On October 29 the Senior Member of Joint Security Control, submitted a memorandum to the Chief of Staff, which appears as J.C.S. 139/1. The reasons for the submission of this memorandum were as follows:

(a) The working time remaining available before D day required that some agency initiate, without delay, the necessary action with OWI and CIAA to coordinate the planning efforts prior to the scheduled broadcast on D day.

(b) The requirements for security were such that action taken be restricted to informing the minimum number of individuals of the minimum amount of information necessary for initial planning.

(c) It appeared to the undersigned that to implement and supervise the execution of the various plans would require that both the JPWC and its working committee remain practically in constant session. This would be obviously impossible due to the very limited time at the disposal of the members.

7. It will be noted that the general directive for propaganda for all countries and the draft Spanish and Portuguese plans were paraphrased and sent to OWI and CIAA as draft plans with the statement that the above plans had not been approved by the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

SECRET

8. The Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff approved the Italian plan on November 3. Had no other action been taken by JSC, the JPWC would have been required to implement the document.

9. Joint Security Control has not concerned itself with any attempted control of subversive activation or long-range planning. It has confined itself to the job of the necessary implementation and supervision of propaganda planning efforts by OWI and CIAA to insure that the necessary data is prepared and in shape to be utilized on D day.

10. It is the opinion of the undersigned that the propaganda as such is not under the positive control of the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff. The Executive Order which set up OWI and CIAA gives the directors of these agencies the sole authority under the President for planning and executing such propaganda as they deem necessary or advisable. It is not through military direction, but as the result of loyal cooperation of the directors of OWI and CIAA that the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff exercise control of these important agencies. The legal authority for this control does not exist at present.

11. Joint Security Control is entirely agreeable to withdraw from activities in connection with psychological warfare planning for TORCH except in regard to supervision of those activities relating to Security Control, as soon as the JPWC deems it desirable.

GEORGE V. STRONG,
Major General, U.S.A.
Member, Joint Security Control.

GEORGE C. DYER,
Captain, U.S.N.,
Member, Joint Security Control.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 46

COPY NO. 1

October 27, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PROPOSED CONVENTION FOR EXTRADITION
OF AXIS WAR CRIMINALS

*This paper
was sent
12/2 to Cordell
Hull.*

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, a proposal of the Office of Strategic Services, has been considered by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee and is recommended by it for approval of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

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J.P.W.C. 43/S

COPY NO. 1

November 3, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure presents the recommendations of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee as approved in its 33d meeting on November 2, 1942, and as forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE

1. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee has studied the problems involved in the letter of Sept. 5, 1942 from the Chairman of the Board of War Communications. It recommends that the Joint Staff Planners report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

(a) That the purpose for which this international broadcasting equipment is needed - propaganda - has a potentially important place in the successful prosecution of modern total war.

(b) That since the manufacturing facilities of the U. S. for this type of equipment are at present being used to the maximum in the production of equipment for direct use of combatant forces, the manufacture of the equipment requested by the Office of War Information is not warranted at present.

(c) That the Board of War Communications and the Federal Communications Commission be requested to maintain a continued scrutiny of existing broadcasting equipment to determine whether any such equipment can be made available to the Office of War Information for its purposes.

(d) That under present conditions the suggested priority for this highly critical equipment should be;

- (1) Combatant forces,
- (2) Office of Strategic Services and Office of War Information,
- (3) Maintenance of existing civilian broadcasting facilities,
- (4) Military morale activities,
- (5) Increase of existing civilian broadcast facilities.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 43/2

October 30, 1942

COPY NO. 1

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure represents the recommendations of the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee on the request of the Joint Staff Planners contained in J.P.W.C. 43.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE

1. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee has studied the problems involved in the letter of Sept. 5, 1942 from the Chairman of the Board of War Communications. It recommends that the Joint Staff Planners report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as follows:

(a) That the purpose for which this international broadcasting equipment is needed - propaganda - has a potentially important place in the successful prosecution of modern total war.

(b) That since the manufacturing facilities of the U. S. for this type of equipment are at present being used to the maximum in the production of equipment for direct use of combatant forces, the manufacture of the equipment requested by the Office of War Information is not warranted at present.

(c) That it is recommended that the Board of War Communications and the Federal Communications Commission be requested to survey the field of existing broadcasting equipment to determine whether any such equipment can be made available to the Office of War Information for its purposes.

(d) That the suggested priority for this highly critical equipment should be;

- (1) Combatant forces,
- (2) Office of Strategic Services and Office of War Information,
- (3) Maintenance of existing civilian broadcasting facilities,
- (4) Military morale activities,
- (5) Increase of existing civilian broadcast facilities.

J.P.M.C. Subcommittee

October 30, 1942

Excerpts

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF reported that he had conferred with Mr. Robert Sherwood of the O.W.I. concerning this Subcommittee's request for information on the O.W.I. needs for international broadcasting equipment. Apparently Mr. Sherwood had considered the letter from the President to Mr. E. M. Davis as an order to W.P.A. to furnish the equipment mentioned. CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF had pointed out to Mr. Sherwood that this letter did not constitute an approval by the President. He also stated his appreciation of the job which the O.W.I. must do in its valuable relation to the military effort, but indicated details of the shortage of such equipment for vital military needs. He believed that Mr. Sherwood had a fuller understanding of the Subcommittee's function and position and that he would furnish the requested information.

COMMANDER WILLEMBUCHER, for the Board of War Communications, said that the Board had made an extensive survey of all broadcasting material that had been manufactured, including equipment in storage, in process of installation, spares, stand-bys, etc. It had considered the possibility of conversion or diversion of transmitters to O.W.I. twelve standard wave transmitters which can be altered for short wave foreign broadcast. It has asked both the Army and the Navy whether these twelve transmitters will be needed for their purposes.

He confirmed the attitude of the O.W.I. regarding the letter from the President to Mr. Davis as being a mandatory requirement that the War Production Board manufacture twenty-two new transmitters for the O.W.I., but stated that his opinion was to the contrary. In this respect CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF pointed out that the information furnished to the President might have been erroneous since Commissioner Craven had indicated that a much longer time would be necessary to manufacture and install the twenty-two transmitters.

COMMANDER WILLEMBUCHER expressed the opinion that if the President understood the critical nature of the situation he would not want to divert manufacturing facilities from vital military needs to the requirements of O.W.I. He believed that if O.W.I. received the twelve transmitters, converted for short wave foreign broadcasting, it will probably alter its desire to press for new equipment in conflict with Army and Navy needs. Conversion of these twelve transmitters will undoubtedly have some effect on manufacturing facilities but much less than if new equipment were manufactured. Following discussion of the information furnished by Commander Willembucher, he left the meeting.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF suggested that the subject paper be returned to the Joint Staff Planners with the recommendation that, although it is highly desirable that communication facilities be made available to O.N.I. for propaganda purposes, it should be done only when and if the equipment can be made available without harm to the military program. LT. COL. Blakeney and LT. COL. WOOLNOUGH questioned the amount of good which is being done by U. S. short wave propaganda, pointing out that there is very little short wave receiving equipment in the Far East and that listening in Europe is perilous. COLONEL WOOLNOUGH estimated that the amount of listening to short wave broadcasts in Europe will undoubtedly decrease due to tubes, batteries and other equipment wearing out, without possibility of replacement. As against the German propaganda field of forty million citizens in the U.S., the U.S. short wave stations reach only a relatively few short wave radios in Axis controlled countries. COMMANDER KIRBY agreed in this viewpoint.

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF felt that even though the number of short wave listeners in the Far East is small, there are neutral countries such as Spain, Portugal and Latin America to be serviced, and that our propaganda machinery must be properly implemented.

LT. COL. BLAKENEY suggested an order of priority for delivery of radio equipment.

After discussion,

THE RECOMMENDATION:

(a) Agreed to recommend to the J.P.W.C. that the subject paper be returned to the Joint Staff Planners with the following recommendations:

(1) That the process for which this international broadcasting equipment is needed - propaganda has a potentially important place in the successful prosecution of modern total war.

(2) That since the manufacturing facilities of the U.S. for this type of equipment are at present being used to the maximum in the production of equipment for direct use of combatant forces, the manufacture of the new equipment requested by the Office of War Information is not warranted at present.

(3) That it is recommended that the Board of War Communications and the Federal Communications Commission be requested to survey the field of existing broadcasting equipment to determine whether any such equipment can be made available to the Office of War Information for its purposes.

(4) That the suggested priority for this highly critical equipment should be;

- a. Combatant forces
- b. Office of Strategic Services and Office of War Information
- c. Maintenance of existing civilian broadcasting facilities
- d. Military morale activities
- e. Increase of existing civilian broadcast facilities.

(5) Directed the Secretary to transmit these recommendations to the next meeting of the JPWC

JPWC Subcommittee

October 28, 1942

Excerpts

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

A memorandum from Commissioner Crane which included a copy of a memorandum from the President to O.W.I. and C.I.A.A. was noted and discussed. It was reported that the O.W.I. has sent no information in answer to the Subcommittee's request for its plans on proposed facilities for international broadcasting.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE

Agreed to defer action on this subject until the requested information is received from the Office of War Information.

SECRET
TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

CONF NO. 1

TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

The following information, furnished by Commissioner
T. A. E. Green, Federal Communications Commission, is fur-
nished for consideration and record.

A. E. Green,
Secretary.

• • • • •
(CONF)

TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

CONF NO. 1000.

TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

I am enclosing herewith copy of letter from the President,
dated October 10, 1940, regarding letter I referred to in my
previous communication with you previously.

Very truly yours,

A. E. Green
Secretary

CONF NO. 1000

• • • • •
TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

CONF NO. 1000

TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

TOP SECRET
NOFORN
NOEYES

SECRET

SECRET

I am advised that the War Production Board is in a position to extend such priority ratings on materials and capacity as will, so far as conditions can now be anticipated, make possible the initial deliveries in three months from the receipt of your applications and for the completion of the order within approximately six months hereafter.

Sincerely,

(Signed) FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

ARTC Subcommittee

October 27, 1942

Excerpts

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

Attention of the Committee was drawn to Commissioner Brown's memorandum of October 21, 1942 and his telephonic message complementing that information; also to Mr. Sherwood's call regarding information to be furnished by O.W.I. The action of the Joint Communications Board on the O.S.D. request for communications facilities was also considered.

MAJOR BOGART pointed out that this matter appears to be tied in to the Directive from the Chief of Staff pertaining to the functions of the G.S.S. and that probably the needs of G.S.S. for communications equipment will be determined by the report of the Sonder Committee.

THE

Test note that further information will be furnished by the O.E.I. and Commissioner Curran on this subject.

[Faint handwritten notes and markings are visible across the page.]

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 43/1

October 24, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

RADIO EQUIPMENT FOR OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure presents a memorandum from the Army and Navy Munitions Board pertaining to applications of the Office of War Information for the assignment of AA-1 preference ratings for the construction of certain radio broadcasting stations and the procurement of transmitting equipment.

This request was referred by the Army and Navy Munitions Board to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for determination of the relative military necessity for such preference ratings. In turn it has been referred to this Committee for a report and recommendations, including a statement from the Joint U. S. Communications Board with its recommendations.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURE

ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD
MUNITIONS BUILDING
Washington, D.C.

October 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT U. S. CHIEFS OF STAFF

Subject: Priorities, Office of War Information

1. The Office of War Information has made application to the Army and Navy Munitions Board for authority to assign AA-1 preference ratings to the inclosed four applications applying to the construction of radio broadcasting stations and the procurement of transmitting equipment. These applications represent a total value of \$2,060,000.00 of which \$1,500,000.00 is for critical materials. (Note by Secretary: These are summarized in Appendix A)

2. Information available to the Army and Navy Munitions Board establishes the fact that the Office of War Information will have to have AA-1 preference ratings to obtain the materials. Assigning AA-1 preference ratings to the applications will put them directly in competition with Army and Navy procurement for the same type of equipment as the radio industry is overloaded with direct Army and Navy orders.

3. Insufficient information has been supplied by the Office of War Information to enable the Army and Navy Munitions Board to evaluate the military urgency of the projects for which the applications are made. The Office of War Information has stated that such documentary support as there is for these projects is of such secret nature that it cannot be revealed.

SECRET

4. Because of this situation, the Army and Navy Munitions Board is forced to refer the applications to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for determination of the relative military necessity so preference ratings can be assigned accordingly.

For the Army and Navy Munitions Board:

/s/ Theron D. Weaver
THERON D. WEAVER
Brigadier General, G.S.C.

/s/ T. J. Keleher
T. J. KELEHER
Rear Admiral, USN

Incl.

4 applications, Form PD-200
O.W.I.

SECRETAPPENDIX AO.W.I. PROJECTS SUBMITTED TO ARMY AND NAVY MUNITIONS BOARD

Application No. 36728, dated October 5, 1942.

Project: Seven radio transmitters for international service, to be located within Continental United States; definite location to be determined. These are required "to provide information to the occupied territories and the Axis countries for the purpose of presenting the United States objectives in the war, as well as the truth regarding news of the day".

Cost: Exclusive of site \$1,700,000.00
Cost of critical materials. \$1,052,100.00

Application No. 36732, dated October 5, 1942.

Project: Furnishing component parts for transmitters which are to be assembled on unstated locations in China. Because of transportation difficulties, any articles of great weight, such as assembled transmitters, can not be shipped to China. This project "is a part of the overall program of the O.W.I. to provide information to the occupied territories and the Axis countries as indicated above. No facilities are available in the area which would produce any service like the one proposed."

Cost: Total cost of project \$30,000.00
Cost of critical materials. \$27,200.00

Application No. 36771, dated October 5, 1942.

Project: Two radio transmitters, two buildings and accessory equipment, to be installed in foreign locations which are not yet definitely determined. The purposes

SECRET

are as stated above in the previous two applications.
No equivalent facilities are available in the areas mentioned.

Cost: Total cost of project \$300,000.00
(Exclusive of site)
Cost of critical materials. . . . \$275,455.00

Application No. 36776, dated October 5, 1942.

Project: Three radio transmitters for programming Alaska,
to be erected at locations not yet determined.
Standard frequencies will be used in these stations
for the purpose of providing service for troop
morale building and news for Alaska. Existing
Buildings are to be used. There are no facilities
available which would give service to the area it
is proposed to serve.

Costs: Total cost of project \$30,000.00
Cost of critical materials. . . . \$10,599.00

SECRET
U.S.S.R. 4th Edition

COPY NO. 1

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: U.S.S.R. 4th Edition
Reference: U.S.S.R. 3rd Edition, 1942, 1943, 1944

Major J. E. Hickey **Capt. H. E. Crosskey, USA**
Major J. E. Hickey **1st. Cdr. Chas. Moran**
Mr. J. C. Rogers
Assistant T. A. E. Green, P.O.O.
Major L. W. Lamm, C.S.S.

1. **U.S.S.R. 4th Edition, 1944**
 (Ref. - U.S.S.R. 3rd Edition, 1943)
 The U.S.S.R. 4th Edition is a preliminary statement of the results of the work done by the U.S.S.R. 4th Edition Committee. The Committee was directed, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a study of the U.S.S.R. 4th Edition, and to submit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee has completed its study, and has submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report contains a number of recommendations, which are being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S.S.R. 4th Edition is a preliminary statement of the results of the work done by the U.S.S.R. 4th Edition Committee. The Committee was directed, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a study of the U.S.S.R. 4th Edition, and to submit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee has completed its study, and has submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report contains a number of recommendations, which are being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The U.S.S.R. 4th Edition is a preliminary statement of the results of the work done by the U.S.S.R. 4th Edition Committee. The Committee was directed, by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to conduct a study of the U.S.S.R. 4th Edition, and to submit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Committee has completed its study, and has submitted a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The report contains a number of recommendations, which are being considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

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SECRET

A report of the number of transmitters operating in other parts of the United Nations was given as follows:

British Isles	- - - - -	18
(on order	- - - - -	18)
British Empire	- - - - -	19
(Australia	- - - - -	4)
(Canada	- - - - -	2)
(India	- - - - -	3)
(South Africa	- - - - -	2)

The questions of the Committee regarding the locations for the proposed 22 new short wave transmitters were made with the idea of conserving plant, personnel and power facilities, inasmuch as it would be possible to use some of the present plants and personnel to service newly installed transmitters. Feasibility to attack was also considered but since there is already satisfactory dispersion of most of the large stations, this point was not regarded as vitally important. One hundred per cent dispersion would be economically costly. Location was also sought with the purpose of obtaining good radio bands to South America and to the Far East and in order to avoid polar regions.

After Mr. Green had left the meeting the Subcommittee discussed the information which it had received. It was the general opinion that there was insufficient information regarding the present facilities of C.N.I. and its future plans for acquiring and using international broadcasting facilities.

THE SECRETARY'S ACTION:

Directed the Secretary to communicate with Mr. Henry Davis, Director of the C.N.I. and request a full report on (1) what international broadcasting facilities are now being used, (2) what facilities are on order, (3) the dispositions and uses intended.

Lt. Col. A. E. Gorthank,
Secretary.

October 19, 1942

JPC

Encryps

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

GENERAL WINTERROWD explained that this paper had been referred to this Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because they desired advice on the effect of such a broadcasting program from the point of view of psychological warfare. **GENERAL WINTERROWD** pointed out that the international broadcasting program might well affect the whole basis of this Committee's work.

THE COMMITTEE:

Took note that the proposal is under study by the Subcommittee.

October 19, 1942

JWC

Encrypts

CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

GENERAL WHEATLEY explained that this paper had been referred to this Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff because they desired advice on the effect of such a broadcasting program from the point of view of psychological warfare. **GENERAL DONOVAN** pointed out that the international broadcasting program might well effect the whole basis of this Committee's work.

THE COMMITTEE:

Task note that the proposal is under study by the Subcommittee.

JPWC Subcommittee

October 16, 1942

Encrypted

CRITICAL PRINCIPLES FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

In view of the fact that only three members of the Subcommittee were present,

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:

Deferred action on this paper until its next meeting.

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 43October 14, 1942COPY NO. 1JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEECRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTINGNote by the Secretary

The enclosures (J.C.S. 125) have been referred to this Committee by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for study and the submission of appropriate recommendations.

Enclosure A is a request from the Chairman, Board of War Communications, for comments and recommendations on a proposal to increase facilities for international broadcasting. It was referred to the Joint Communications Board, whose recommendations appear in Enclosure B.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRET**ENCLOSURE A**

September 5, 1942

Combined Chiefs of Staff
 Public Health Building
 1901 Constitution Avenue
 Washington, D. C.

Gentlemen

The attached report of the Interdepartmental Committee for International Radiobroadcasting Facilities has been approved in principle by the Board of War Communications. However, before the Board takes any action with respect to approval of the plan in its entirety, it is desired to obtain additional information from other interested agencies.

The Board of War Communications views this plan very favorably and desires to assist in every way possible to improve our international broadcast facilities. In this connection, you will note that only fourteen international broadcast transmitters are being used by this country while the Axis' psychological warfare efforts are carried on with at least sixty-eight transmitters. The Committee also reports that, according to reliable intelligence information, Germany plans to place twenty additional 500 kw transmitters in operation prior to December 1, 1942.

Inasmuch as this program requires the use of critical materials which are needed by the Army and Navy, the Board of War Communications has requested the War Production Board to consider the matter jointly with the Army and Navy Munitions Board to determine its practicability from a production viewpoint and advise the Board of the estimated period of time required to bring it to fruition. In addition, the Board desires the comments and recommendations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, particularly from the standpoint of use of critical materials and the possibility of eliminating any duplication of effort in the transmission of United Nations programs in the Allied cause.

Sincerely yours

/s/ James Lawrence Fly
 Chairman

Attachment

SECRET

REPORT OF INTERDEPARTMENTAL PLANNING COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL RADIOBROADCASTING FACILITIES

This Interdepartmental Planning Committee was organized pursuant to the recommendation contained in the joint letter dated July 15, 1942, from the Director Office of War Information, and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, which letter was approved by the Board of War Communications on July 23, 1942.

The specific task assigned to this Interdepartmental Committee is to recommend an efficient and adequate organization of short wave broadcasting facilities, designed to enable the United States to counteract effectively the psychological warfare being waged by our enemies against this and other countries of the world.

The Axis' psychological warfare efforts are directed to all parts of the world. Germany has long implemented this warfare with at least 60 short wave transmitters and reliable intelligence information indicates her plans to place 20 additional 200 kilowatt transmitters in operation prior to December 1, 1942. This large number of transmitters not only enables Germany to accommodate its propaganda but also to interfere deliberately with short wave broadcasts emanating from the United Nations. The short wave transmitters, operating within Japan and Italy when added to those in Germany and those captured in conquered territories, swell the total to more than 100 transmitters which are available to carry the "Voice" of the Axis.

Such a wealth of transmitters permits multi frequency transmission of programs to all areas of the world from each of the Axis sources, thereby assuring listeners dependable reception at all times on at least one, and in most cases more than one frequency. Such multi frequency coverage has been known to utilize 20 frequencies for transmission to a single region. Germany regularly uses 16 frequencies for its broadcasts to the Americas alone.

The Committee has agreed unanimously that the minimum radio requirements for the successful conduct of psychological warfare by the United States is 24-hour radio program service to all parts of the world at their principal listening times by means of facilities capable of producing clear reception by the listeners in all foreign countries. The Committee has therefore agreed upon the program service and organization of facilities set forth in Appendix A attached hereto.

The Committee has likewise recognized the essential role short wave radio programs play in sustaining the morale of our armed forces in the field. Such a service is in addition to the services planned for purposes of psychological warfare. In part, these programs would be transmitted during the program services indicated in Appendix A, while additional time would be available for extending this service without increasing the transmitting facilities there shown.

At present the United States has available only 14 international broadcast transmitters to serve the entire world, as follows: two 100 kw transmitters, one 75 kw, eight 50 kw, one 30 kw, one 15 kw and one 7 kw. It is obvious that these facil-

SECRET

ities available to the United States is woefully inadequate in every respect to meet the requirements of successful operation in psychological warfare by the United States.

The plans laid by the Committee to meet these requirements are faced by the realities of the existing situation with respect to shortage of critical materials, shortage of man power, shortage of time, and the difficulties inherent in establishing a completely new organization within the Government. The Committee would, therefore, make immediate use, in the most practical manner, of existing short wave radio broadcasting facilities as well as the organization of the licensees now operating such facilities. But the Committee considered it likewise essential to increase these facilities as rapidly as possible and so far as necessary to render the desired program service.

These proposals are set forth as a plan based upon the following principles:

- (1) The use of all the time of existing and future short wave broadcast transmitters by the Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, in accordance with program schedules mutually agreeable.
- (2) The purchase, from existing licensees, of 24-hour operation and maintenance service for all the transmitters.
- (3) The contracting for program production as needed, in accord with the specifications of the Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.
- (4) The purchase by the Government of the additional transmitters required; and the contracting with station licensees for the installation and maintenance thereof at existing locations, as specified. These transmitters will remain Government property but options may be given to interested licensees to purchase such transmitters at a fair price from the Government after the war.
- (5) The negotiation for improvements by licensees of existing facilities as required.
- (6) The licensing by the Federal Communications Commission of existing licensees to operate the facilities in accordance with the plan.
- (7) The pooling and coordination of all international broadcasting frequencies to provide an integral system, functioning as a single unit instead of as individual stations.
- (8) Pending consummation of the plan, the Board of War Communications to allocate for international broadcast use all available operating facilities in other services. (See Appendix C)

To carry out this plan the following are required: construction and installation of 22 new transmitters at a cost of \$4,400,000; installation of 21 new antennas at a cost of \$910,000; modification of existing equipment at a cost of \$300,000; additional housing at a cost of \$300,000; making an estimated total cost of \$5,910,000.

SECRET

It is proposed to use the 36 transmitters (14 existing transmitters and 22 new transmitters) in accordance with Appendix B. This, of course, is subject to change, in details but not in principle, depending on the negotiations with the participating companies. However, this proposal provides for 14 transmitters in the west distributed between San Francisco and Los Angeles and 22 transmitters in the east distributed among Boston, Schenectady, New York and Cincinnati. In the absence of actual experience under this plan the estimated cost of operating and maintaining these facilities, exclusive of programming, is \$4,320,000 per year.

The plan utilizes to the maximum the frequencies now available for assignment to international broadcast stations in the United States. However, the following additional frequencies are absolutely essential to carrying forward the full program of operation: one 6 mc, seven 7 mc, three 9 mc and six 11 mc frequencies (See Appendix B for frequency assignment).

The following specific steps are required to place the plan into effect:

- (1) The Board of War Communications to approve the plan in principle making available the additional frequencies required for this service.
- (2) The Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs to secure the appropriation and to allocate funds for the purchase and installation of new equipment and for modifications of existing equipment in accordance with the recommendations contained herein.
- (3) The Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs to negotiate and pay for the services to operate the facilities in accordance with the plan and have participating companies submit appropriate applications to the Federal Communications Commission.
- (4) The Federal Communications Commission to issue licenses and construction permits in accordance with the plan.
- (5) The War Production Board and the Army and Navy Munitions Board to accord priority for the necessary construction and materials.

/s/ T. A. M. Craven

T. A. M. Craven, Representing
Board of War Communications and
Federal Communications Commission.

/s/ Elmer Davis

Elmer Davis, Director Office of
War Information.

/s/ Nelson A. Rockefeller

Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator
of Inter-American Affairs

U. S. SECRETAPPENDIX "B"

<u>Location 1/</u>	<u>Trans-mitter 2/</u>	<u>Power</u>	<u>Frequencies to be used primarily 3/ 4/</u>
Station #1 Boston	<u>#1</u>	50kw	6140, 7C, 9570 kc
Station #2 Boston	<u>#2</u>	50 or 100kw*	7C, 9570, 11870 kc
	<u>#3</u>	50kw	6040, 11790 kc
	<u>#4</u>	50 or 100kw**	7230, 7D, 15130 kc
* Now 7kw			
** Now 20kw			
Station #3 Schenectady	<u>#5</u>	50kw	6190, 9530, 11847.5, 11870 kc
	<u>#6</u>	50 or 100kw	7000, 11847.5, 15130, 15330 kc
	<u>#7</u>	100kw	9570, 9590, 11847.5, 11E kc
	<u>#8</u>	50 or 100kw	11870, 15250, 15330 kc
Station #4 New York	<u>#9</u>	50kw	6120, 9480, 15270 kc
	<u>#10</u>	50 or 100kw	7A, 11830, 17830 kc
	<u>#11</u> ***	50kw	6170, 7B, 9590, 9A, 11B kc
	<u>#12</u>	50 or 100kw	7000, 7G, 9A, 11780, 11E, 15270 kc
	<u>#13</u>	50kw	6170, 7250, 9480, 11830, 11D, 15250 kc
	<u>#14</u>	50 or 100kw	7250, 9480, 9650, 11830, 15270, 17780 kc

✓ Locations within the east coast and west coast areas may vary from those shown as determined by negotiations and other controlling factors.

✓ Those underlined are now available.

✓ The frequencies specified are those which will be used principally by the station indicated. However, all frequencies will be pooled and available for assignment to each station as necessary to carry out the plan.

✓ The symbols 7C, 7D, 11E, etc. refer to new frequencies required, for example, 7C means the third new frequency required in the 7 megacycle band.

U. S. SECRET

<u>Location 1/</u>	<u>Trans-mitter 2/</u>	<u>Power</u>	<u>Frequencies to be used primarily 3/ 4/</u>
Station #5 New York	#15	50kw	6060, 9650, 11780 kc
	#16	50 or 100kw	7250, 11710, 11780, 15190 kc
	#17	50kw	6100, 7B, 9670 kc
	#18	50 or 100kw	7B, 9670, 11890 kc
	#19	50 or 100kw	6A, 9700, 11C kc
	#20	50 or 100kw	7F, 11C, 15150 kc
Station #6 Cincinnati	#21	75kw	6080, 9590 kc
	#22	75kw	7E, 11710 kc
Station #7 San Francisco	#23	100kw	6060, 6080, 9550, 9A, 11A kc
	#24	50 or 100kw	7000, 7B, 11A, 15290 kc
Station #8 San Francisco	#25	50 or 100kw	6100, 7D, 9B, 11780 kc
	#26	50 or 100kw	7D, 9B, 11B, 11F, 15190 kc
	#27	50kw	6190, 9550, 11730 kc
	#28	50 or 100kw	7250, 11730, 15210 kc
	#29	50 or 100kw	6060, 6080, 9570, 11710, 11790, 11D kc
	#30	50 or 100kw	7F, 11870, 15210, 15290 kc
Station #9 Los Angeles	#31	50 or 100kw	5985 kc
	#32	50 or 100kw	7230 kc
	#33	50 or 100kw	6040, 7A, 7E, 9530, 11790 kc
Station #10 Los Angeles	#34	50 or 100kw	7E, 9530, 9590, 11790 15290 kc
	#35	50 or 100kw	5985, 6040, 7000, 7G, 6A, 11A, 15150 kc
	#36	50 or 100kw	7D, 7G, 9590, 9C 15290, 17760 kc

SECRETAPPENDIX "C"

The Committee realizes that the procurement of the 22 additional transmitters and antennas necessary to bring the plan shown in Appendix A to full fruition will take a long time. As an interim measure designed to make possible immediately a broadcasting service more adequate than that which is possible with the existing 14 international stations, though short of the goal stated in Appendix A, the Committee requests that the Board of War Communications allocate to the exclusive use of the Office of War Information and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs such existing transmitting facilities of 10 kilowatt or more power, now idle or used only occasionally for other international services than broadcasting, as the Board of War Communications considers could be so allocated without serious impairment of such services.

At present six commercial communication radio telephone transmitters are under contract. The frequencies in use are those assigned to point-to-point program transmission service. Recently three of these frequencies were reassigned and effective September 1, 1942 it will be necessary to discontinue a portion of this service unless frequencies can be supplied.

As further commercial radio telephone service is curtailed for any reason and thus additional short wave radio telephone facilities become idle, it is requested that such facilities be assigned to the conduct of psychological warfare.

SECRETENCLOSURE B

6 October 1942

JOINT U.S. CHIEFS OF STAFFCRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

The Joint Communications Board has studied the matter of the use of critical materials for international broadcasting, including the letter from Mr. James Lawrence Fly, Chairman of the Board of War Communications, dated 5 September 1942, together with its enclosure (Report of the Interdepartmental Committee for International Radiobroadcasting Facilities).

The J.C.B. has found that there is a grave shortage of critical materials for military, naval and aircraft radio and radar equipment. Any diversion of such material for the manufacture of apparatus to be used in international broadcasting would prevent the manufacture of equipment which is sorely needed for combat use.

The Joint Communications Board believes that critical materials should be used only for critical equipment and that the military efforts of the armed forces will be impeded by the diversion of authority is given for the procurement of the radio equipment specified in Appendix "B" to the Report of the Interdepartmental Committee.

/s/ G. B. MYERS

October 13, 1942

J P V C
Emergency**CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTS**

GENERAL HEDENBERG brought to the attention of the Committee a proposal of the Joint Communications Board which involved a program for providing radio stations to combat Axis propaganda to allied and neutral countries. It appeared that a negative recommendation had been made by the Board because of a shortage of critical materials needed for such stations. It is suggested that this matter involved subjects in which the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee is interested and upon which it is recommended are needed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

THE RECOMMENDATION

It is noted that General Hedemeyer would request that this subject be referred by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for study and recommendations.

SECRET

J.P.W.C. 41

COPY NO. 1

October 2, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

REGULATION OF PUBLICITY
RE GERMAN REPORTS OF SHIP SINKINGS

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure represents a proposal on this subject which the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee recommends be forwarded to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff for approval.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREREGULATION OF PUBLICITY RE GERMAN REPORTS OF SHIP SINKINGSBACKGROUND:

1. Publication by U. S. newspapers of German radio propaganda has had harmful results. The most recent instance of U. S. newspapers announcing in bold headlines the German radio claims of the sinking of three U. S. transports with loss of thirteen thousand soldiers is perhaps the most flagrant example.
 2. Because of the special vulnerability of the American mind to the influence of newspaper headlines, a particularly dangerous condition in home-front morale is raised by the publication of unconfirmed Axis-originated reports concerning ship-sinkings, especially troop transports.
 3. The policy of the U. S. Navy Department is to withhold the announcement of the sinking of naval ships until such time as (a) the next of kin have been notified, and (b) the military significance of the sinking has been lost.
 4. Regulation of the publication of Axis radio reports in U. S. newspapers is made difficult because of the people who listen to Axis broadcasts and who would notice the suppression of such reports. It may be possible, however, for the Office of War Information to obtain greater voluntary cooperation from the press in "playing-down" such announcements. It is believed that the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would materially assist the Office of War Information to accomplish that objective.
- REGULATION:
5. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff request the Office of War Information and the Chief Censor to secure from the U. S. press, including the news services, added cooperation in decreasing the importance given to publication of Axis reports of ship sinkings, especially of ships transporting troops.

JPEG Subcommittee Minutes

September 15, 1942

Excerpts

PUBLICATION OF COMPLETE CASUALTY LISTS

LT. COL. BLAKENEY stated that no report has yet been received from the public opinion services which were to execute a canvass on this subject.

**EXCERPTS FROM
JPMC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES**

August 26, 1942

PUBLICATION OF COMPLETE CASUALTY LISTS

MR. TAYLOR stated that it was the opinion of various members of the O.S.S. that the study of this question should be prepared there and, if approved by the J.P.W.C., the Office of War Information should be requested to make a determination on the publication of complete casualty lists. COLONEL DONOVAN suggested that it might be preferable to send the proposal to the Joint Chiefs of Staff who, if they approved, would refer the matter directly to O.W.I. He also suggested that facilities of the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S. be used for the initial investigation of the attitude of the publication.

LT. COL. BLAKENY emphasized the desirability of an initial investigation into public opinion as a guide to the Subcommittee in drafting a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and indicated that a report could be made in about a week.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE:-

Requested COLONEL BLAKENY to initiate the survey of public opinion as to the effect of publication of complete casualty lists, and to report its findings in about a week.

August 26, 1942.

Subject: To determine the influence of war casualties upon public morale.

1. Four samples should be used for investigating the problem. Two of the samples should be taken from communities where casualties are publicly known to be high. Two other comparable independent samples should be taken from communities where casualties are unknown or small.
2. Public opinion questions previously used by the Office of Public Opinion Research in estimating public morale should be used with all four samples.
3. Results should be computed independently for each sample. If public knowledge of casualties tends to depress morale, communities with large casualties should tend to have lower morale than communities with unknown or few casualties. On the other hand, if knowledge of casualties tends to raise public morale, communities with large casualties should tend to have higher morale than the communities where the casualties are few.
4. The purpose of using four independent samples instead of two is to provide a check on the reliability of the obtained results.
5. Samples should be taken in small communities, -- if casualty lists have not been widely public, -- since news of casualties will tend to be more widespread in a small community.
6. If at all possible, the sample should be taken from communities where the public opinion morale questions have been polled earlier. Results obtained at the present time could then be checked against those earlier figures. This would provide an additional estimate of the influence of casualties on public morale.

REPORT FROM
SFC. [illegible]

August 24, 1962

REMARKS BY SENATOR CARROLL L. LEE

SENATOR LEE reported the result of CARROLL LEE's investigation which indicated that the Counter-Intelligence Program of the U.S. has an obligation to provide complete facts with accurate information. It was stated also that it was proposed to give a list of public opinion through certain specific channels.

SENATOR LEE expressed the belief that it would be preferable to publish some and some of the data in an instant action.

THE COMMITTEE:

Text note that the C.I.P. will provide a report on this subject to the subcommittee.

POSSIBLE COURSE:

*British-American
Relations* *File*

I. To allow publicity to run its course with no intervention.

- Advantages:**
- (1) Avoids any possible criticism of governmental suppression of free press.
 - (2) Avoids the effort and possible difficulties latent in any organized plan.
 - (3) May stimulate public anger over the war by capturing news attention.
 - (4) Avoids public suspicion of any official compilation (e.g. Bryce Reports).

- Disadvantages:**
- (1) The movement will certainly be overdone and probably get a reaction from seober sources.
 - (2) Confusion will certainly cloud the public impressions.
 - (3) Military information less effectively collected.

II. Encouraging some private agency holding public confidence to interview the travelers and issue a report (e.g. The Carnegie Peace Foundation, The Association of American Universities, The American Bar Association, The Council of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Policy Association, The Red Cross).

- Advantages:**
- (1) Avoids charge of political motives.
 - (2) Some dignity.
 - (3) Probability of just and free conclusions.

- Disadvantages:**
- (1) No compulsion or legal control possible.
 - (2) Committee slow and doubtful of organization.
 - (3) Committee would have no access to quantities of interview material already available in C.I.A. etc., from earlier travelers.
 - (4) Results unpredictable.
 - (5) Personnel of committee depends on volunteer motives and probably inferior.
 - (6) No cash administered.

(7) Weak control over quotations and protection of persons interviewed.

(8) Military information must be separately covered.

III. Appointment by Presidential, Cabinet or Staff action of a Commission with compulsory power to swear, record and publish testimony, by holding all Gripsholm passengers until interviewed under oath, with duty to include previous official material and issue a matured report.

Advantages: (1) Simplicity and relative speed.
(2) Compulsion and oath available.
(3) Dignity.
(4) Government assumes its duties to inform public.
(5) Military information easily gathered and segregated.

Disadvantages: (1) Suspicion of any governmental intervention in news.
(2) Suspicion of official freedom. (e.g. "Another Pearl Harbor Report," "Another Wickersham Report," unknown outcome of same technique in the Rubber Inquiry and its consequences on opinion)
(3) Some delay in organizing a committee.
(4) Resentment of interference by returning journalists, officials and private citizens.
(5) Delay while report is prepared and loss of public attention while journalists and others wear out topic.
(6) Procedure shopworn.

IV. Appointment of Military Commission to interview and report for the General, for example, one active General, one retired, and an O.S.S. member acquainted with the Orient, or an O.S.S. group.

Advantages: (1) Speed and simplicity.
(2) Probability of getting all military material.

(3) Permits determination later of policy on publicity, as for example, allowing OWI or a civilian group access to accumulated material with authority to digest and publish.

(4) Full compulsory powers.

(5) Access to earlier interview sources.

(6) Freedom from interference.

Disadvantages: (1) Probably inefficient on public relations needs.

(2) Suspicion of military censorship.

(3) Suspicion of military propaganda.

(4) Attracts criticism of our Army and Navy for too much intervention in civil affairs

V. Authorizing OWI to collect interviews, to use compulsory powers and to publish report.

Advantages: (1) Official compulsion and oath available.

(2) Special skills available for interviewing and estimating news values.

(3) Considerable control.

(4) Speed and ease.

(5) Could be given access to earlier interviews, etc.

Disadvantages: (1) Suspicion of propaganda especially marked in public mind.

(2) Possibly miss military information.

(3) No confidence in this agency abroad.

(4) Probable professional resistance by journalists.

(5) Possible lack of candor among civilians.

(6) Close daily involvement of OWI with press is an embarrassment to its independence.

VI. Authorizing State Department to cover matter with a Board organized by the Secretary.

Advantages: (1) Speedy and easy.

(2) Could be given compulsory and oath authority.

- (3) More public confidence in State than in most government agencies.
- (4) Department is acquainted with many official needs for information, and
- (5) Partly acquainted with military needs.
- (6) Dignity.
- (7) Complete control from Administration.
- (8) Access to earlier material on Jap acts.
- (9) Expert knowledge of Far East.

Disadvantages:

- (1) Public suspicion about any official or bureau authority.
- (2) Department is considered formal by press.
- (3) Probably have to be supplemented for military purposes and D.R.W. and C.W.I. might even insist on duplicating work.
- (4) Probably not as efficient as public representatives or newspaper men in public relation aspects.

VII. **Commission Policy** to endeavor to secure best features of all three courses, by having Administration (President or Secretary of War) appoint a Chairman with compulsory powers and asking two private organizations to appoint two other members. Meanwhile allowing individuals arriving to publish and say what they please, after making a sworn statement to the Commission. Outside agencies requested to appoint a member might be selected among the President of National Academy of Sciences, of American Bar Association, of American Medical Association, of Associated Press, of Council of Foreign Affairs or Foreign Policy Association, U. S. Chamber of Commerce, National Grange, American Federation of Labor.

Advantages:

- (1) Compulsory Powers and Oath.
- (2) Access to official earlier information.
- (3) Assurance of free action.
- (4) Actuality of some control.
- (5) Speed.
- (6) Public interest in novel procedure.

-6-

- (7) Minimise irritation of journalists and travelers returning.
- (8) Dignity, clearing confusion, asks public reservation of opinion, etc., as in alternative C.
- (9) Permits of gathering military information along with public and segregating it.

Disadvantages (add)
RECOMMENDATION:

- (a) That some measure be adopted at once before arrival of the ship; that the Commission board the ship with enough interviewers (e.g. one civil, one military member and a stenographer in each team) to cover minor passengers while Commission covers major; that it be given compulsory power to hold all passengers until sworn and interviewed, that it then release them with no restrictions except the normal censorship; that it segregate military information and publish in a week or two a factual report on the outrage evidence.
- (b) That the combination plan (VII) is best.

EXCERPT FROM
JPWC MINUTES

September 7, 1942

FRICTION BETWEEN U. S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES

The recommendations of this paper were reconsidered and several changes made.

ADMIRAL TRAIN suggested that there might be need of a recommendation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on relations among the armed forces of all the Allied Nations.

GENERAL STRONG stated that it might soon be necessary to recommend legislation to prosecute American citizens who, under the protection of constitutional privileges, are sabotaging the war effort. COLONEL DONOVAN expressed the belief that present legislation is sufficiently broad for this purpose but that the real difficulties are found in actualizing prosecuting officers and in the policies which govern them. He suggested that a study of this situation be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee under whatever directive GENERAL STRONG desired to submit.

THE COMMITTEE

- a. Took note that GENERAL STRONG will submit a memorandum to the JPWSC outlining a study to be made of desired action to affect prosecution of citizens and elements who are sabotaging the war effort.
- b. Approved the basic paper with certain amendments.
- c. Directed the Secretary to transmit this paper, as amended, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff through the Joint Staff Planners.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 35/3d Draft

September 7, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

FRICTION BETWEEN U. S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES

Note by the Secretary.

The enclosure represents the final draft of this discussion and recommendations as approved by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee on September 7, 1942. It is transmitted for information and record.

A. H. Onthank
Secretary

SECRETENCLOSURESITUATION:

1. Friction is developing in contacts between British and American armed forces and between members of the armed forces and the civilian population, both here and in England. Critical or hostile attitudes toward the British have been noted on a large scale among members of the American armed forces, particularly the Navy and Marines, and these attitudes seem most pronounced among officers. Expressions of such critical or hostile attitudes by members of the American armed forces are frequent. Anti-American sentiments among members of British armed forces and British civilians in contact with American forces are less frequently noted, but there is a growing British sensitivity to American criticisms, both in England and among British civilians and members of the armed forces stationed in this country. The increasing friction is revealed in numerous but so far inconsequential clashes in resorts, trains and in ports here and abroad, and by currents of gossip, anecdotes and epithets. This friction is not yet serious, though it is much more marked than in World War I and is already causing some anxiety to American Commanders abroad. It may, unless controlled, impede the war effort.

SOURCE:

2. The Committee has studied a variety of sources of information including official military digests of field reports on Anglo-American relations in World War I from the War College, confidential reports from British Government sources, a survey of the four chief British newspapers through July and August, tabulation of some intercepts by British and American sources, a survey of the attitudes of the American civilian population from the Bureau of Intelligence, OWI, and some personnel questionnaires tabulations from the Special Service Branch, War Department. These sources indicate some anxiety in British official circles and in our Command. Very little editorial

SECRET

comment in British metropolitan papers. Considerable talk of incidents on American trains, in resorts and seaports. Of American boys in an army air technical school, quizzed officially after six months' service, 20% say the war is fought to defend the British Empire, as against about 67% who disagree.

3. Friction in England, still not serious, hinges on American high pay, some American swagger and belittling of British effort, and the negro troops whose acceptance by the British disturbs white American sensibilities. Censorship experience, while still small, shows in Northern Ireland considerable reciprocal antagonism, in Australia antagonism with British, friendliness toward Australia. Questionnaires of new recruits in American camps show English "liked" next to Australians, ranked below Russians and Germans in "military strength", below Australians, Germans and Russians as "fighters", and evenly divided on whether England is doing her full share. American civilian opinion shows 1/2 to 2/3 satisfied that the British are doing all they can to win the war, about 1/3 contrary and 10% uninformed, the figures varying with periods of British military success.

4. PRIMARY FACTORS:

a. Anti-British sentiments of American soldiers and sailors derived from general civilian attitudes long existent in this country and strengthened by the British military defeats in Singapore, Burma, Libya, etc.

b. Failure of American officers, soldiers and sailors to refrain from expressing anti-British sentiments owing to a number of causes, including the following:

(1) Failure to realize the extreme sensitivity of the British to American criticism at this moment.

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(2) Failure to realize the importance of maintaining good feeling among allies as a factor in the war effort.

(3) Poor example set by high officers and civilian officials.

c. Misunderstandings by Americans of British customs, habits and peculiarities and vice versa.

d. "Chip on the Shoulder Attitude" of many British soldiers and civilians which tends to provoke unfriendly reactions from Americans and causes incidents for which Americans are held responsible to receive unduly wide circulation.

e. Resentment of British soldiers and civilians over higher pay of the American soldiers.

f. Tradition of professional rivalry between British and American Navies and to a lesser degree between British and American armies, even between the British Foreign Office and the State Department.

g. Axis propaganda, which is constantly attempting to envenom relations between British and Americans, and certain other propagandas which from time to time have this effect.

h. Lack of restraint of the American Press in criticizing English military defeats and more particularly in exaggerating American contribution in Combined military operations.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee has concerned itself entirely with the condition in the military forces and its consequences on military operations but it finds that two other sectors of opinion affect the forces; namely, general American civilian opinion about England and other nations and also tones in

Washington officialdom and among higher officers which are reflected in the ranks. The Committee concludes that there are sufficient anti-British attitudes expressed in the troops and revealed in scattered incidents and by the British anxiety to call for observation and attention. The antagonism might easily run wild if war news is bad. Combined operations may even now be impaired.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Armed Forces.

(1) That instructions to commanders at home and abroad on the importance of maintaining good relations with our allies for efficiency of operations be reiterated and emphasized; and that new or additional steps be taken to reach the men in small units by explanation and appeals, avoiding orders unless necessary.

(2) That the commanders of all units in the armed forces impress on their officers and non-commissioned officers the importance of patience and good relationships with our allies as a prerequisite for successful operations.

(3) That the Special Services Division of the Army and the Morale Officers of Navy and Marine Corps be severally instructed to observe record tests and report on the attitudes of officers and men in regard to our allies.

(4) That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff direct the units of the War and Navy Departments charged with the duty of morale to coordinate their efforts in an examination of the relations between U. S. and British armed forces, and to recommend or to undertake, as appropriate, such preventive or corrective action as may be required.

SECRET

(5) That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff request the Combined Chiefs of Staff to approach this problem with a course of action directed to the same end as indicated above.

b. Civilian Population.

(1) That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff call to the attention of the proper authorities the need for discouraging anti-British talk and gossip among civilian officials of the Government in Washington.

(2) That a study be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee of the role played by Axis and other propagandas, including the propaganda of groups in this country, as an underlying factor of friction between British and American armed forces; and that recommendations for appropriate counter measures be prepared on the basis of this study, and report made to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

c. General

That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff take note that while the precept of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee covers only a consideration of the friction between U. S. and British armed forces, the subject is really broader and should be considered as applicable, in the first instance, to the armed forces of all the United Nations, and in the second instance, to broadcasts, newspaper dispatches, and editorial writings which cover matters that have a direct bearing upon our relations to the United Nations in fields other than military.

**EXCERPT FROM
JFPC MINUTES**

August 31, 1942

**FRICTION BETWEEN U.S. AND BRITISH ARMED
SERVICES**

COLONEL BURNHAM read to the Committee the draft of J.F.W.C. 35 as prepared by the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

GENERAL STONE pointed out that the approach to this problem would vary according to the locality in which American forces might find themselves, and suggested that troops going to Ireland be required to read, or be lectured on, the handbook prepared by the War Department entitled "A Short Guide to Great Britain", that forces of the U. S. going to Australia or remaining in the U. S. had best be approached along different lines, emphasis being made on tolerance and association.

GENERAL BURNHAM suggested that he take the matter up informally with Mr. Elmer Davis insofar as it affected the civilian population.

After discussion of the report of the Subcommittee paragraph by paragraph:

THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

Agreed upon certain amendments and directed the Secretary to prepare a revised draft.

**EXCERPT FROM
JFPC MINUTES
MINUTES**

September 1, 1942

THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

Each side of the amendments agreed upon by the Joint Committee.

SECRET

COPY NO. 1

J.P.W.C. 35/2d Draft

AUGUST 31, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

FRICTION BETWEEN U. S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES

Note by the Secretary.

The enclosure presents a discussion of this subject and revised recommendations of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

Chas. Moran

Acting Secretary

SECRET**ENCLOSURE****SITUATION:**

1. Friction is developing in contacts between British and American armed forces and between members of the armed forces and the civilian population, both here and in England. Critical or hostile attitudes toward the British have been noted on a large scale among members of the American armed forces, particularly the Navy and Marines, and these attitudes are most pronounced among officers. Expressions of such critical or hostile attitudes by members of the American armed forces are frequent. Anti-American sentiments among members of British armed forces and British civilians in contact with American forces are less frequently noted, but there is a growing British sensitivity to American criticisms, both in England and among British civilians and members of the armed forces stationed in this country. The increasing friction is revealed in numerous but so far inconsequential clashes in resorts, trains and in ports here and abroad, and by currents of gossip, anecdotes and epithets. This friction is not yet serious, though it is much more marked than in World War I and is already causing some anxiety to American Commanders abroad. It may, unless controlled, impede the war effort.

SOURCES:

2. The Committee has studied a variety of sources of information including official military digests of field reports on Anglo-American relations in World War I from the War College, confidential reports from British Government sources, a survey of the four chief British newspapers through July and August, tabulation of some intercepts by British and American codes, a survey of the attitudes of the American civilian population from the Bureau of Intelligence, OWI, and some pertinent questionnaire tabulations from the Special Service Branch, War Department. These sources indicate some anxiety in British official circles and in our Command. Very little editorial

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comment in British metropolitan papers. Considerable talk of incidents on American trains, in resorts and seaports. Of American boys in an army air technical school, quizzed officially after six months' service, 20% say the war is fought to defend the British Empire, as against about 67% who disagree.

3. Friction in England, still not serious, hinges on American high pay, some American swagger and belittling of British effort, and the negro troops whose acceptance by the British disturbs white American sensibilities. Censorship experience, while still small, shows in Northern Ireland considerable reciprocal antagonism, in Australia antagonism with British, friendliness toward Australia. Questionnaires of new recruits in American camps show English "liked" next to Australians, ranked below Russians and Germans in "military strength", below Australians, Germans and Russians as "fighters", and evenly divided on whether England is doing her full share. American civilian opinion shows 1/2 to 2/3 satisfied that the British are doing all they can to win the war, about 1/3 contrary and 10% uninformed, the figures varying with periods of British military success.

4. PRINCIPAL FACTORS:

A. Anti-British sentiments of American soldiers and sailors derived from general civilian attitudes long existent in this country and strengthened by the British military defeats in Singapore, Burma, Libya, etc.

B. Failure of American officers, soldiers and sailors to refrain from expressing anti-British sentiments owing to a number of causes, including the following:

- (1) Failure to realize the extreme sensitivity of the British to American criticism at this moment.

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(2) Failure to realize the importance of maintaining good feeling among allies as a factor in the war effort.

(3) Poor example set by high officers and civilian officials.

c. Misunderstandings by Americans of British customs, habits and peculiarities and vice versa.

d. "Chip on the Shoulder Attitude" of many British soldiers and civilians which tends to provoke unfriendly reactions from Americans and causes incidents for which Americans are held responsible to receive unduly wide circulation.

e. Resentment of British soldiers and civilians over higher pay of the American soldiers.

f. Tradition of professional rivalry between British and American Navies and to a lesser degree between British and American armies, even between the British Foreign Office and the State Department.

g. Axis propaganda, which is constantly attempting to envenom relations between British and Americans, and certain other propagandas which from time to time have this effect.

h. Lack of restraint of the American Press in criticizing English military defeats and more particularly in exaggerating American contribution in Combined military operations.

CONCLUSIONS

The Committee has concerned itself entirely with the condition in the military forces and its consequences on military operations but it finds that two other sectors of opinion affect the forces; namely, General American civilian opinion about England and other nations and also tones in

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Washington officialdom and among higher officers which are reflected in the ranks. The Committee concludes that there are sufficient anti-British attitudes expressed in the troops and revealed in scattered incidents and by the British anxiety to call for observation and attention. The antagonism might easily run wild if war news is bad. Combined operations may even now be impaired.

6. **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

A. Armed Forces.

(1) That instructions to Commanders at home and abroad ~~in~~ the importance of maintaining good relations with our allies for efficiency of operations be reiterated and emphasized; and that new or additional steps be taken to reach the men in small units by explanation and appeals, avoiding orders unless necessary.

(2) That the Commanders of all units in the armed forces impress on their officers and non-commissioned officers the importance of patience and good relationships with our allies as a prerequisite for successful operations.

(3) That the Special Services Division of the Army and the Morale Officers of Navy and Marine Corps be severally instructed to observe, record tests and report on the attitudes of officers and men in regard to our allies.

(4) That the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the units of the War and Navy Departments charged with the duty of morale to coordinate their efforts in an examination of the relations between U. S. and British armed forces, and to ~~obtain~~ such preventive or corrective action as may be required.

(5) That these units establish and maintain liaison with whatever corresponding British organization exists or may exist in the future.

SECRETb. Civilian Population.

(1) That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff call to the attention of the proper authorities the need for discouraging anti-British talk and gossip among civilian officials of the Government in Washington.

(2) That a study be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee of the role played by Axis and other propagandas, including the propaganda of groups in this country, as an underlying factor of friction between British and American armed forces; and that recommendations for appropriate counter measures be prepared on the basis of this study and report made to the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff.

EXCERPT FROM
JPMC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 28, 1942

FRICTION BETWEEN U.S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES

CAPTAIN GROSSKOPF objected to the formation of any further committees to deal with this problem but suggested that the Public Relations or kindred branches of the two services were equipped to handle the subject.

LT. COL. BLAKENEY pointed out that at present there were in existence the following agencies with an interest in this problem.

a. Army

- (1) Bureau of Public Relations.
- (2) Special Services Division.
- (3) Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S.

b. Navy

- (1) Office of Public Relations
- (2) Morale Branch of the Bureau of Navigation.

LT. COL. BLAKENEY called attention to the fact that these agencies may possibly be considering the subject matter and suggested that they be suggested to keep this Committee informed of any action they might take in this connection.

COLONEL DONOVAN presented the following suggestions:

That the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the units of the War and Navy Departments charged with the duty of morale maintenance to coordinate their efforts in an examination of the relations between the U.S. and British Armed Forces, and to undertake such preventive or corrective action as may be required.

That these representatives establish and maintain liaison with their corresponding British organizations and to advise of any crisis in the future.

THE SECRETARY:-

Approved the recommendation suggested by COLONEL

Directed the Secretary to Transmit the proposed, as amended, to the Senior Committee.

COPY NO. 1

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J.P.W.C. 35

AUGUST 28, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE
FRICTION BETWEEN U.S. AND BRITISH ARMED FORCES

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure presents a discussion of this subject and recommendations of the Joint Psychological Warfare Subcommittee.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSURESITUATION:

1. Friction is developing in contacts between British and American armed forces and between members of the armed forces and the civilian population, both here and in England. Critical or hostile attitudes toward the British have been noted on a large scale among members of the American armed forces, particularly the Navy and Marines, and these attitudes seem most pronounced among officers. Expressions of such criticism or hostile attitudes by members of the American armed forces are frequent. Anti-American sentiments among members of British armed forces and British civilians in contact with American forces are less frequently noted, but there is a growing British sensitivity to American criticisms, both in England and among British civilians and members of the armed forces stationed in this country. The increasing friction is revealed in numerous but so far inconsequential clashes in resorts, trains and in ports here and abroad, and by currents of gossip, anecdotes and epithets. This friction is not yet serious, though it is much more marked than in World War I and is already causing some anxiety to American Commanders abroad. It may, unless controlled, impede the war effort.

REMARKS:

2. The Committee has studied a variety of sources of information including official military digests of field reports on Anglo-American relations in World War I from the War College, confidential reports from British Government sources, a survey of the four chief British newspapers through July and August, tabulation of news intercepts by British and American sources, a survey of the attitudes of the American civilian population from the Bureau of Intelligence, OWI, and some pertinent questionnaire tabulations from the Special Service Branch, the Department. These sources indicate some anxiety in British command circles and in our Command. Very little editorial

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comment in British metropolitan papers. Considerable talk of incidents on American trains, in resorts and seaports. Of American boys in an army air technical school, quizzed officially after six months' service, 20% say the war is fought to defend the British Empire, as against about 67% who disagree.

3. Friction in England, still not serious, hinges on American high pay, some American swagger and belittling of British effort, and the negro troops whose acceptance by the British disturbs white American sensibilities. Censorship experience, while still small, shows in Northern Ireland considerable reciprocal antagonism, in Australia antagonism with British, friendliness toward Australia. Questionnaires of new recruits in American camps show English "liked" next to Australians, ranked below Russians and Germans in "Military Strength", below Australians, Germans and Russians as "fighters," and evenly divided on whether England is doing her full share. American civilian opinion shows 1/2 to 2/3 satisfied that the British are doing all they can to win the war, about 1/3 contrary and 30% uninformed, the figures varying with periods of British military success.

4. *Training Friction of Sentiment*
~~Personnel Friction~~

a. Anti-British sentiments of American soldiers and sailors derived from general civilian attitudes long existent in this country and strengthened by the British military defeats in Singapore, Burma, Libya, etc.

b. Failure of American officers, soldiers and sailors to refrain from expressing anti-British sentiments owing to a number of causes, including the followings:

(1) Failure to realize the extreme sensitivity of the British to American criticism at this moment.

SECRET

(2) Failure to realize the importance of maintaining good feeling among allies as a factor in the war effort.

(3) Poor example set by high officers and civilian officials.

c. Misunderstandings by Americans of British customs, habits and peculiarities and vice versa.

d. "Chip on the Shoulder Attitude" of many British soldiers and civilians which tends to provoke unfriendly reactions from Americans and causes incidents for which Americans are held responsible to receive unduly wide circulation.

e. Resentment of British soldiers and civilians over higher pay of the American soldiers.

f. Tradition of professional rivalry between British and American Navies and to a lesser degree between British and American armies, even between the British Foreign Office and the State Department.

g. Axis propaganda, which is constantly attempting to envenom relations between British and Americans, and certain other propagandas which from time to time have this effect.

h. Lack of restraint of the American press in criticizing English military defeats and more particularly in exaggerating American contribution in ^{combined} ~~joint~~ military operations.

8. CONCLUSIONS:

The Committee has concerned itself entirely with the condition in the military forces and its consequences on military operations but it finds that two other sectors of opinion affect the forces; namely, general American civilian opinion toward England and other nations and also tones in

Washington officialdom and among higher officers which are reflected in the ranks. The Committee concludes that there are sufficient anti-British attitudes expressed in the troops and revealed in scattered incidents and by the British anxiety to call for observation and attention. The antagonism might easily run wild if war news is bad. ~~An offended England might conclude a separate peace, if hard-pressed.~~ ^{Combined} ~~Joint~~ operations may even now be impaired.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. Armed Forces.

(1) That instructions to Commanders at home and abroad in the importance of maintaining good relations with our allies for efficiency of operations be reiterated and emphasized; [and that new or additional steps be taken to reach the men in small units by explanation and appeals, avoiding orders unless necessary.]

(2) That ~~all officers~~ ^{advise all units} all officers' ~~be instructed in the importance of patience and good relations, illustrated by concrete illustrations~~ ^{be instructed in the importance of patience and good relations, illustrated by concrete illustrations}

~~as a result of disastrous battles to faults~~ ^{as a result of disastrous battles to faults} ~~as a result of disastrous battles to faults~~ ^{as a result of disastrous battles to faults}

(3) That the Special Services Division of the Army and the morale officers of Navy and Marine Corps be severally instructed to observe, record tests and report on the attitudes of officers and men in regard to our allies, ~~from time to time.~~

b. Civilian Population.

(1) That this report with its annexes be communicated to the Office of War Information for such action as the O.W.I. deems appropriate.

(2) That the British Government be kept informed through the proper channels of any evidence that may be obtained throwing light on unsatis-

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factory but correctible attitudes among the British civilians toward American troops stationed in England.

(3) That the Joint Chiefs of Staff call to the attention of the proper ~~authorities~~ authority in this country the need for discouraging anti-British talk and gossip among civilian officials of the Government in Washington.

(4) That a study be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee of the role played by Axis and other propagandas, including the propaganda of groups in this country, as an underlying factor of friction between British and American armed forces; and that recommendations for appropriate counter measures be prepared on the basis of this study and ~~submitted to the Government~~ *submitted to the Government* *CPS*
~~Agency concerned.~~

6 a 4 That the Joint Chiefs of Staff direct the units of the War and Navy Departments charged with the duty of morale ~~to~~ to coordinate their efforts in an examination of the relations between U. S. and British armed forces, and to ~~take~~ *recommend* such preventive or corrective action as may be required.

See That these units establish and maintain ~~with~~ *with* whatever corresponding British organization exists or may exist in the future.

EXCERPTS FROM
JFPC SUBCOMMITTEE
MINUTES

August 26, 1942

DIFFICULTIES BETWEEN BRITISH AND AMERICAN TROOPS

MR. TAVEL presented for advice the first draft of a memorandum prepared by the O.S.S. on this subject, including an estimate of the sources of the trouble and recommendations for preventing or mitigating the difficulties.

CHIEF, O.S.S. indicated that considerable material pertaining to this question had been received in the War Department from the European Theater Commander, especially citing differences of opinion between British and American troops. In this connection CHIEF, O.S.S. reported that the War Minister had been concerned over the recall of the 1st Canadian Division and suggested that a certain number of the 1st Canadian Division soldiers be retained in the United States.

CHIEF, O.S.S. suggested that instead of setting up a Joint Committee of British and American officers to study causes and to recommend corrective steps, it would be preferable to have first a solely American committee for that purpose, which would confer later with British officials or a British committee if one is organized.

Other suggestions were made as ancillary of this first draft memorandum, especially the inclusion of a study of both Axis and Communist propaganda which tend to incite trouble between Britain and the United States.

THE MEMORANDUM.

It was noted that the O.S.S. will revise its policy to incorporate the suggestions made at this meeting.

MEMORANDUMSITUATION:

Friction is developing in contacts between British and American armed forces and between members of the armed forces and the civilian population, both here and in England. Critical or hostile attitudes toward the British have been noted on a large scale among members of the American armed forces, particularly the Navy and Marines, and these attitudes seem most pronounced among officers. Expressions of such critical or hostile attitudes by members of the American armed forces are frequent. Anti-American sentiments among members of British armed forces and British civilians in contact with American forces are less frequently noted, but there is a growing British sensitivity to American criticisms, both in England and among British civilians and members of the armed forces stationed in this country. The increasing friction is revealed in numerous but so far inconsequential clashes in resorts, trains and in ports here and abroad, and by currents of gossip, anecdotes and epithets. This friction is not yet serious, though it is much more marked than in World War I and is already causing some anxiety to American Commanders abroad. In any, unless controlled, impedes the war effort.

- 3 -

of new recruits in American camps show English "liked" next to Australians, ranked below Russians and Germans in "military strength", below Australians, Germans and Russians as "fighters," and evenly divided on whether England is doing her full share. American civilian opinion shows 1/2 to 2/3 satisfied that the British are doing all they can to win the war, about 1/3 contrary and 10% uninformed, the figures varying with periods of British military success. (Exhibits are attached)

SOURCES OF TROUBLE:

1. Anti-British sentiments of American soldiers and sailors derived from general civilian attitudes long existent in this country and strengthened by the British military defeats in Singapore, Burma, Libya, etc.
2. Failure of American officers, soldiers and sailors to refrain from expressing anti-British sentiments owing to a number of causes, including the following:
 1. Failure to realize the extreme sensitivity of the British to American criticism at this moment.
 2. Failure to realize the importance of maintaining good feeling among allies as a factor in the war effort.
 3. Poor example set by high officers and civilian officials.

- 2 -

SOURCES:

The Committee has studied a variety of sources of information including official military digests of field reports on Anglo-American relations in World War I from the War College, confidential reports from British Government sources, a survey of the four chief British newspapers through July and August, tabulation of some intercepts by British and American censors, a survey of the attitudes of the American civilian population from the Bureau of Intelligence, OWI, and some pertinent questionnaire tabulations from the Special Service Branch, War Department. These sources indicate some anxiety in British official circles and in our Command. Very little editorial comment in British metropolitan papers. Considerable talk of incidents on American trains, in resorts and seaports. Of American boys in an army air technical school, quizzed officially after six months' service, 20% say the war is fought to defend the British Empire, as against about 67% who disagree. Friction in England, still not serious, hinges on American high pay, some American swagger and belittling of British effort, and the negro troops whose acceptance by the British disturbs white American sensibilities. Censorship experience, while still small, shows in Northern Ireland considerable reciprocal antagonism, in Australia antagonism with British friendliness toward Australia. Questionnaires

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- C. Misunderstandings by Americans of British customs, habits and peculiarities and vice versa.
- D. "Chip on the Shoulder Attitude" of many British soldiers and civilians which tends to provoke unfriendly reactions from Americans and causes incidents for which Americans are held responsible to receive unduly wide circulation.
- E. Tradition of professional rivalry between British and American Navies and to a lesser degree between British and American armies, even between the British Foreign Office and the State Department.
- F. Axis propaganda, which is constantly attempting to sever relations between British and Americans.

CONCLUSIONS:

The Committee has concerned itself entirely with the condition in the military forces and its consequences on military operations but it finds that two other sectors of opinion affect the forces; namely, general American civilian opinion about England and other nations and also tones in Washington officialdom and among higher officers which are reflected in the ranks. The Committee concludes that there are sufficient anti-British attitudes expressed in the troops and revealed in scattered incidents and by the British anxiety to call for observation and attention. The antagonism might easily run wild if care were not taken. An offended Englishman might desert us

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in the struggle, if hard-pressed. Joint operations may even now be impaired.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Some or all of the following are suggested:

I. Armed Forces

A. That Commanders at home and abroad be instructed in the importance of preserving good feeling for efficiency of operations, and the men be reached in small units by explanation and appeals, avoiding orders unless necessary.

B. That in the course of all officers schools, the importance of patience and good relations be covered by concrete illustrations from military history.

C. That the Special Service Division of the army and the morale officers of Navy and Marine Corps be severally instructed to observe, record tests and report from time to time.

II. Civilian Population

A. That this report with its annexes be given to the Office of War Information with a request that a suitable publicity campaign be undertaken in the United States to combat anti-British sentiment.

B. That the British Government be kept informed through the proper channels of any evidence that may be obtained throwing light on unsatisfactory

*present
little for
the time being*

*August
will
be done*

- 6 -

but correctible attitudes among the British civilians toward American troops stationed in England.

- C. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff call to the attention of the proper civilian authorities in this country the need for discouraging anti-British talk and gossip among civilian officials of the Government in Washington.

III. Long Term Measures

That a ~~permanent joint committee~~ of British and American officials be set up for the purpose of analysing all cases of friction between British and American forces or all factors likely to lead to such friction with the view to recommending as need arises to the military and information authorities in the two countries proper corrective steps, such as long-range educational campaigns; that this joint committee be composed of representatives of the British and American Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the British Minister of Information and of the Office of War Information.

**REPORT FROM
JFUC KINSHAS**

August 24, 1962

DISCUSSION OF THE PROBLEM AND U.S. SOLUTION

GENERAL COMMENTS: suggested that this might be a problem on which the C.R.L. could make a constructive contribution.

GENERAL COMMENTS: indicated belief that some of the difficulty is due to material in the press as on the radio which is based on observation of some individual individuals or on rumors of an official which were being spread. **KINSHAS** stated that in order to get a more accurate picture to have a joint board with an American and a Congolese and suggest my suggestion. It is believed that it is the function of this committee to make the question and to make any constructive suggestions.

THE CONCLUSION

That note that the C.R.L. will submit a proposal on this subject to the Subcommittee.

August 24 1946
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AMERICAN RELATIONS

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August 24, 1942

BRITISH REACTION TO AMERICAN TROOPS IN BRITAIN

Source: Reports of Ministry of Information, June 25, 50; July 13, 14, transmitted by State Department. Strictly Confidential.

1. General.

2. It is reported that arrival of American troops was received with apprehension. Trouble was caused only a small number of Americans, and a process with local girls. Some of the "sawyer", "talk", and they have some.

3. American troops are not allowed to be in the streets. American troops are not allowed to be in the streets. American troops are not allowed to be in the streets.

4. American troops are not allowed to be in the streets. American troops are not allowed to be in the streets.

REPORT ON NORTH IRELAND

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 case, 101 are very strongly critical,
 strongly favorable.

States Office of Consular

attitudes toward
 Australia, attitudes

are usually
 people are usually

Factors and

Attitudes

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Rank of Various People by American soldiers

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Which have the
greatest military
strength?

Which soldiers
make the best
fighters?

Australians

Russians

Germans

English

Australians
Germans

Russians

Japanese

English
Finnish

Japanese

Chinese

Americans

Italians

August 24, 1942

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Attitudes of the American People toward the English

The attitudes and actions of American leaders and soldiers toward the English are significantly conditioned by those of the American people and spring from the same cultural roots and sources of information. It is doubtful if our leaders and soldiers will adopt an attitude much out of line with that of the people in general. What are the attitudes of the people?

Recent reports of the Bureau of Intelligence of the State Department, 1942, reveal the results of nation-wide surveys of opinion on this question. The results are as follows:

The American people are generally favorable toward the English. The English are associated with the qualities of courage, honor, and gallantry. The English are generally regarded as the most gallant of the Allies.

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friction is developing in contacts between British and American armed forces and between members of the armed forces and the civilian population, both here and in England. Critical or hostile attitudes toward the British have been noted on a large scale among members of the American armed forces, particularly the Navy and Marines, and these attitudes seem most pronounced among officers. Expressions of such critical or hostile attitudes by members of the American armed forces are frequent. Anti-American criticisms from members of British armed forces and British civilians in contact with American forces are also frequently noted, but there is a growing British sensitivity to American criticisms, both in England and among British civilians and members of the armed forces stationed in this country. The increasing friction is revealed in numerous but so far inconsequential clashes in words, actions and in facts here and abroad, and by examples of gossip, accusations and quibbles. This situation is not yet serious, though it is much more marked than in World War I and is already causing some anxiety to American commanders abroad. If not, unless controlled, against the war effort.

- 2 -

The Committee has studied a variety of sources of information including official military digests of field reports on Anglo-American relations in World War I from the War College, confidential reports from British Government sources, a survey of the four chief British newspapers through July and August, tabulation of some intercepts by British and American censors, a survey of the attitudes of the American civilian population from the Bureau of Intelligence, OWI, and some pertinent questionnaire tabulations from the Special Service Branch, War Department. These sources indicate some anxiety in British official circles and in our Command. Very little editorial comment in British newspaper reports. Considerable talk of incidents on American troops, in reports and reports. Of American boys in an army air technical school, returned officially after six months' service, 20% say the war is fought to defend the British Empire, as against about 80% who disagree. Friction in England, still not serious, hinges on American high pay, some American swagger and belittling of British effort, and the negro troops whose acceptance by the British disturbs white American sensitivities. Concerning experience, while still small, shows in Northern Ireland considerable personal antagonism, in Australia antagonism with British, friendliness toward Australia. Questionnaires

- 3 -

of new recruits in American camps show English "liked" next to Australians, ranked below Russians and Germans in "military strength", below Australians, Germans and Russians as "fighters," and evenly divided on whether England is doing her full share. American civilian opinion shows 1/2 to 2/3 satisfied that the British are doing all they can to win the war, about 1/3 contrary and 1/4 uninformed, the figures varying with periods of British military success. (Exhibits are attached)

REASONS FOR SENTIMENTS

- A. Anti-British sentiments of American soldiers and sailors derived from general civilian attitudes long existent in this country and strengthened by the British military defeats in Singapore, Burma, India, etc.
- B. Failure of American officers, soldiers and sailors to refrain from expressing anti-British sentiments owing to a number of causes, including the following:
 1. Failure to realize the extreme sensitivity of the British to American criticism at this moment.
 2. Failure to realize the importance of maintaining good feeling among allies as a factor in the war effort.
 3. Poor example set by high officers and civilian officials.

- 4 -

- C. Misunderstandings by Americans of British customs, habits and peculiarities and vice versa.
- D. "Chip on the Shoulder Attitude" of many British soldiers and civilians which tends to provoke unfriendly reactions from Americans and causes incidents for which Americans are held responsible to receive widely wide circulation.
- E. Resentment of British soldiers and sailors over higher pay of the American soldiers.
- F. Tradition of professional rivalry between British and American Navies and to a lesser degree between British and American armies, even between the British Foreign Office and the State Department.
- G. Anti propaganda, which is constantly attempting to worsen relations between British and Americans, and certain other propaganda which from time to time have this effect.
- H. Lack of restraint of the American press in criticizing English military defense and more particularly in exaggerating American contribution in joint military operations.

The Committee has concerned itself entirely with the situation in the military forces and its consequences in military operations but it finds that two other

- 2 -

sectors of opinion affect the domestic, military, economic, American civilian opinion about England and other nations and also those in Washington, London and other major officers which are reflected in the ranks. The Committee concludes that there are sufficient anti-British sentiments expressed in the troops and revealed in scattered incidents and by the British anxiety to call for operations and attention. The propaganda might easily run wild in war news is bad. An official British press report in the situation, it must be said, that operations are even now being delayed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Some or all of the following are suggested:

I. Armed Forces

- A. That instructions to Commanders of units and forces in the importance of maintaining good relations with our allies for efficiency of operations be reinforced and emphasized and that new or additional steps be taken to insure that the war is well won by cooperation and support, avoiding errors which would be detrimental in the course of all efforts.
- B. That the importance of relations and cooperation be covered by appropriate dissemination of information.

- 3 -

sectors of opinion affect the forces; namely, general American civilian opinion about England and other nations and also tones in Washington officialdom and among higher officers which are reflected in the ranks. The Committee concludes that there are sufficient anti-British attitudes expressed in the troops and revealed in scattered incidents and by the British anxiety to call for observation and attention. The antagonism might easily run wild if war news is bad. An offended England might desert us in the struggle, if hard-pressed. Joint operations may even now be required.

Some or all of the following are suggested:

I. Armed Forces

- A. That instructions to Commanders at home and abroad in the importance of maintaining good relations with our allies for efficiency of operations be re-iterated and emphasized; and that new or additional steps be taken to reach the men in small units by explanation and appeals, avoiding orders unless necessary.
- B. That in the course of all officers' schools, the importance of patience and good relations be stressed by concrete illustrations revealing

- 6 -

instances of disastrous battles due to faulty relationship between Allies.

- C. That the Special Services Division of the Army and the morale officers of Navy and Marine Corps be severally instructed to observe, record tests and report on the attitudes of officers and men in regard to our allies from time to time.

II. Civilian Population

- A. That this report with its annexes be communicated to the Office of War Information for such action as the O.W.I. deems appropriate.
- B. That the British Government be kept informed through the proper channels of any evidence that may be obtained throwing light on unsatisfactory but correctible attitudes among the British civilians toward American troops stationed in England.
- C. That the Joint Chiefs of Staff call to the attention of the proper civilian authorities in this country the need for discouraging anti-British talk and gossip among civilian officials of the Government in Washington.
- D. That a study be made of the role played by radio and other propaganda, including the propaganda of groups in this country, as an

- 7 -

underlying factor of friction between British and American armed forces; and that recommendations for appropriate counter measures be prepared on the basis of this study and communicated to the Governmental Agency concerned.

III. Long Term Measures

- A. That a permanent committee be set up to keep watch on the state of relations between British and American armed forces and to recommend such ^{preventive} preventive or corrective measures as seem required.
- B. That this committee be composed of representatives of the Army and Navy and the C.V.I.
- C. That this committee establish and maintain liaison with whatever corresponding British organization exists or may exist in the future.

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COPY NO. 10

J.P.W.C. 15

June 20, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE
COORDINATION OF MILITARY PROPAGANDA WITH
THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

Note by the Secretary

The Enclosure, presented by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., is transmitted for consideration.

A. H. Onthank
Secretary

S E C R E TJ.P.W.C. 19E N C L O S U R EPROPOSAL:

It is proposed that daily, weekly and basic directives, properly integrated with military strategy through agencies of the J.C.S. and C.C.S. be issued to cooperate with the Office of War Information for propaganda designed to assist the conduct of war.

DISCUSSION:

Since the particular propaganda designed to assist military strategy is an important weapon of war it should be directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

METHOD:

Propaganda with objectives to assist directly in the conduct of war can be integrated with military strategy in three stages.

In the first stage, a basic plan for each theater or nation should be developed and designed to assist general military strategy and properly integrated by the J.C.S., for this purpose. It should contain in detail what themes are to be stressed and what themes are to be avoided in such propaganda. This basic plan (developed by Psychological Warfare Branch with Office of War Information, State Department and other government agencies) is not static but is changed as military operations progress and as other fundamentals in the situation alter.

The basic plan is used as a general guide for the Office of War Information on propaganda with military objectives.

The second stage consists of issuing written weekly directives on this propaganda. In these directives lie the essence of the campaign as to timing, scope and objectives.

S E C R E T

These consist (1) of general statements of background of the Army and Navy situation, political, economic, psychological and special situations as they effect the military situation and (2) after each estimate of situation the weekly propaganda directives for these are set down. The estimates of the military situation in each area or nation are compiled by the specialists in G-2 and Office of Naval Intelligence, the political estimates by experts in the State Department, the economic background by the Board of Economic Warfare, and the psychological factors by the Psychological Warfare Branch. Army and Navy planners in the Psychological Warfare Branch, aided by military experts (intelligence and operations) and representatives of Office of War Information, will work out directives based on the general plan and the estimates of the different situations that effect the military objectives. After these weekly military propaganda directives are drafted and approved by the proper authorities in the J.C.S. and/or C.C.S., as to integration with coordinated military policy, they are sent to the Office of War Information.

The third stage consists of daily directives running through the 24 hours of the day. In these daily propaganda directives lies the tactics of the campaign.

The Psychological Warfare Branch acts as a clearing house for all information effecting the military situation received by the State Department, G-2, Office of Naval Intelligence, Board of Economic Warfare, etc., intelligence systems as well as by radio broadcasts (propaganda) from all over the world. This information is sent to Psychological Warfare Branch by scrambler telephone and the planners draft propaganda directives on the basis of this information that is in turn sent to Office of War Information by scrambler teletype. However, it is important that before being sent to Psychological Warfare Branch, these daily directives are checked and passed on for military policy by the offices of both the Army and Navy chiefs of theaters.

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By this method there will be a constant, up-to-the-minute, uniform and combined propaganda effort against military objectives, always checked and directed by the proper agencies of the J.C.S. and the C.C.S.

RECOMMENDATION:

That, to cooperate with the Office of War Information, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee be authorized to develop basic propaganda plans designed to assist the conduct of war, issue weekly and daily directives for the same approved by the proper agencies of the J.C.S. and C.C.S., War and Naval Operations Divisions.

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 17JUNE 1, 1942COPY NO. 10JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEMEASURES IN EVENT OF RUSSIAN COLLAPSE IN 1942Note by the Secretary

1. The Joint U.S. Strategical Committee has requested that it be furnished with an appreciation of the psychological warfare factors in a situation which assumes that by the summer of 1942,

- a. RUSSIA is impotent, or so weakened that her military forces can be contained by approximately half of the GERMAN forces;
- b. FRANCE is actively collaborating both militarily and economically;
- c. TURKEY is passively collaborating with the Axis powers.

2. A J.U.S.S.C. appreciation of the objective, including a map indicating basic areas of influence and disputed adjoining areas, is attached.

A. H. Onthank,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREAppreciation of the Objective.

With the disintegration of the Russian Army which has been absorbing the greater part of the German war effort, Germany will be free to take further steps looking to the realization of her basic war aims.

Germany seeks to establish a greater Reich, embracing the Germanic people and territory sufficient to support them within a political unit; and freedom to control the wealth of the world beyond. Similarly Japan envisages a domination of at least the Far East. To accomplish these objectives, they must integrate the resources of their spheres of influence into their economies, and defeat the military forces of the United Nations.

To successfully deny the realization of these enemy aims, the United Nations must oppose the economic development of the Axis, and defeat the Axis forces. For purposes of study the world has been divided into three basic areas, (See Map attached), which have no preliminary justification beyond the fact that they are probable theaters of operation, influence, and control. The areas between the three basic areas of control may be disputed by the opposing major powers. Each power will strive to extend or retain its control over the resources and territory of the disputed areas most complimentary to its war effort. If our military forces are insufficient, under the assumptions of the directive, to secure an early defeat of the Axis, it is clear that we must retain control over sufficient territory to support an expanding war effort if we are ultimately to obtain the superiority required for victory.

S E C R E T


The purpose of this study is to determine the measures which should be adopted by the United Nations if the assumptions of the directive materialize. As a basis for judgment, the study will examine each area with reference to its economic and military resources, the political conditions obtaining therein, and its capacity to support military operations - food supply, weather, communications facilities, etc. The strategic importance of each area to our war effort, and to the effort of the enemy will then be determined. The measures we should adopt will be derived from an evaluation of these results.

1 Attachment - Map.

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No. 1862b

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


OUTLINE CHART OF THE WORLD

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Washington, D.C. published Jan. 1955 at the Hydrographic Office
under the authority of the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

THE WORLD



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Reaction to Assumed Situation (Reference: J.P.W.G. 17)

AREA A. Situation and Probable Reaction to Assumed Military Situation.

United States: Government has followed public opinion, not led. In current situation neutralizes Russia and forbids attack on Communist various pressure groups for (a) isolation, (b) humanitarian aid, (c) negotiated peace, (d) defense, and various other programs will produce confusion. There will be no unified public opinion. The public will be amenable to propaganda and strong leadership only.

Such the same applies to **BRITAIN**.

Russia: Russia's participation is now less unified than that of U.S. Reaction hostile to U.S. and influence of Anti-American groups and Anti propaganda, issues open possible mobilization and internal disorder. If Russia makes a move, strong communist elements in Russia (and other Latin American countries) will oppose war and add to internal confusion.

Western Europe: Participation due largely to American protection, and U.S. dependency (financial and economic) on U.S.

France: The general will-to-fight is very strong and based on U.S. possible capacity. The assumed situation would not reduce this unless as a result of a prolonged stalemate. As in the case of the U.S. and Canada, continued air attack on Germany would prevent declaration of offensive spirit.

Germany: The will-to-fight is well demonstrated by the U.S. The prospect of a long campaign, however, could encourage opponents, native interest groups, and revive isolationism.

With a prolonging of stalemate in Europe and possible loss of Area B-1, Area-2, and Area-3, all three nations, U.S., Canada and Great Britain would be increasingly receptive to offers of negotiated peace with slight concessions from statesmen by the Axis.

AREA B.

Canada: Canada is not on the verge of declaring war on Germany. There is a great deal of sympathy for the Allies, but a great deal of suspicion of the U.S. and a great deal of suspicion of the Allies. The U.S. and the Allies are not on the verge of declaring war on Germany. There is a great deal of sympathy for the Allies, but a great deal of suspicion of the U.S. and a great deal of suspicion of the Allies.

Western Europe: Popular sentiment favors Allied forces. In general, the public is not on the verge of declaring war on Germany. There is a great deal of sympathy for the Allies, but a great deal of suspicion of the U.S. and a great deal of suspicion of the Allies.

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General Remarks on Area A-1: South America in general is not expected to join the Axis Nations and is detached in attitude, waiting to see which side is likely to win. In case of diminished prospects of Allied victory, all three nations will offer opportunity for Axis infiltration and possible air operations, directed against Panama.

Area A-2.

South Africa: Axis sentiment now embarrassing and would be seriously reinforced. Military efforts of South Africa might be neutralized.

Area A-3.

India: Increased threat of German drive to the east would strengthen Indian passive resistance to British control. Japanese propaganda would be increasingly effective.

Area B.

Germany: East control of Germany is not threatened and under the present conditions many of the present difficulties with home population and foreign workers will diminish. German psychological position will be strong.

Central European: The assumed conditions will diminish resistance in the occupied areas, particularly France, Norway and Czechoslovakia. This applies equally to Germany's allies, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria.

Sweden: Strong sympathy with Norway now prevailing in Sweden will be expressed if Russia is neutralized. Actual cooperation with Germany in supply of munitions, etc., would be maintained. Sweden's policy, like that of other smaller nations not neutral would be necessarily determined by prospective outcome.

Area B-2.

South Africa: The situation assumed would be accepted in North Africa and that area would become a German sphere of influence and increased economic collaboration.

Area B-1.

Russia: Danger of Russian surrender to Germany is remote. Russian retreat beyond Volga has been long planned and provided for as a last resort. There is, however, grave danger that successful German drive into Russia might end in capitulation which would remove Russia from active fighting. There is no reason to expect Russia to keep her agreement to fight with Great Britain and the United States to the end. As soon as Russia surrenders indicate a truce, that may be expected.

- 2 -

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SECRET**ANNA C.**

Japan: If the neutralization of Russia occurred after serious impairment of Russia's war capacity, Japan could be expected to take advantage of this situation to move into Siberia, and to threaten Alaska.

Japan is the best controlled and integrated of all the nations now at war. Her will-to-fight and capacity to fight may be expected to increase rather than diminish. There is in Japan no group or party that is capable of effective resistance to the government.

ANNA C-1.

Philippines and NW: Japanese domination in this area is comparatively recent. The native populations can not be expected to give any support to the United Nations or to engage in any efforts of the Japanese program. This is true even of the Filipinos, but even there no serious counter-attack to the Japanese is to be expected. Japanese propaganda and agents have had great effect in this area.

ANNA C-2.

Guangdong, China: Resistance to the Japanese may be expected to continue to be negligible.

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[illegible]

The most important single objective. Support of these countries is absolutely necessary. Increased number of Spanish, tourists, and others in Latin America to direct propaganda to commit countries to active participation. Promotion of Latin American education. Increased economic collaboration. Planned programs. Definite plans as to how to use. These nations that can be used to well planned programs in present time. Latin American military units should be utilized and used in active operations.

American public opinion can be directed toward the desired end if steps are taken now. First, for something to fight for, not only against pornography in terms of obscenity and public decency, specific legislation should be used to prevent that to prevent confusion of minds.

[REDACTED]

[illegible]

[REDACTED]

Additional planes and men from U.S. and S.A. required that be supplied and in to the States. Attack on Japan proper as aid to Australia. Propaganda of our cause. Should be used effectively at present time.

any one to have underground active and
as such it would be working of front in
England or elsewhere. In regard of little
long contact or relation to Gellman.

██████████ ██████████

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JOHN E. S. STANFORD'S COMMENT

July 13, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

1. In studying the draft of reactions to current situations in reference to study of Russian colleges we feel that the data in this draft will be useful as a summary of the situation, and we specifically request your comment on the following:

Area A - Europe

Does this paragraph cover Ireland, Australia and New Zealand?

Area B - South Africa and India

What will be the anti-British sentiment in these areas?

India What is the psychological evaluation in regard to Germany vs. Japan?

2. For the rest of the estimate, we are submitting the following additional assumptions as to sources of action:-

a. For the Japanese Theater - Australia and Alaska defended. Military effort against G-I.

b. For the German Theater - the Americans and England defended. Occupation of Northwest Africa. Defense of A-G.

Based on the above the following data is requested:-

a. The psychological factors involved in the survey of the above available and exposed in both theaters.

b. A tabulation of the psychological strength factors for (1) the Axis, (2) the United Nations.

c. A tabulation of the psychological weakness factors for the Axis and the United Nations.

d. A survey of Japan's psychological problem.

e. A survey of Germany's psychological problem.

f. A survey of the United Nations' psychological problem.

g. (1) An analysis of the psychological effects desired by Japan.

(2) An analysis of the psychological effects desired by Germany.

(3) An analysis of the psychological effects desired by the United Nations.

h. An estimate of the capability of the Axis under the assumed conditions to make a strong bid for peace. The psychological factors under this condition are extremely important.

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E.J. Stanfield,
Captain, U.S.N.,
JAN 1943.

Comments on "Reaction to Assumed Situation"

The following comments are confined to certain sections only of the document, as indicated. They were arrived at as follows: We considered, first, the present attitude of the people of these countries toward Russia, and, second, the probable reaction of public opinion of these people to the assumed neutralization of Russia.

UNITED STATES -- The reaction of the American public to the assumed situation is critical, for people in Allied countries are now orientated toward the United States and its future military role. Public opinion experts report that in general the average American has little conception of Russia's role in the war. Russia is a vague, far-off place with bizarre names, whose people are doing a good job of defending their country. The American people does not see that the lot of Russia is important in our own military effort. Thus, their reaction to the assumed situation is likely to be that of only momentary sympathetic regret. Thus, the public would, if affected at all, show a heightened will-to-fight, enhancing the characteristic, though unrealistic, attitude that the United States will have to win the war pretty much herself. Confusion and disillusionment would occur only later with specific and continued reverses of American armed forces.

CANADA -- Public opinion is much like that in the United States. There is little reaction to Russia's role, the orientation being toward the United States and England. Some elements of the people (the French Canadians) are not highly enthusiastic about the war even now, but in general the Canadians would follow the reaction in the United States.

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ENGLAND -- The present general will-to-fight is indeed high, but that the assumed situation would not demoralize it is not so certain. Confidential opinion studies in England reveal that the English have very much identified their prospects with the continued fight by the Russians. These studies reveal that the English show a high degree of confidence, hope and belief in Russia. Thus, the assumed situation may result in a great reduction of a will-to-fight. The degree of demoralization would be contingent on (1) the volume of direct aid from America and (2) skill and cunningness of the Allied propagandists in developing the theme that the Russian campaign was a fortunate break for England in the first place, and has served the purpose of exhausting Germany to the point of assuring ultimate Allied victory.

CHUNGKING, CHINA -- The effect of the situation on the Chinese might be complex. Free China has a number of conflicting elements in it. The former communist group in the North might react quite differently from the Chiang Kai-shek factions. Certain sections in the South, in particular, Kweichow, have frequently been apathetic to the war against Japan. Here, again, public reaction in the United States and our subsequent war policy and practice is critical. The United States would be the only remaining hope of the Chinese. Thus, if the Chinese calculated that the United States had not adequately helped Russia (whether from policy or from practical difficulties) and that concrete prospects of effective aid from us were slim, China, or certain sections of China, might make a deal with Japan.

SECRET

July 18, 1945

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J.P.W.C. 16

May 18, 1942

COPY NO. 16

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

ANNOUNCEMENT OF GERMAN INTENTION TO INVADE ENGLAND

Note by the Secretary

1. In accordance with direction of the Committee, the attached memorandum on this subject has been submitted to the Joint Staff Planners (J.P.S. 7/15).

A. H. ONTHANK
Secretary

SECRETENCLOSURE

May 18, 1942.

MEMORANDUM

To: The Secretaries, Joint Staff Planners.

Subject: Announcement of German Intention to Invade England.

1. The Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, at its meeting today, considered the advisability of a U.S.-British announcement of German intention to invade England, solely under the condition that our G-2 intelligence reports sufficient indication of the probability of such an attack.

2. The following advantages would seem to accrue from an announcement of German intentions:

(a) It would eliminate the surprise effect, particularly in the U.S. and among neutrals;

(b) It would give a psychological advantage to the U.S.-British;

(c) It would increase confidence in the U.S.-British among their allies and among neutrals.

3. Even if the attack did not eventually occur, credit might be taken for causing its abandonment, as the British did in 1940.

4. Execution of this suggestion, if approved, should be left primarily to the British, as having paramount interest. Although the Committee realizes the need of discussing this idea with the British, it desires approval of the idea by the Joint Chiefs of Staff before laying it before the British and tendering the services of the affiliated U.S. agencies.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

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J.P.W.C. 14

APRIL 30, 1942

COPY NO. 13

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

ESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY COMMITTEE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS

Note by the Secretary

1. The Enclosure has been presented to the Committee for consideration, and with amendments, has received approval.

LT. COL. A. H. ONTHANK

Secretary

SECRETENCLOSUREESTABLISHMENT OF A SECURITY COMMITTEE FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS.PROPOSAL

It is proposed that a Joint Security Committee be established, to prevent the leakage of information in connection with military operations, to devise measures to deceive the enemy in connection therewith, to coordinate all security measures within the armed forces and to act in an advisory capacity on security for all other government agencies that have direct or indirect activities bearing on military operations.

DISCUSSION.General.

Surprise is essential to successful military operations, but it is difficult to secure because of the extensive preparations which these operations require.

Without concealment of these preparations surprise is impossible. Therefore secrecy is essential. The prospect of obtaining surprise may be greatly increased by a vigorous and imaginative psychological warfare policy of active deception, so that the enemy is led to misconstrue even that true information which he does obtain.

The essence of successful deception is truth which presents a false picture. Whether deception is practiced during preliminary arrangements, through rumors, or whether it is applied tactically, there must be some true facts which the enemy can check; otherwise he will not be persuaded. Deception must spring from the false inference which he is induced to draw.

Secrecy depends on habitual discretion on the part of all involved, on sound routine methods, and on intelligent

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staff work. It is essential that the plan for joint operations be watched closely through all its stages, and the probable opportunities for leakage anticipated.

Secrecy is not, however, an end in itself. It is necessary to balance secrecy with efficient preparation. Secrecy must not be carried to the point where not enough officers know of an operation to carry it out efficiently, where necessary intelligence is not made available, and where propaganda is not carefully fitted in with the plan.

The enemy is constantly seeking, by spies in all classes and by all other available means, for information of our objectives, the composition of our forces, our intended movements, and the time of the various phase of our operations. All usual security methods must be enforced to prevent so far as is possible leakage of information which singly, or together with other apparently innocuous scraps of data, will give the enemy information of this sort. The British formed such a group when talk of their proposed raids on Norway was circulated in the harbors of preparation and lead to German knowledge of the enterprise and defeat of same.

In the case of a major operation, it will often be impossible to hide completely the fact that it is in progress. It is therefore necessary to deceive the enemy as to our true intentions. In such a case a complete plan of deception will be required.

A complete deception scheme should be a reasonable alternative to the general plan, appear plausible to the enemy, not be prematurely revealed, and supply some incorrect information to the enemy. It must be an integral part of the preparations designed to secure success for the real operation.

S E C R E T

The deception scheme (a "cover" scheme) will be submitted by the Joint Security Committee to the Joint Planners for approval, to insure that it does not conflict with any real plan. When approved, the execution of the cover plan which affects the troops taking part will be a responsibility of command. The Joint Security Committee will be responsible for coordinating other measures designed to mislead the enemy and to prevent the enemy from gaining information of our real intentions. Plans for military operations must be carefully scrutinized for all possible leaks and all possible precautions taken against their eventualities.

Once an operation has begun, security is a responsibility of the theater commander, who should plan and coordinate execution of security and deception schemes within his command, and will recommend adequate security measures to non-military agencies involved in order to ensure their cooperation.

Composition.

The Joint Security Committee should include one officer from each of the following agencies: Army Operations Division (as chairman for land operations), Naval Operations, G-2, GHI, A-2, Psychological Warfare Branch.

The Joint Security Committee will function in accordance with policies laid down by the Joint Planners.

Recommendations:

The establishment of a Joint Security Committee to recommend necessary measures to prevent leakage of information, to devise deception, and to coordinate security measures of all agencies in connection with military operations.

The Committee be allotted a budget and be authorized to obtain its own clerical personnel, equipment, supplies and space.

S E C R E TCOPY NO. 13J.P.W.C. 13APRIL 27, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEENEAR EAST - DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN LEGIONNote by the Secretary

1. The Enclosure, copy of a memorandum from Mr. M. J. Gladakis to Hon. John J. McCloy, Asst. Secretary of War, has been transmitted to this committee for consideration. Notation was made that the subject should be related to suggestions previously made in J.P.W.C. 12.

A. W. ONTIAR,.
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREMEMORANDUM

To: The Honorable John J. McCloy
Assistant Secretary of the War Department

From: N. J. Cladakis

Subject: Development of an American Foreign Legion in the
Near East

The attached pamphlet (to be circulated at meeting of J.P.W.C.) concerning the advisability of organizing a foreign legion under the American flag in the Near East is the framework of an idea. Even as an idea it has immense value, because it can be made effective with very little money, material, ships or men. The principal thing it needs is authority -- the authority of the United States Army. Much of its effectiveness would depend upon the ingenuity and resourcefulness of those who were in command on the spot of action.

The basic idea is outlined in the memorandum of N. J. Cladakis to Mr. Milo Perkins. The significance of the idea is expressed in the exchange of letters between the President and Mr. Louis Adamic. The kind of feasible operations are detailed in the geographical maps. From information available here prospective operations can be envisaged -- better ones doubtless can be improvised in the field during operations.

Once authorization were given to the United States Army to proceed, the following could be done swiftly with a minimum of officer leadership and a minimum of technicians from America:

1. The establishment of headquarters under the American flag in Cyprus, which would be the magnet for the kind of recruits and much of the arms and small vessels required.

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2. The broadcasting from headquarters of propaganda of ACTION through small transmitters on ordinary wave lengths, and not on short wave radio, since too few people in the occupied countries have the latter type.

3. The establishment of a base at headquarters for the distribution of material, especially to such forces as those of Mihailovich. It would be more feasible to use planes to drop equipment to guerrillas from Cyprus than from Russia. Immense encouragement would be had from a little such equipment.

4. The use of the base at headquarters as a center for the reception of allied agents and informed refugees escaping from the occupied countries. More facts could be correlated and operations authenticated, particularly those relating to the elements in the occupied countries which are pro-United Nations. A staff for this work would require a limited personnel.

(Mr. Nicholas Mirkovich, Chief of the Office of Economic Affairs and the Office of the Reconstruction of Yugoslavia, has available to responsible military officials a current report of the domestic, military and political situations of the occupied countries and the diversionists in them who would be useful to us.)

5. The actual -- receptive -- commando operations by refugees from the countries to be topped -- men who know the conditions, the geography and the people they would meet.

If there is no delay, very much can be accomplished by a few highly competent officers, trained to organize and to administer, possessing imagination and courage, supported by the United States Army.

/s/ E. J. Cindakis

APR 27, 1942

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 11

April 9, 1942

COPY NO. 13

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PLAN TO CUSHION PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST POSSIBLE
GERMAN SUCCESSES IN SPRING OFFENSIVE

Note by the Secretary

The Enclosure, is presented by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREPLAN TO CUSHION PUBLIC OPINION AGAINST POSSIBLE
GERMAN SUCCESSIONS IN SPRING OFFENSIVEPURPOSE.

To cushion public opinion against possible German successes in the coming spring drive.

BACKGROUND.

The winter operations on the Russian fronts have been reported to the public as a great successful Russian offensive with a deterioration of the fighting powers of the German armies. Axis propaganda has, at the same time, lowered the level of public expectancy for victories in Germany. This leaves our own public and peoples in Latin America and in occupied countries in a vulnerable position from a morale point of view to withstand the possibly unexpected German victories that may come in the initial stages in the coming spring offensive in Russia. The effect on the U.S. public would probably be to make it demand in stronger terms than ever some kind of offensive action on our part.

DISCUSSION.

Propaganda should be started now by various government agencies to rationalize this situation so that the effect on the public will be minimized.

Building up by press and radio comment a colossal drive with greatly increased man power in the German armies taken from factories and recruited from allies, and with heavily equipped numbers of planes, tanks and equipment produced during the winter, will lead the public to expect successes from the German armies.

On the other hand, to exploit Russian tactics and strategy of last fall for use again this spring; in retreating until German communications become too long, will serve to temper the possible shock to the public of early military events on this front.

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It is desirable to develop, if possible, public opinion so that it will absorb news of possible allied reverses and at the same time to control it from demanding some offensive action at the wrong time.

RECOMMENDATION.

In order to seize the propaganda initiative, it is recommended that a letter, substantially as below, be sent to War Department Bureau of Public Relations and Navy Office of Public Relations, for control in the domestic field, and to the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., for control in the foreign field, of all propaganda issued by non-military government agencies:

DRAFT OF LETTER:

"The following is a general directive for the presentation of both foreign and domestic propaganda by government agencies on the expected spring offensive by Germany against Russia.

"Unexpected Axis victories may raise the public demands for offensive United States and British action to such a degree as to seriously embarrass the government on the conduct of war.

"The following points should be interpreted to the public:

"It is asserted that the spring offensive of the German armies will be an all-out effort from the advance strong support points held by them. These armies have been recently reinforced by large numbers of fresh troops drawn from factories and from allies. It is possibly larger than any military force brought together by Germany on any front. Great numbers of tanks, planes and guns have been produced this winter and brought to strategic points on the front. The coming offensive will be carried out by the most colossal strength in man

SECRET

and equipment that the Germans can bring together. Such an offensive is bound to have considerable initial success. These possibilities should be explained to the public so that it will not only be prepared, but will already have discounted some of these possible military events when they happen.

"On the other hand our propaganda should help maintain the morale of the Russians and stimulate their war effort. We can praise the persistence of their winter offensive and their considerable successes. In order to lower the popular expectancy for the Russians to hold the present line and drive back the Germans, it will be well to praise Russia's masterful tactics and strategy of last summer and autumn. The Russians can fall back again to absorb the first full blows of the Germans and continue withdrawing while keeping their forces together by extending the German lines and communications and making it difficult to bring up supplies."

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J.F.W.C. 7

MARCH 21, 1942.

COPY NO. 14

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

DEMAND FOR UNITED NATIONS OFFENSIVE

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, submitted by the Psychological Warfare Branch, W.I.S., G-2, is presented to the Committee for consideration.

A. H. ONTHANK
Secretary

SECRETENCLOSURE

Growing Popular Demand for United Nations Offensive

I. PURPOSE:

1. The growing worldwide popular demand for an offensive by the United Nations is creating a situation on the development of which the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee should request guidance.

II. DISCUSSION:

1. Principal among the many expressions of this demand are those by:
 - a. The Russians in speeches by Stalin and Litvinoff for the creation of a front in Western Europe.
 - b. The British Press and Radio.
 - c. The Domestic Press and Radio.

2. These demands will develop into expectations and encourage the belief that some action can be looked for in the near future. If not satisfied this may lead to disappointment and a lowering of morale.

3. The wave of popular enthusiasm for an offensive in the near future might assume such proportions as to become embarrassing to the actual conduct of the war.

4. It is a function of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to call attention to this situation and take appropriate action with proper guidance from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to either:

1. Lower the level of expectancy for offensive action.
2. Encourage it.
3. Based upon the decisions arrived at for handling the situation, directives should be issued by the appropriate

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authority to the various governmental agencies, both U. S. and British who have contacts with the press and radio, to take the necessary action in the matter.

III. RECOMMENDATIONS:

S E C R E T

J.P.W.C. 6

MARCH 20, 1942

COPY NO. 14

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PROPAGANDA FOR RUSSIA

Note by Secretary

1. The attached proposal from the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., G-2, is presented to the Committee for consideration.

A. H. ONTHANK

Secretary

SECRETENCLOSUREJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

Propaganda for Russia

I. Proposal

1. To assist in the maintenance of Russian morale and to stimulate a continuance of the Russian war effort.
2. To cement relationships between Russia and the other United Nations.

II. Discussion

1. Analysis of recent speeches by Stalin on the birthday of the Red Army, followed by two speeches of Litvinov in the United States give expression to:
 - a. The desire of Russia for concrete evidence of the sincerity of allied assistance.
 - b. Practically a demand that a western front be established to relieve pressure on Russia.
 - c. A veiled threat that unless some concrete evidence of continued allied support is forthcoming, Russia may make a separate peace.
2. The question of propaganda to Russia must depend for guidance upon the declared intentions of the United Nations from both the military and political standpoint.
3. The British Political Warfare Executive, as has previously been called to the attention of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, requested the Coordinator of Information to commit the Germans, through propaganda, to a spring offensive in Russia.
4. It is apparent that a propaganda campaign emanating from the United States and aimed at Russia should

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have as its primary objective the stimulation and continuance of the Russian war effort. Such a campaign should be considered and commented on by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee. Guidance in this matter should be obtained from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Recommendations

1. To be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee

SECRETCOPY NO. 13J.P.W.C. 5/1April 4, 1942.PLAN FOR GERMAN SPRING OFFENSIVE AGAINST RUSSIA

1. PURPOSE. To achieve a propaganda victory for the United Nations, by committing the Germans to a Spring offensive against RUSSIA, which the Germans might fail to execute.

2. BACKGROUND.

a. The British Political Warfare Executive proposed to the Press Radio Section, Coordinator of Information, that U. S. propaganda commit the Germans to a Spring offensive against RUSSIA. If the German offensive did not materialize, the Germans would be in a position of difficult explanation.

(1) Analogous action by the British was cited by which British propaganda, in committing the Germans to an invasion of Britain after Dunkirk, had proved successful when the Germans failed to fulfill the commitment.

3. DISCUSSION.

a. If the Germans do undertake the offensive and are successful, our propaganda will have emphasized their victory.

b. If the offensive is not undertaken in whole or in part and instead Germany attacks in the Middle East, both our propaganda and our intelligence will be discredited at home and abroad.

c. Russian propaganda has been attempting to force a United States-British offensive in Western Europe to relieve German pressure on Russia. The proposed propaganda plan would support the Russian contention and arouse public

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opinion to force a strategic commitment which may or may not be in accord with the strategic plans of the United Nations.

d. Present information indicates general acceptance of the probability that a German offensive will be undertaken against Russia this spring.

4. RECOMMENDATION. For reasons stated above the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee recommends:

That the Joint U. S. Chiefs of Staff request through the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee the Coordinator of Information to decline the proposal of the British Political Warfare Executive to use propaganda to further commit the Germans to a Spring offensive against RUSSIA.

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COPY NO. 14

J.P.W.C. 5

MARCH 20, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

GERMAN SPRING OFFENSIVE AGAINST RUSSIA

Note by Secretary

1. The attached proposal from the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., G-2, is presented to the Committee for consideration.

A. H. ONTHANK,

Secretary.

ENCLOSUREJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

German Spring Offensive against Russia

I. PROPOSAL:

1. At a meeting on March 5, 1942 of the Press Radio Section of the Coordinator of Information, it was proposed by Mr. Pflaum of the Coordinator's office that American propaganda commit the Germans to a spring offensive against Russia.
2. This proposal was made at the request of the British Political Warfare Executive with the agreement that British propaganda would take the same line.
3. It was believed by the Coordinator that since British propaganda committing the Germans to an invasion of Britain after Dunkirk had proved successful when the Germans failed to fulfill the commitment, this new but similar propaganda directive would also be successful. The C.O.I. contends that the establishment of this objective may furnish a propaganda victory for the United Nations if the objective is not attained.

II. DISCUSSION:

1. The Psychological Warfare Branch submits the following considerations:
 1. Propaganda must be integrated with future war plans. This proposal may not be so integrated.

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- b. If the Germans do undertake the offensive and are successful, our propaganda will have emphasized their victory.
- c. If the offensive is not undertaken in whole or in part and instead Germany attacks in the Middle East, both our propaganda and our intelligence will be discredited at home and abroad.
- d. The proposal, from the American point of view, assumes that the chief need from propaganda at this point in the war is for a propaganda victory to stimulate morale. This underestimates the American capacity for facing realities. No synthetic victories are needed.
- e. Russian propaganda has been attempting to force a United States-British offensive in Western Europe to relieve German pressure on Russia. The proposed propaganda plan would support the Russian contention and arouse public opinion to force a strategic commitment which may or may not be in accord with the strategic plans of the United Nations.
- f. The military and propaganda situation now and the situation after Dunkirk are not the same.

III. RECOMMENDATION:

To be made by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

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J.P.W.C. 4/1

COPY NO. 14

MARCH 20, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

INFORMATION RE POLAND

Note by the Secretary

1. The attached memorandum and study are submitted by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., G-2, as pertaining to the request for information of the Polish Military Attaché, (J.P.W.C. 4).

A. H. ONTHANK

Secretary.

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ENCLOSUREPROPOSED REARMMENT OF CIVILIANS UNDER AXIS CONTROL

1. Based on the reasonable assumption that there are hundreds of thousands of men, women and older children in the occupied countries of Europe ready and anxious to assist the United Nations in fighting for their cause, the problem of giving them the effective armed means of rendering such assistance is a part of psychological warfare.
2. The psychological objectives would be:
 - a. Demoralization of troops used for policing conquered countries.
 - b. Stimulation of civilian morale and will to revolt.
 - c. Lessening of civilian fear of reprisals for acts of sabotage.
3. The attainment of these objectives could be accomplished by means of a wide and quantitative distribution of small arms to the civilian population, together with instructions for their effective employment.
4. The proposal offered for consideration involves:
 - a. The design and manufacture in large (5,000,000) quantities of small, inexpensive but heavy calibre pistols to use standard ammunition.
 - b. The preparation of instructions for use.
 - c. The distribution, with twenty-five rounds each, of such pistols by means of:
 - (1) Dropping from planes via parachutes.
 - (2) Through agents.
5. The matter of timing is important:
 - a. Design and manufacture should proceed in complete secrecy as to the ultimate use of weapons.

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- b. Plans for distribution should parallel manufacture.
- c. Radio announcement should precede distribution.
- (1) No date should be given.

STUDY OF PROPOSED REARMING OF CIVILIANS
UNDER AXIS CONTROL

The Situation

Since the outbreak of the present war, the people of conquered nations are disarmed at the outset, and, therefore, have no means of organized defense. They are helpless to take any active part against their aggressors without material aid from the Allied nations fighting for their deliverance.

The Germans have provided the background for a successful counter-revolution by their treatment of the people in conquered countries.

It is believed that in these conquered countries there are many hundreds of thousands of men, women and older children who would gladly assist the Allies in fighting for their cause if they had facilities and guidance. The United States and Britain can supply these facilities and guidance at low cost and by means that will effectively obtain the active aid of these people in a universal harassment of the enemy within their boundaries; this will create a terrific drain on the man-power of the enemy for police work and, at the same time, lower the morale of enemy units and enemy forces assigned to policing duty.

One of the burning points in the last war was mutiny by the German navy. This was alleged to have been caused by submarines being sent to sea and never returning. This kind of duty on submarines extremely unpopular with German sailors. In the present

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war this factor has been recognized and corrected for both naval and aircraft by continually juggling bases of operation. If it were possible to make policing of conquered nations equally unpopular, it should go a long way toward shortening the war. This is borne out somewhat by Germany's present complaint of Russian civilians back of their lines continually harassing the military with arms left with them by the retreating Russians.

Psychologically, the situation is much different when one knows that his enemies are unarmed and thus easily controlled and when he knows that they are armed and able to shoot back. Psychologically the situation is also different when one knows who the enemy is and when one doesn't. A shot in the back could occur at any time. Who is friend and who is foe? Who has guns and who hasn't?

The Proposal

It is suggested that the United States and Britain undertake at once to manufacture and distribute from five to ten million very small, inexpensive, heavy caliber pistols to the inhabitants of conquered countries.

These pistols would be secretly distributed by undercover contacts or dropped by small parachutes from airplanes, flying at night at high altitudes, and scattered to obtain the widest distribution.

Each pistol should be accompanied by twenty or twenty-five rounds of ammunition and an instruction sheet printed in the language of the country in which it is to be distributed.

The box containing each pistol and ammunition might bear the following printed message: "Hide this package until it can be examined in private". The printed sheet inside should contain complete instructions not only on the operation of the arm itself

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but should carry a message of encouragement from the Allies and specific instructions on how to use the arm under various conditions with the minimum possibility of detection; also instructions on passing these arms around to others who are loyal to the country so that they in turn might help the cause. It should also be mentioned that these arms are being distributed to all conquered nations. The individual parachutes used for landing each arm without damage might be labeled "V" for Victory to tie in with the present campaign.

Method of Manufacture

Since these arms would be designed primarily for relatively few firings in short-range work, neither expensive finish nor long life would be essential; they should be extremely simple in design. They should be chambered to use some standard cartridge for which our present industry is tooled to manufacture in mass production.

It is possible that the parts for this arm could be manufactured by small shops throughout the nation on a specification basis and then assembled at some central point. They could be shipped to various distribution points in Europe, as produced, and held for some short time for distribution.

Cost

It is estimated that at all arms, such as mentioned above, could be produced at very low cost, perhaps as low as a dollar or two dollars each, and that the entire campaign could be carried out in all conquered nations for approximately the cost of one battleship.

Expected Effect

The success of any military operation depends to a very great extent on morale -- both morale of troops and morale of civilians.

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Having arms capable of concealment at home, place of work and on the person seems to be the most effective tool of the civilian. While it might be perfectly practicable for a Russian peasant to conceal a grenade, rifle or even a small machine gun, it would be impractical for civilians in the more densely populated areas to conceal anything but a small firearm such as a pistol.

It is true that Germany at present tries to bully the conquered nations into submission by threats and carrying out of reprisals. However, this is relatively easy for them to accomplish among an unarmed people. If they knew that hundreds of thousands of arms had been distributed to the civilian population with no definite information of how many or where, they would hesitate to shoot a hundred hostages for each German killed for fear that ten times that number of Germans might be shot the following day.

Suppose that the Germans or friends of the Germans did find four weapons to every one found by a patriot. These small weapons would be of no value to the German war effort. And think of the physical damage that could be done by those which did not fall into German hands.

In addition, the psychological effects would be startling. If it were stated over the radio that 200,000 revolvers were being dropped and the Germans actually found only 100,000, the knowledge that 100,000 guns were missing or in the hands of German hating patriots would have a direct effect upon German morale.

Even if only a few weapons were distributed, if the Germans believed that more had been dropped, this would indicate to them that since they had failed to find the weapons, they must be in the hands of their enemies.

Furthermore, since the exact time at which the weapons were to be dropped would not be known, German anxiety states would be prevalent.

CCS 385 (C-16-42)

SECRETJ.P.W.C. 4COPY NO. 14MARCH 16, 1942JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEINFORMATION RE POLANDNote by the Secretary

The below memorandum from the A.C. of S., G-2, War Department General Staff is presented to the Committee for discussion.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

- - - - -
ENCLOSURE

March 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2.

On March 5, the Chief of the Eastern European Section referred to this office a memorandum, as follows: "Polish M/A requests information on the following:--

"What agency can be contacted which can make available arms and supplies to the population in Nazi occupied territory for revolt and rebellion?

"Type of equipment desired - hand weapons, explosives, grenades, light 'Ds and ammunition."

The Polish M/A has been contacted and it appears that this is a matter concerning psychological warfare which must be taken up by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

Recommendation:

That this be referred to the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee for action.

Percy G. Black,
Colonel, G.S.C.

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COPY NO. 14

MARCH 20, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

SUGGESTED CHINA PLAN

Note by the Secretary

1. The attached plan is submitted by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., G-2, as supplementary to J.P.W.C. 3.

A. H. ONTHANK

Secretary

ENCLOSUREJOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEPARTIAL PLAN FOR COOPERATION IN THE CHINESE THEATER OF OPERATIONSI. PURPOSE

1. It is essential that a general policy with respect to China be established for guidance as soon as possible.
2. The present difficulties of supplying material aid make it apparent that an important existing means of influencing the course of the war in China is through the use of psychologic warfare. Among the devices of such warfare, propaganda is important because it can be used constructively as well as destructively, as determined by psychologic strategy. Applied to China, this is important, since when the Chinese think they are whipped, they are whipped, but not until then.
3. Two main military objectives with respect to China can be assumed to be:
 - a. To Keep as many Japanese divisions as possible occupied in China.
 - b. To preserve Chinese territory, resources and cadres of Chinese personnel for use in later military operations against Japan.

II. PROGRAM

1. Although psychologic warfare operation is a function of command in the theater in China, it is thought possible to help achieve these objectives by cooperative action on the basis of a general plan.
2. A general cooperative plan for psychologic warfare in the China theater should aim:
 - a. To maintain and stimulate the Chinese will to fight.
To do this, it is essential:
 - (1) To clarify China's war aims.

These should be integrated with the war aims of the United Nations, and so clarified as to make the Chinese zealous to enjoy the benefits of a victory which they can help to achieve.

- (2) To maintain and promote the prestige of Anglo-American military and naval personnel with the Chinese.
- (3) To rally overseas Chinese throughout the world to the cause of the United Nations.

b. To support the present National Government at Chungking.

To do this, it is essential:

- (1) To support the Kuomintang [Nationalist Party] against the Communists and radicals in China.
- (2) To establish a standard of unity for China. (Unanimity of war effort by all groups in China.)
- (3) To register an expectation of unity within China.
- (4) To build up the Chinese sense of the importance of China's role in the war.
- (5) To condemn appeasement and armistice.
- (6) To give the Chinese State both actual and symbolic evidences of international equality. (At this point, coordinate diplomatic, fiscal, and military action could counter Japanese and defeatist propaganda, and show that China is fighting as a formally equal partner in the ABCR front.)

c. To prevent the use of Chinese raw or manufactured materials, labor supply or puppet troops by Japan.

To do this, it is essential:

- (1) To upset the economy of Occupied China.
(For instance currency as it affects Japanese supply problems)
- (2) To excite the natural acquisitiveness of the Japanese in Occupied China. (Hurt Japanese morale as well as economic plans)

d. To emphasize the expectation of the United Nations that the unity of China will be maintained inviolate, and to stress Nationalist and not Communist or radical leadership of such unity.

To do this, it is essential:

- (1) To maintain and promote governmental, political and economic stability in Free China.
- (2) To give suitable public recognition to the Chinese leaders.

e. To demoralize and render untrustworthy to Japan those Chinese political and military establishments created with Japanese aid.

To do this, it is essential:

- (1) To impair the morale of the Wang Ch'ing-Wei government at Nanking. (Propaganda job)
- (2) To prepare further plans properly adapted to the group mentality of each of the other traitor groups.

f. To reinforce and strengthen such Chinese propaganda efforts as may assist in the accomplishment of our main objectives.

To do this, it is essential:

- (1) To coordinate our propaganda efforts with those of the Chinese.

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- (2) To aid in counteracting Axis propaganda designed for China.
3. This partial Plan does not include, for immediate consideration, such features of psychologic warfare as sabotage, terrorization, etc. Since Free China is already controlled by its own army which is closely familiar with the physical and the psychological terrain, any American action will have to be agreed to by Chiang Kai-Shek, since it is a function of command.
 4. A survey of qualified personnel and other resources at hand, to be made now, would facilitate compliance with requests from the theater commander for cooperative help in the execution of psychological warfare.

III. DISCUSSION

1. Short-range, dynamically delivered propaganda--to be closely synchronized with the conduct of field operations--should be planned and timed by the theater commander in cooperation with such helpful materials and personnel as he may request from the Joint and/or Combined Chiefs of Staff.
2. Long-range, educationally presented propaganda-- particularly propaganda whose source is the United States proper -- may be planned and executed as a means of promoting the general conduct of the war, and may be carried out under the direct supervision of the Psychological Warfare Branch, in consultation with the theater commander through General Macruder and in active collaboration with existing governmental and military agencies.
3. Long-range plans for immediate initiation, together with the agencies whose collaboration is particularly essential, are set forth in the accompanying Suggestions for the Immediate Implementation of the China Plan for Psychological Warfare.

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COPY NO. 14

J.P.W.C. 3

MARCH 16, 1942.

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

SUGGESTED CHINA PLAN

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure is presented by the Psychological Warfare Branch, W.I.S., G-2, for consideration by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

SECRETENCLOSUREMEMORANDUM TO PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE ON CHINA.

1. It is essential that a general policy with respect to China be established for guidance as soon as possible.
2. The present difficulties of supplying material aid make it apparent that the present existing means of influencing the course of the war in China is through the use of psychologic warfare. Besides the use of subversion, sabotage, intimidation, terrorization and demoralization, this type of warfare includes propaganda as its most effective weapon. Propaganda can be used constructively as well as destructively, as determined by psychologic strategy. Applied to China this is important, since when the Chinese think they are whipped they are whipped, but not until then.
3. Two main objectives with respect to China seem apparent:
 - a. To keep as many Japanese Divisions as possible occupied in China.
 - b. To preserve Chinese territory, resources and cadres of Chinese personnel for use in later military operation against Japan.
4. It is thought possible to achieve these objectives through the use of psychologic warfare, which should aim:
 - a. To maintain and stimulate the Chinese will to fight
 - b. To support the present National Government at Chungking.
 - c. To prevent the use by Japan of Chinese economic and military resources - raw materials, manufactured goods, labor supplies and puppet troops.
 - d. To stress for Chinese consumption the expectation of United Nations that the unity of China will be maintained

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inviolate, and to emphasize Nationalist rather than Communist or Radical leadership of such unity.

e. To demoralize Chinese political and military puppet troops, rendering them useless to Japan.

f. To reinforce such local Chinese propaganda efforts as may assist in the accomplishments of the main directives.

* * *

I. CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FRAMING OF PROPAGANDA DIRECTIVES.

It has been made very plain that the Chinese armies are not at all on the offensive at the present time, that they accept the Japanese position as a stalemate, and that also, as is usual in China, the desire of individuals or factions to gain special advantage at the expense of the Republic is operating to the detriment of the military effort as a whole.

In this situation, certain Chinese characteristics play into our hands. In contrast to the European and American nations, which have acquired a certain immunity to propaganda, the modern Chinese represent almost virgin territory for skillful psychological manipulation from the United States. Our efforts will be aided by the fact that the articulate classes in China are accustomed to naive propaganda easily recognized as governmental or "proletarian", but are unprepared to counteract a skillful propaganda which makes no attempt to impose on them or to offend them.

Some of the most important Chinese political traits, from the point of view of a propaganda approach, are the following:

1. Chinese self-esteem.

The Chinese are not fully responsive to the symbols and appeals of national patriotism, as developed by the Western peoples. God, fatherland, flag and government do not mean much to the Chinese. Instead, the Chinese -- even those of

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the lowest classes -- are intensely proud of China as an old, advanced culture and civilization. It is probable that a majority of the Chinese even today feel themselves superior to the technologically advanced nations. The conflict between this traditional and well-founded sense of superiority and the humiliatingly inferior position of China as a modern nation-state, is one of the biggest practical motivations in the war, since the Chinese feel that if they defeat Japan they will have at least proved their equality in international politics.

2. Revolutionary idealism.

The present Chinese revolution, now past its ninetieth year, has finally accustomed the Chinese to glorify dynamic change, idealistic statements of long-range social objectives, and radical proclamations of democracy. All Chinese politicians, whether sordid or patriotic, use the high-flown language of revolutionary human betterment, and the articulate Chinese public expects to hear such language.

3. Individual self-esteem.

The Chinese are not any more vain than other people, but they are obligated by their traditions to live lives fitted to certain stereotyped roles. A Chinese cannot retain his efficiency or self-respect unless he thinks others see him as he sees himself -- fulfilling the part which a rational natural and human order impose. It is vital to remember that the Chinese maintain (without religion) a strictness of social discipline which only our best organized religious groups (such as Catholics, Mormons) preserve in the Western world. They do this through self-esteem and shame, not through supernatural sanctions.

4. Practicality.

Although the Chinese insist on the formal language of idealism, they are keenly aware that affairs must also be

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carried out on the basis of practicality. Idealistic policy and practical policy, both of them required by the Confucianist tradition, do not always coincide in China. (Idealistic proclamation of "national unity" does not preclude civil war; "national resistance" might not forestall an armistice today.) The modern Chinese insists on retaining freedom of movement on both levels of action. Effective American action must accordingly preserve a sincerely idealistic approach, but it must also offer the Chinese government a succession of hard-headed economic, military and political bargains.

For example, professions of a common democratic cause are not only good, but necessary. Of all the public audiences in the world today, the Chinese is perhaps the only one which would respond affirmatively to war and post-war aims which scheduled benefits to be attained as far ahead as 2000 A.D. Yet the modern Chinese is not bemused or hypnotized by such extreme far-sightedness; he looks to the day and hour to exploit each momentary advantage. Thus, American long-range appeals could be powerfully reinforced by immediate retrocession to China of all our special extraterritorial rights. Such retrocession has been promised the Chinese Foreign Office by our State Department, but there is danger that our enemies will gain the psychological advantage of acting first in this respect. The Chinese respect our idealism, but more practically they note that the United States has done nothing concrete as yet to carry out its general promise of international equality for China.

Admiration of wit and mischief.

The Chinese respect intelligence above vitality, studiousness above health, guile above force, mischief above discipline. Any action which can appeal to wit and mischief, which is practical, and which injures the dignity and self-esteem

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of the antagonist without violating the strict Chinese decencies, is likely to succeed.

An instance: Wang Ch'ing-wei is reported to have put a price of \$500,000.00 on Chiang's head. Chiang is supposed to have replied by putting a price of \$1.00 on Wang's head. The \$1.00 price guaranteed immunity and further reward to any potential assassin, but made a fool of Wang at the same time.

6. Interest in private action.

Wherever possible, the Chinese should be allowed the opportunity for private initiative and profit. Centuries of loose government have accustomed the Chinese to doing things for themselves, and private affairs are usually better managed in China than are public.

* * *

II. SUGGESTED INITIAL DIRECTIVES FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL OFFENSIVE IN CHINA.

The means essential to the accomplishment of the main objectives in the suggested China plan may be implemented by the following directives:

1. To maintain and stimulate the Chinese will to fight.

To do this it is essential:

- a. To clarify China's War Aims.
- b. To maintain and promote the prestige of Anglo-American Military and Naval personnel with the Chinese.
- c. To rally overseas Chinese throughout the world to the cause of the United Nations.
- d. To take advantage of current incidents and situations capable of adaptation to this purpose.

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Further explanation of these directives the need for and means of their accomplishment are enlarged as follows:

a. Clarify China's war aims.

(1) It is essential that Chinese war aims be integrated with those of the United Nations and made appealing so as to assure the Chinese that if they fight hard they will get more and if they fight poorly they will get less. It should be pointed out that the Chinese war aims do not merely include restoration of the territory controlled in 1937, but return to the territory controlled by China in 1894. The Chinese will not be contented merely with driving out the invader from the territory which he has occupied during the present war but they wish to recover territory seized in earlier Japanese invasions. In other words, they insist on peace with victory, not peace without victory. Since a propaganda plan includes diplomatic issues necessary to its execution, a forecast should be made of China's post-war role by exploratory comments and consultations which will enable the present Chinese government to give realistic promises to its citizens of national dignity, prosperity, and stability for the post-war period.

(2) Emphasis must be given to the modernization of China, which is already a cardinal dogma in Chungking's plans, with particular emphasis on carrying present efforts to an even more effective rate of progress; all forms of communication, as well as on-the-spot contacts in America, officials in West China should be used for this purpose. This includes popularization, in the western democracies as well as in China, of the theme that the Chinese will proceed soon after

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victory to the enjoyment of the good things of modern industrialism (cameras, radios, bicycles, busses, movies) and avoidance of the "China-is-a-potential-market" refrain, which would lead the Chinese to think that our interest in them was purely financial.

b. To maintain and promote the prestige of Anglo-American Military and Naval personnel with the Chinese.

(1) Emphasis should be placed on the soundness of British and American Military personnel and it should be shown that the Anglo-American powers have a military tradition no less glorious than the Prusso-German. Every effort should be made to popularize British and American military history and to show that the age of present existing military units go back, in the case of the British Army, to the seventeenth century, while units of the United States Army go back to the eighteenth century. A further help in this regard would be suitable translations into Chinese of both theoretical and practical works on the conduct of war by British and American authors, such as the works of Fletcher Pratt and Hanson Baldwin.

(2) The practicability of American and British military effort should be brought out. The fact should be made clear that America and Britain are suffering initial reverses, not because they are militarily inept but because their devotion to peace blinded them to the military preparations of the aggressors. To illustrate this, parallels may be drawn between China, Britain and the United States to show that all three countries now suffer because of their love of peace and their desire to renounce military preparations. It should be further brought out that few men are more rational than men

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drugged with the fanaticism of a distorted ideology. Emphasis should also be placed on the storehouse of technical brain power available to the Anglo-American nations as a result of their peacetime industrial development, all of which can now be converted to military use.

(3) As the Chinese have gained the impression that the German and Soviet armies have out-demonstrated the Anglo-Americans in inventiveness with respect to war, every opportunity should be taken to feature examples of Anglo-American daring and originality of thought and action with respect to the war.

Notes on Implementation:

This matter of promoting prestige of the Anglo-American military and naval personnel should be carried out not only with respect to the Chinese in China but also with respect to the overseas Chinese. All available propaganda channels should be used for this purpose, but particular note should be made of publications that may be read by overseas Chinese, and which find their way to China and have an important influence on the English-reading Chinese. Such journals as The Nation and The New Republic (both of which commonly portray British and American military men as brass-hatted fogies or die-hard pukka sahibs), should be offset by making available through whatever means necessary such alert publications as the American and British Service Journals, the American Rifleman, popular aviation journals, etc., etc. A Chinese-language military digest would undoubtedly have great influence in the situation if the difficulties of editing, translation, printing and distribution could be overcome.

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c. To rally overseas Chinese throughout the world to the cause of the United Nations.

(1) Most of the Chinese residing in the United States, Canada and South America are of Cantonese origin, and while in many instances their long residence in the countries of their adoption has given them a knowledge of these foreign languages, the most powerful influence by means of the radio could be secured through broadcasts in the Cantonese dialect. Their understanding and support through this means could be secured with greater effectiveness.

(2) The unfortunate similarity in appearance between Chinese and Japanese leads to many instances of misidentification. Every effort should be made to urge local and state authorities to prevent such misidentification and to extend sympathy to the Chinese on appropriate occasions.

(3) Positive suppression, wherever legally or administratively possible, of the use of such insulting references as to the "yellow" race should be attempted. Such appellations play directly into Axis hands.

(4) Every advantage should be taken of news concerning the Chinese in America to build up Chinese moral, both here and elsewhere, with particular reference made to Chinese support of the British and American war effort. This news should be transmitted, where possible, not only to the various Chinese communities in the United States but to Japan and Europe as well. It is interesting to note that the Axis radio, (not ours), reported the presence of Chinese among American troops in North Ireland. Such reports, both stressed and amplified,

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provide excellent material for counteracting Axis exploitation of the charge, "American race discrimination."

(5) Use should be made of the overseas branches of the Kuomintang within the United States and the British Empire. Since the Kuomintang, or Chinese Nationalist Party, is officially associated with the Chinese Government, it offers the possibility of usefulness because of its influence on overseas Chinese. It is suggested that invitations might be sent to Kuomintang branches offering to take selected parties of properly identified Chinese visitors through army camps and establishments where those may be open to the general public. This would be for the purpose of letting the Chinese see the progress in American armament and training. It would also be desirable to make use of the Kuomintang in connection with purely domestic organizations within the United States, such, for example, as civilian defense in the Chinese quarter, campaigns for the sale of Treasury Bonds in the same. Intelligence agencies of the Kuomintang should be requested to aid in checking Chinese defeatists, pacifists or class war activities within the United States and British Empire.

(6) Publicity should be given to men of the Chinese race serving in the armed forces of the United Nations outside of the Far East and circularization of such photographs given the broadest possible publicity both here and abroad, and particularly in China and the Soviet Union as proof of the inter-racial solidarity of the United Nations.

SECRET2. To support the present National Government of China at Chungking.

To do this it is essential:

- a. To understand what is involved in the support of the Chungking Government.
- b. To establish a standard of unity for China.
- c. To register an expectation of unity within China.
- d. To build up the importance of China's role in the war.
- e. To condemn appeasement and armistice.
- f. To give the Chinese State both actual and symbolic evidences of international equality.

Explanation and suggested directives for the accomplishment above are as follows:

a. To understand what is involved in the support of the Chungking Government.

(1) The support of the present National Government of China at Chungking is essential to the success of any effort to achieve the major objectives. This government is legally and actually the creature of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang), of which Chiang Kai-shek is Party Chief. To the men in control of Chungking, the maintenance of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) is no less important than the preservation of the Chinese government and armies. They have fought Communism for fifteen years, and most of them would probably prefer a Japanese China to a Soviet China, although they hate both. No conservative or moderate group outside the Kuomintang exists with sufficient organization to uphold a government of any kind. Kuomintang and the Chungking Government are inseparable.

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(2) It should be noted, however, that the Chinese Red forces who have been valuable in the Yangtze Valley as guerrilla bands are useful in the present situation under the control of the Chungking Government, but are nevertheless potential enemies to a triumphant democratic cause. Their ultimate loyalty is to the cause of international liberation of working classes and colonial peoples from imperialistic exploitation which would include, from their point of view, the present form of government in the United States.

b. To establish a standard of unity for China.

(1) In order to maintain the morale of the key military and political personnel of Free China and to forestall any break in China's domestic unity, it is essential to show the Chinese a good example of unity between the United States and Great Britain.

(2) To do this:

(a) Publicity should be given to the concurrence in the war effort of all British and American political parties and the dwindling into unimportance and ineffectuality of anti-war groups both in Britain and America.

(b) Emphasis should be placed, likewise, on harmony between labor and capital in these countries and the support of their "capitalist" governments by British and American communists.

(c) For the Chinese it is also desirable to emphasize the use in defense of both young and older persons and to point out that the question of party affiliation is in no way a factor.

c. To emphasize the establishment of unity within China.

It is important to stress the American and British expectation of unity within China. Such statements should

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not be carried to such extreme lengths as might suggest outside meddling with purely Chinese affairs, but should definitely hold up to the Chinese the fact that we expect from China an all-out and unified effort.

d. To build up the importance of China's role in the War.

(1) Constant reiteration is imperative of the inevitability of ultimate victory for the United Nations. The importance of the Chinese role in the winning of this victory and the relation of Chinese positive efforts today to China's post war position should be stressed. With regard to this, it is important to announce the expectation that China will replace Japan as the leading great power in East Asia.

(2) The part China will play in war time and post-war leadership should be stressed. This may be given effect when quoting statements by other United Nations leaders by citing an appropriate statement by Chiang K'ai-shek or some other Chungking leader.

(3) So also when favorable mention is made of Chinese leaders by sources from which the Chinese get little news, such as from Latin American, West Asiatic or even American Negro sources, these should be quoted. Such quotations would not only interest the Chinese but at the same time would counteract Axis allegations that this is a war for the defense of Anglo-Saxon world hegemony.

(4) Reference to China's experimentation with a new kind of democratic philosophy and government, (the five power system, etc.), would be desirable from time to time.

SECRETe. To condemn appeasement and armistice.

Condemnation of appeasement or armistice should be unqualified. It should be emphatically stressed that this war must be fought to a military victory and that nothing short of this should be for a moment considered.

f. To give the Chinese State both actual and symbolic evidences of international equality.

(1) Diplomatically, and in military contacts, an attitude of superiority on the part of Britain and the United States towards China should be avoided even though practical circumstances seem to justify such an attitude at the time.

(2) Similarly emphasis should be placed on bilateral relations on the basis of collaboration and equality between America and China, and Britain and China, both to improve Chinese morale generally and to forestall an unwholesomely close Soviet-Chinese entente.

(3) It is important to proceed with the practical implementation of the general promise of equality made to China.

(a) Removal of the last vestiges of extra-territoriality in China.

(b) Recognition of the Chinese language (at least de jure) as a major international language along with English and Spanish.

(4) Advice of the Chinese should be requested in matters lying outside the Far Eastern theatre and in which the Chinese can be expected to have special knowledge or experience.

(a) As an example, Chinese Guerrilla leaders could possibly be brought to Cairo, London, or Washington for consultation in the development of

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guerrilla or commando tactics. Even if their advice was worthless, by asking of it would provide psychological stimulation to the Chinese.

(b) The Chinese could be asked for suggestions on general matters of strategy with respect to the war.

Notes on Implementation.

This directive would require the coordination of the diplomatic, military propaganda planning, and publicity services of the combined powers, so that when practical action was taken, full psychological exploitation could be extended to cover the advantage offered.

3. To prevent the use of Chinese raw or manufactured materials, labor supply, or puppet troops by Japan.

To do this it is essential:

- a. To upset the economy of Occupied China.
- b. To excite the natural acquisitiveness of the Japanese in Occupied China.

Suggested directives for the accomplishment of both of the above are as follows:

(1) Through possible action from Free China it is important to keep the black markets as active as possible in the occupied zone. Exchange values as between yen-bloc and United Nations currencies and as between different types of Japanese-sponsored currency are subject to manipulation in occupied China by action within Free China. Commodity prices could also be influenced, if not controlled, by such action. The Japanese plan to develop a controlled, systematic, economic system in occupied China. Joint American and Chinese action which could keep currency and commodity price relations in check would undoubtedly be a serious interference

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with Japanese efforts at development. Such interference would also have the additional effect of corrupting, bankrupting or demoralizing Japanese and traitorous Chinese officers who are, already, speculating very widely in Occupied China.

(2) To stimulate speculative activities through use of radio or other means of communication with a view to disorganizing Japanese military and administrative personnel. Coordination of economic interference with propaganda concerning such interference might succeed in getting the attention of the Japanese and traitors for United Nations broadcasts.

(3) To extend the scope of strictly economic warfare to occupied China in collaboration with Chungking authorities would be important if it could induce a raise in the price of commodities not wanted by the Japanese in order to promote competitive cultivation. If the Japanese want cotton or millet legume production might be subsidized - for example - through the guerrilla governments. In other instances, it would be effective to raise the price of commodities wanted by the Japanese so as to make the Japanese fixed-price schedules more difficult to enforce. The speculative devices and means to accomplish this would have to be planned by expert economists, but the general directions and thinking would require close coordination with war plans.

4. To emphasize the expectation of United Nations that the unity of China will be maintained inviolate, and to stress the Nationalist and not Communist or radical leadership of such unity.

To do this it is essential:

1. To maintain and promote governmental, political and economic stability in Free China.

2. To give suitable public recognition to Chinese leaders.

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Suggested directives for the accomplishment of the above are as follows:

a. To maintain and promote governmental, political and economic stability in Free China.

(1) By means of the recent loan of \$500,000,000 to China, the Lend Lease policies, and through private American aid to Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, substantial effect has already been given to this directive. There now exists the necessity that conditions among the Chinese common people, which are a major factor in United Nations strategy, be studied, and that remedies be planned and aid extended in the light of that strategy. Types of action by way of illustration may include:

(a) Further American pressure and aid in systematizing the Chungking tax policy.

(b) Direct American purchase of commodities in Free China.

(c) Sending of American gifts such as medical kits, inoculation outfits, cartridge reloading supplies to the Chinese guerillas, but being careful to do so in such a way that the Chungking Government can neither show offense nor refuse transit.

(2) Every effort should be made to promote the welfare of the common soldiers in the Chinese National Armies, by making available the resources and experience of the combined armies to aid in their broad education. This might include not only educational courses in military matters, but also shop training and courses which would be of value to them in their post-military careers. It should be remembered that the Chinese are already

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committed to education along the Soviet pattern, a policy which was adopted in 1922-24, but opportunities may be offered to offset this by making available training along strictly technical and generous educational lines.

(3) It would be important to explore and develop the possibilities of coordination along the lines of popular welfare work, with particular reference to the welfare of the enlisted man, as this offers an immense field for affirmative American action in the Far East. Such action, by contrast with that taken by the Japanese in occupied China, may have valuable results.

b. To give suitable public recognition to Chinese leaders.

(1) In any effort to emphasize the expectation of unity within China, it is essential to build up recognition of outstanding Chinese leaders with the rest of the world. While Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek is well known, there are other leaders under him who could very well be brought to the foreground and their names made familiar through suitable publicity. Chiang K'ai-shek himself, and a small group of leaders, carefully chosen and acceptable to him, should be awarded honors by both United States and Britain with full advantage taken of psychological value of such action within China itself.

2. To demoralize and render untrustworthy to Japan those Chinese political and military establishments created with Japanese aid.

To do this it is essential:

a. To impair the morale of the Wang Ch'ing-wei government in Hankow.

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Suggested directives for the accomplishment of this are as follows:

(1) No opportunities should be lost to criticize and to condemn Quislingism in China as treason. It should be pointed out that those who are lending themselves to the Japanese have lost all honor, and should be regarded with contempt.

(2) It might be good strategy occasionally to present an apology for some Chinese traitors, without specifying their identity, by suggesting that some of these men are really worthy and actually loyal, but are attempting to help the common people in the occupied zones. Or, tentatively, it could be suggested that some of the traitors are traitors twice over in that they are now in contact with Chungking, or with some other of the United Nations Government.

(3) Classification and association of the Nanking traitors by name with some of the more odious European traitors; as for example, Quisling, Deat, or Hlinka.

(4) Hints should be dropped to the effect that the Germans and the Nanking traitors, working under cover, are preparing an economic and diplomatic double-cross on the Japanese. There is probably enough truth in this to make many Japanese restless, inquisitive, and impertinent to their Chinese colleagues.

(5) Much publicity should be given to verbatim quotations of all Japanese statements that are made which are naturally offensive to the Chinese. As for example:

(a) Japan is politically superior to all other people.

(b) Japan is racially superior to other Asiatics.

(With concurring German statements on this point).

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(c) Japan despises what it refers to as the degeneracy, inefficiency, untrustworthiness, corruption, cowardice, and dishonor of all Chinese.

(6) Assurance should be given of separate and inescapable American vengeance on all America's enemies, irrespective of nationality, location or political status.

Notes on Implementation.

These directives can very effectively be utilized in connection with shortwave radio, since many of the Chinese traitors have shortwave sets. They also lend themselves to use through the suitable distribution of pamphlets, and through agents in the occupied territories.

6. To reinforce and strengthen such Chinese propaganda efforts as may assist in the accomplishments of our main objectives.

To do this it is essential:

- a. To coordinate our propaganda efforts with those of the Chinese.
- b. To aid in counteracting Axis propaganda designed for China.

Suggested directives for the accomplishment of the above are as follows:

a. To coordinate our propaganda efforts with those of the Chinese.

(1) Chinese propaganda emanating from Chinese sources in Chungking should be carefully studied with a view to determining its objectives. Suitable influence, diplomatically introduced should be brought to bear to give it more effective direction and to coordinate it with propaganda efforts of the United Nations.

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B. To aid in counter-acting Axis propaganda designed for China.

(1) Where this propaganda concerns itself with the have-nots, the anti-imperialists, and designates the Japanese as Asiatic liberators, these themes should be met with commonsense exposés of what Japan and the Axis countries generally have already contributed to these ends.

(2) Great stress should be placed on such counter-acting themes as:

(a) Economic equality under the Atlantic Charter.

(b) The importance of political realities as against economic theories concerning colonialism.

(c) The flat contradictions of racial themes wherever found.

* * *

III. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CHINESE.

Some general cautionary directives are necessary to apply to any propaganda material that may be prepared for use in China. Advertising campaigns have often been ruined by unfortunate ignorance of Chinese thought and phraseology, and propaganda campaigns run the same hazard. The word "turtle" or even an indirect reference to that reptile presents extraordinary obscene connotations to the Chinese, and President Roosevelt's reference to a "turtle" policy must have startled and amused the staff of the Chinese Party Ministry of Information, while giving them a somewhat difficult problem in paraphrasing.

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1. Sarcasm, in China, insults the person to whom it is addressed as much as the person at whom it is directed. The Chinese rarely grasp the implications of sarcasm, and when they do, they are usually annoyed. Sarcasm violates the basic Confucian teaching that words be maintained clear, pure, honorable, and plain.

2. Proverbs and jokes with a moral, even a very trite moral, are relished by the Chinese. The didactic feature should always be emphasized in humor, and jokes should be based on universal human situations. (A thief in Anhui hid in a sack of rice. When the armed farmer came to the storeroom with a lantern, the thief whispered, "This is just a sack of rice!")

3. Illustrative anecdote is to be preferred to exposition.

4. Printed material should have either a meritorious literary style, or else be edited in outline form to convey the impression of a technical, scientific approach. (Chiang commonly lectures with a blackboard and chalk, dictating outlines and drawing a profusion of diagrams.)

5. Simple declarative statements should be used. Conditional statements should be avoided. Chinese grammar has no subjunctive and the statement of a condition contrary to fact should be avoided, since it must be phrased as a lie and then contradicted.

6. Figures should be avoided. The Chinese, because of a literary rather than a scientific tradition, feel unfamiliar with statistical presentation. If large numbers are to be used, ten thousand (wan) or convenient multiples should be used. Millions and billions frequently sound silly to the Chinese.

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7. Argument should proceed by analogy, not by logic. (Not, "Since Japan is dishonorable, she is therefore untrustworthy", but "Japan is untrustworthy. Why? The Japanese are dishonorable. Everyone knows that peoples and nations without honor cannot be trusted. They are not responsible to themselves, and cannot be responsible to others.")

8. General moral terms (love, happiness, goodness, honesty, bravery, beauty) should be employed: general political terms (democracy, rights, constitutionalism, dictator) should be avoided. Simple factual situations, involving personal interests or money, are more helpful than political rhetoric.

9. Sex should be avoided altogether, but its avoidance should be completely unnoticeable. The Chinese refer matter-of-factly to sex, excretion, nudity, etc. more often than do the Western peoples, but they are horrified by any display whatever of a positive sexual interest. To many modern Chinese, a sweet, demure bathing-girl as portrayed on a Saturday Evening Post cover is obscene.

10. Information should make up the greater bulk of appeals to China, rather than entertainment or stimulation.

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J.P.W.C. 2/1

COPY NO. 14

MARCH 21, 1942

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

PROPOSED PLANS FOR USING KOREANS AGAINST JAPAN

Note by the Secretary

1. The attached plan, to be considered in connection with the study previously presented on this subject, (J.P.W.C. 2), is submitted by the Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., G-2, for consideration by the committee.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

U.S. SECRETENCLOSUREPROPOSED PLAN OF PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE FOR USING KOREANS AGAINST JAPAN

Recognizing that Psychological Warfare activities are a function of command in the theater of operations, but being charged with the responsibility for integrating Psychological Warfare and military strategy, the object of these proposals is to cooperate with the plans of the theater commander.

I. PURPOSE

1. To develop a favorable situation for us in Korea, in Manchuria and, through Koreans, in Japan, by psychological warfare.

II. DISCUSSION

1. Korea serves a triple purpose in psychological warfare through:
 - a. Activity within Korea, itself.
 - b. As a means of transmitting similar activity to Japan.
 - c. As a counter to Japanese propaganda.
2. The first phase of psychological warfare involves enlightenment of the Korean people.
 - a. Clarification of issues involved as listed in attached study.
 - b. Offering hope for Korean freedom.
 - c. Potential strength of United States as compared with Japan.
 - d. All material calculated to build up Korean morale and hatred of Japanese.
3. Psychological warfare by means of Koreans requires a consideration of:
 - a. Choice of Korean independent organizations and groups inside as well as outside of Korea, who are mostly antagonistic to each other.
 - b. The influence of geographical distribution of

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Koreans on their sympathies.

(1) Koreans in Korea proper-- organizations much suppressed.

(2) Koreans in Manchuria--best groups to work through.

(3) Koreans in the Korean Provisional Army in China under Chiang K'ai-shek and in the Korean Volunteer Corps with 18th Chinese Army--latter communistic.

(4) Koreans in Siberia--under influence of U.S.S.R.

(5) Koreans in Japan proper--subdued by Japanese police.

(6) Koreans in the United States and Hawaii-- not influential in Korea.

c. Propaganda for the above groups will vary in effectiveness and necessitates special adaptation to each.

d. The difficulties of organizing underground groups to distribute propaganda and to cooperate in espionage and subversive activities will likewise vary according to the above geographical groupings.

4. Propaganda and espionage could start immediately in the Korean field by fostering underground organizations.

a. To unite Koreans against the Japanese.

(1) Through short-wave radio.

(2) Through standard wave radio from China.

b. To disconcert the Japanese or immobilize a considerable number of troops. Possibilities of direct action are:

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- (1) Assistance to either the Korean Provisional Army or the Korean Volunteer Corps in China.
- (2) The encouragement of guerilla activities in Manchuria.
- (3) Through organized Korean Agents, espionage could be conducted on Japanese activities and plans.

c. In all psychological warfare plans for this theater the following points should be considered:

- (1) No established radio-sending stations in Korea can be used. Secret short-wave portable sets are a possibility.
- (2) Thousands of Koreans contact Japanese in their daily life, and what these hear, they will tell.
- (3) Koreans in Japanese offices will pass on rumors.
- (4) Koreans in the Japanese Army, in work battalions and in Japanese espionage service will report on all propaganda reaching Korea.
- (5) Japanese fishing boats and other water transports are in constant communication and will carry stories among the marine workers.
- (6) All rumors starting in Korea made known to the Japanese will find their way through letters and visits into Japan. Printed matter may be hidden in freight shipments to Japan.

d. Propaganda to other Asiatic countries and for world-wide distribution should stress:

- (1) The thirty years of cruelty and barbarism against Koreans under Japanese rule.

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- (2) Complete suppression of Korean freedom.
 - (3) Japanese suppression of all religions.
 - (4) Japanese exploitation of Korean economy.
 - (5) Japan's violations of treaties.
 - (6) Assassination of Queen Myung Sung in 1895
and poisoning of Emperor Kwang Moo in 1919.
- e. The above should be implemented through a directive from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the government agencies collaborating in psychological warfare and transmitted to our representatives in Chungking for decision and cooperation with Generalissimo Chiang K'ai-shek, the theater commander.

CCS 385 (3-16-42)

U.S. SECRETJ.P.W.C. 2MARCH 16, 1942COPY NO. 14JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEEPOSSIBLE ACTION FOR KOREANote by the Secretary

The attached enclosure consisting of (a) memorandum from the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. (b) memorandum from Psychological Warfare Branch, M.I.S., G-2, and (c) paraphrase of telegram of March 7, 1942 from American Ambassador at Chungking, is presented for consideration of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

A. H. ONTHANK,
Secretary.

U.S. SECRETE N C L O S U R E

March 4, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF WAR PLANS DIVISION:

Subject: Korea and possible action.

I. Discussion:

Relating to points raised in letters of Brigadier General Gerow and Lieutenant Colonel Allen, dated February 16th and 17th, respectively. An answer has been delayed for the attendance of our representatives at the conference in Washington of the United Korean Committee, which ended yesterday.

1. This committee attempted to unite those Korean organizations in the United States and other countries which affiliate with the Korean Provisional government and the Korean National army, headquarters of both being in Chungking, China. It is believed by this office that the meeting of the Korean groups in Washington did not arrive at any workable solution of unity and that the conflicting leaders are as far apart as ever.

Kim Ku is Provisional President in China, located at Chungking, and Gen. Li Chung-chun commands the army, reputedly 35,000 men, under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

2. Dr. Syngman Rhee, active in the Korean independence movement since its inception, holds credentials from the Korean Provisional government (not recognized by the State Department) as its diplomatic representative in the United States. His dealings as a possible diplomat must be with the State Department.

3. The Sino Korean Peoples League is another

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Korean organization in the United States, in Honolulu and in China. It has a corresponding representative in Washington in the person of Kil Soo Haan, now out of the city. A further report will be made on it later. As now understood, this league is affiliated with the Korean Volunteer Army, under General Kim San, and operating with the Chinese Communist armies in that country. It is said to receive support from the USSR.

4. The three Americans who addressed the Secretary of War on February 4th, and to whom he replied on February 23rd, are: Harris, pastor of the Foundry Methodist church, Stagger, a lawyer, and Williams, a public relations man. All are in Washington and have been interested in the Korean movement for years.

5. Diplomatic recognition of any Korean group at this time seems inadvisable, but this is a matter for the State Department.

6. Terrorism, sabotage and similar direct action in Korea, or in Japan via Korea, until organized and continuous, undoubtedly would provoke the Japanese into a repetition of the massacres and barbarism which followed the civil-war Korean passive uprising in 1919, in response to President Wilson's self determination of smaller people.

7. Koreans are widely dispersed outside of their own country and with conflicting sympathies in Japan, China, Siberia and other countries.

8. Whatever propaganda or direct action is taken by the War Department in the Korean field must be planned, budgeted and timed in coordination with War Plans Division.

9. The Special Study Group is preparing studies on this subject that are nearing completion and will be submitted under separate cover. From these studies it is apparent that the entire question is one which must be closely coordi-

ated with War Plans through the Joint Staff Planners.

10. This section believes also that no other agency in the government should take definite steps with any Korean group until a definite directive has been prepared by the Joint Staff Planners.

II. Recommendation:

That the question of subversive activities on the part of Koreans be taken up at the first meeting of the Committee of Psychological Warfare.

RAYMOND E. LEE
Brigadier General, U.S. Army,
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2.

March 4, 1942. G-2, S. S. G. JBW

PLAN FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Assistance to Korean Armed Forces Which Are Openly Organized Only in Siberia and China

1. In Siberia, with an estimated 2,000,000 Koreans, such Koreans are either mingled in the USSR army or controlled by it.
2. In China, they are: (a) the Korean National army which is a distinctive Korean unit under Korean Gen Li Chung-shan with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's forces and (b) the Korean Volunteer army which is mixed with the Chinese Communist 10th army and roving bands in Japanese occupied China and Manchuria under Korean Gen. Kim Yak-san. Unverified figures give their respective strengths as 35,000 and 600, though the Volunteers claim vastly more with the roving bands included. Consideration should be given to the capacity of these

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"armies" to operate independently along the Korean or Manchukuo frontier which should increase their fighting spirit and be a greater menace to Japan.

Recommendation -- Assistance to either Korean army will be guided by our Military mission with Chiang Kai-shek.

Assistance to Korean subversive activities in Siberia, in China, Manchuria, Korea and Japan. Political allegiances of Korean individuals or groups can be disregarded if they can be used as weapons against Japan. Possible uses are:

1. Guerrilla attacks causing Japanese losses and requiring strengthened Japanese forces.
2. Terrorism such as destruction of Japanese military establishments, bridges and communications, starting fires, assassinations and other violence.
3. Spreading propaganda, written or oral, among Koreans and Japanese, to provoke disorder and with the long-time objective of a Korean revolution.
4. Reporting on Japanese plans and operations and on local conditions which will include countering and corrupting Koreans being used as agents by Japan.

Recommendation -- That steps be taken to organize or contact already existing individuals or groups who can carry through such activities. Many will be receptive to assistance but few will be capable. Conditions vary, according to countries, as follows:

1. Siberia. The USSR is adept in such activity and undoubtedly well organized as, in addition to the long frontier, the Japanese naval and air base at Seishin, Korea, is a direct threat to Vladivostok.

Recommendation -- None, for the present, though the

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situation must be taken into consideration.

2. Manchukuo, with an estimated 1,000,000 Koreans and half as many Japanese, because of its size and scattered population gives the Japanese a more difficult job of policing than Korea and Japan. For the same reasons, objects for attack are less numerous and it must not be overlooked that many Koreans, being Japanese subjects, believe their lot is better under Japanese rule than under Chinese. Japan, lacking confidence in Korean loyalty, has weeded most Koreans out of its army. It uses them as labor battalions and more effectively as spies. Latent Korean patriotism might be aroused in those while many more already are anti-Japanese.

Recommendation -- Harassing and subversive actions can start at any time that military conditions make them advisable. Prior to that time, contacts and organization work should be completed.

3. Korea, with some 25,000,000 Koreans and 700,000 Japanese, has lost much of its 1919 enthusiasm for independence. Japan has scattered crumbs of petty officialdom to some Koreans, given many more employment in commercial, political and illegal undertakings, suppressed Christian influence and, more than all, sowed the spirit of the people by ruthless repression and degradation. While claims of Koreans in the United States that Korea will rise en masse against Japan should not be taken seriously, thousands of Koreans can be depended on to risk their lives for the Korean cause. Numerous arsenals and other military establishments are in Korea as promising targets.

Recommendation -- That no indiscriminate terrorist acts be encouraged in Korea at present. To be effective, they must be worthwhile, systematic and continuous. Sporadic and isolated acts would merely provoke the Japanese to bloody re-

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prisals on innocent Koreans while we might lose agents who would be more useful later and also incur the hatred of Koreans for bringing down the Japanese vengeance.

However, we should not delay building up, or operating through an already existing, secret organization in Korea which will spread our propaganda, report on internal conditions and be ready for direct action when that becomes desirable.

4. Japan. Koreans in Japan proper are a small, suspected and closely watched minority. As a group, they are no more effective for any action than are the Japanese in California. Individually, they probably hate the Japanese more intensely than do Koreans in Korea as they are treated as an inferior and contemptible people in Japan.

Terrorism and sabotage by Koreans is possible but extremely difficult in Japan. Years ago, a Korean attempted to assassinate the emperor. Such an incident would unite Japanese but seriously disturb them. A high official or officer could be replaced easily but with the same disturbing effect among the people. Closely guarded military establishments and government property might be damaged. Fires could easily be started which, with favorable winds, would do great damage to Japanese cities.

The greatest value of Korean agents in Japan, probably would be in spreading our propaganda among Japanese and getting our reports of actual conditions in the country.

Recommendation -- The necessary contacts in Japan should be established, also the lines and methods of communication.

PROPAGANDA

Use of the conventional methods of propaganda distribution must vary according to the country to which it is sent.

1. Radio. This would be in the Korean language.

2. Shortwave. We can use KOEI and the new COI

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station, both on the Pacific coast. China and Manchukuo are covered more effectively by standard wave. As shortwave receiving sets are prohibited in Korea and Japan, few there would hear such broadcasts. They would be government monitoring stations and highly trusted individuals. The cumulative effect on them may be worth the effort and some propaganda would leak out to the general public.

In this connection, the possibility of using portable shortwave sets for communications between agents should be considered.

b. Standard wave. Stations in China can be heard in Manchukuo and Korea. If available, the Russian station at Khabarovsk is the best medium. Koreans would listen to such broadcasts though the Japanese would severely punish them if caught. What they heard would circulate by word of mouth, more important because it is forbidden.

2. Handbills. Pictures of production and similar literature. The reading matter should be in Korean or Japanese according to the destination. Pictures of our preparations and what they promise for final victory would be effective at present. They can be distributed by plane or brought into the countries by underground. The printing can be done in Los Angeles or Hawaii and, if the type fonts are available, in China to save bulky transportation. Such messages will have a permanent character and the few not destroyed will be effective.

Recommendation -- Make inquiry to ascertain where and what printing equipment is available.

3. Reports brought by agents. Because of years of suppression, grapevine rumors circulate even more widely in Korea than in China. However, as it is comparatively easy for Japanese gendarmes to trace the source of a story, and nab a

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valuable agent, it may be discreet to limit an agent's activity to bringing in instructions and material supplies and collecting information to take out.

Recommendation -- As previously, that a corps of agents be organized.

Types and methods of communication for what may be classed as Korean propaganda will vary according to whether it is directed to (1) Koreans in their language. (2) other Asiatics in varying languages and (3) Japanese in that language. Some distinctions, are:

1. Propaganda types for Koreans.

a. War developments unfavorable to Japan and the Axis.

b. The hope of Korean freedom if democracy wins contrasted with continued slavery under Japan.

c. Stories and printed matter on American preparations.

d. Anti-Japanese incidents in Korea and Manchukuo as reported by our secret agents.

e. Operations of Korean armed forces or guerrillas in China and anti-Japanese sentiment, or resistance, in other occupied countries.

f. Stories of Japanese oppression in Korea, Manchukuo, etc. to strengthen Korean hatred for the "dwarf devils".

g. Past deeds of Korean heroes, especially against Japan, to encourage their conceit that they are a heroic and unconquerable people.

h. Showing that the Japanese material development of Korea and Manchukuo has been entirely for the benefit of Japan and Japanese and at the expense of Koreans whose only

謝安

once installed, it would eliminate many Japanese
c. Rossmore and Munro attempting to work up
the well known Japanese situation

should be

1. 1950年10月1日，中华人民共和国成立，标志着中国历史进入了一个新的纪元。

[illegible]

1. The first part of the document is a list of names and addresses, which appears to be a directory or a list of contacts. The names are written in a cursive script, and the addresses are listed below them.

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opportunities for advancement are as traitors in the service of Japan.

This could be communicated to Koreans in several ways:

a. Radio would reach Koreans in unoccupied territory but, as previously shown, its reception would be limited in Korea, Manchukuo and Japan which are the principal objectives. Portable shortwave sets are a separate proposition.

b. Printed matter could be smuggled into Manchukuo and Korea or scattered by plane with confidence that, once inside, it would circulate among Koreans.

c. Reports and rumors circulating by word of mouth. Once started, they will be repeated among practically all Koreans. They may come into the country through radio or agents who must be used to smuggle in literature though the literature itself, without any oral additions by an agent, should be sufficient to start abundant stories.

Recommendation -- In addition to previous recommendations that agents and mechanical equipment be secured, persons who can speak and write the Korean vernacular are necessary. Also, preparation of such propaganda as is based on historical facts can start now.

2. Korean Propaganda for other Asiatics and other countries.

This need not be limited to Asiatics though from its nature it will appeal more strongly to them. Japan's record of 30 years of tyranny in Korea will show other Asiatics what its seditious slogans "Asia for the Asiatics", and "Co-prosperity Sphere in East Asia" actually mean. Suitable types of propaganda, are:

a. Barbarisms and cruelties against Korean civilians, women and children, to enforce Japanese rule.

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b. Complete suppression of Korean freedom, even to the elemental privilege of having a voice in the government of their own country.

c. Japanese unification and official control of all religions whether Buddhist, Mohammedan, Christian or others.

d. That Japanese economic development and material improvements in Korea have been entirely for Japan and Japanese and have ruthlessly exploited Korea and degraded the Koreans.

e. Korea's centuries of independence, so recognized by China, its wars against Japanese invasion and its treaties with other world powers (the 1st with the USA in 1896, still not abrogated).

f. Japanese violations of treaties and violence to seize the country, including the assassination of Queen Myung Sung in 1895, and the poisoning ex-Emperor Kwang Moo in 1919.

g. Continuous fight for freedom by Korean leaders, through diplomacy and terrorism; barred from the Versailles and Washington conferences by Japan, the assassination of Prince Ito, an attempt on the Emperor in Tokyo and the Shanghai bomb where Admiral Nomura lost an eye and others were killed, and the exile armed forces which for years have harassed the Korean frontier.

h. The present activity of Korean units in China which while not a great factor in the outcome of the war, will be impressive from the fact that they are refugees, hard put to survive and actuated only by a desperate hope for freedom.

i. Complete and picturesque reports of Korean present subversive activities in Korea, Manchukuo and Japan which will show that Korean patriots will die for their cause and will inspire other patriots in Japanese occupied territory to similar deeds.

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While no obstacles exist to spreading such propaganda in free territory in any part of the world, the same obstacles as in Japan, Korea and Manchukuo will be faced in other Japanese or Axis occupied territory, differing according to the particular country.

Recommendation -- A decision should be made on what countries we will reach with such propaganda and the necessary agents, speakers, writers and equipment provided. Consultation with Britain and Holland is suggested as they may direct propaganda along these lines to territories where they are more familiar and more interested.

3. For Japan: the type of propaganda will be determined by our plans for that country. Instead of grieving over the sufferings of Korea or enthusing over Korean revolt in Korean propaganda, Japanese would take pride in being stern rulers and redouble their efforts to prevent Korean sabotage. Korea, and Manchukuo to a lesser extent, figure in propaganda to Japan as transmission belts. The more obvious Korean contacts with Japan and Japanese are:

a. Thousands of Koreans whose daily activities associate them with Japanese.

b. Koreans in Japanese offices who will feel obligated to inform to their superiors.

c. Koreans in the Japanese army, work battalions and intelligence service who will report all Korean activities.

d. Koreans in crews of Japanese fishing boats which cruise regularly between the two coasts.

While the above apply primarily to propaganda in the Korean language, it will reach Japanese in translated form, to practically all in Korea and to a more limited circle in Japan.

e. Japanese in Korea who, being Japanese, are in

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constant close touch with relatives and friends in the homeland and will inform them of everything, either by letter or visit, which is happening or rumored to be happening in Korea.

f. Japanese returning to the islands may carry propaganda literature to show as curiosities, or carry it unknowingly when slipped into their baggage.

g. Printed matter can be put into ordinary shipments to Japan, or other ingenious methods in which Koreans are well versed. If any considerable quantity is put into a single shipment, confederates must be contacted in Japan to receive it and continue the distribution. Koreans are capable of distributing or dropping such literature in places where it will be found by Japanese.

Printed matter can be smuggled into Korea, easier than into Japan. As few Japanese are in Korea, compared to the millions in their home country, it may be advisable not to distribute Japanese language propaganda literature in Korea and risk detection and confiscation before it reaches its final destination.

h. Portable shortwave radio sets to expedite communications between agents in Japan and outside.

Recommendation -- Once organization is effected, Japan proper is merely a dynamic extension of the field of activity.

While action on the following must be initiated by the Chief Executive and State department, possibly after consultation with Britain, China and the USSR, two other factors in the Korean situation may be properly considered here because

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of their propaganda effect. They are:

1. Official recognition of an exile government for Korea. Such recognition undoubtedly would widen the present breach between Koreans who have the common purpose of ousting Japan from their country. The USSR, also China and other countries, might have a different entry from the one we select. Also, if Koreans are to be independent, their first privilege is to pick their own government, not be given a government handpicked in advance as a preliminary to self-government.

2. A commitment by our government to independence for Korea when Japan is defeated. We need have no scruples about giving away Japan's possessions. Such a declaration will make the Atlantic charter and the Four Freedoms specific to at least one country in the Pacific. It will have great effect among all Asiatics and in all democracies. It will not discriminate between Korean factions nor conflict with ambitions of other powers. It will hold out the same hope and promise for all Koreans. All would continue equally useful to use against Japan. Apparently this is the policy which is being followed by Chiang Kai-shek who is closer to the Korean situation.

Action on many of the proposals in this agenda can be originated and continuously directed from Washington. Action on others will depend on suggestions and recommendations from our Military Mission in Chungking while future plans, organization and direction will be largely by that mission which is in the theater of operations. When the Committee on Psychological Warfare has agreed on a program, it can be co-

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ordinated through the Joint Staff Planners with the War Plans division for time, budget and plan.

The purpose of the action outlined in this agenda is to use Korea and Koreans for a single objective -- the defeat of Japan. Because of understandable Korean rivalries and the apparent conflicting social ideologies of their supporters, the wise course seems to use all, and only those, Koreans who are united with us against Japan. Under such circumstances, guidance and decision must be entirely in our hands. Koreans must be consulted and their capabilities and Korean conditions thoroughly understood for any action but we must make our own valuations of their reports and claims. A safe precaution to prevent unfortunate personal jealousies interfering with our main purpose would be not to let any Korean know anymore than is absolutely necessary about what other Koreans are doing for us.

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March 6, 1942. G-3, S.S.G. JBW

SECRET -- No' to be included in a file accessible to a Korean.Korean Rivalries and Personalities

A significant division among those Koreans who agree on antagonism to Japan, is clearly symbolized in Washington by Dr. Syngman Rhee and Kil Soo Haan. Charges hurled by the followers of each range from personal venality to being Japanese agents. With Korean independence nearer than at any time in 30 years and the possibility of American financial and material support even closer, the rivalry for position is understandable. It may be only a surface indication and we may be successful in using all Korean elements against Japan even though obliged to deal separately with each one.

However, we should understand the fundamental differences, aside from personal recriminations, between Koreans.

Dr. Rhee, about 70 years old, was the first president of the so-called Korean republic, elected in Korea in 1919, as part of the passive demonstration for independence following President Wilson's enunciation of self-determination for smaller people. Thirty of the electors gave themselves up to the Japanese in a vain hope of preventing the imprisonment, torture and murder of thousands in Korea who had taken part in the parades and election. Japan blocked his presentation of Korea's position at Versailles in 1919, and again at Washington in 1922. The first seat of the Korean Provisional government was in Shanghai, later in Washington and now in Chungking with Kim Ku as president and with a cabinet. Dr. Rhee has credentials from the Korean Provisional government which is not recognized by our State department. Its commission is at 1742 Robert Street NW, which also is his residence.

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The Korean National army, distinct Korean units under Gen. Li Chung-chun, a Korean, has been organized by the Provisional government and is under the command of and largely supported by Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking. Its strength is given at 35,000, which is ridiculed by rival Koreans who say no force of that size could be equipped with the \$75,000 which Chiang and his wife have donated at different times. Dr. Rhoe's optimistic promises, based on Provisional government instructions from Chungking, are that, with American support and the continued cooperation of the Chinese general staff, this army can be increased at once to 45,000 men, that 100,000 Koreans are available for espionage work, more thousands will mutiny and desert from the Japanese army and conscript labor battalions, hundreds will escape from the homeland to join the fighting and more will rally from Manchukuo and Japanese occupied China. The Provisional government has an established army and thousands of patriotic followers but we must decide their effectiveness and how heavily their figures should be discounted.

The United Korean committee was organized in Honolulu in April 1941, to coordinate the activities of all Korean organizations in America. Won Soon-lee, in Honolulu, is its president and Kim Ho, a business man at Reddy, Calif., is its president for continental United States, Mexico and Canada, with offices at 1368 West Jefferson Boulevard, Los Angeles. Included in the United Korean committee, are:

1. Korean National association. Pyong Yo-cho, president in Honolulu, and Kim Ho, its head in Los Angeles, with a Sanington address at 7309 Georgia Avenue. It publishes Now Korea in Los Angeles, Kim Yong-jeung, editor.
2. Dong Ji Hol (United Thought Society) in Honolulu. Publishes United Korean Weekly.
3. Korean American council, 327 Colorado Building,

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Washington. A friendship group of Koreans and Americans, many of the latter quite prominent.

4. Sino Korean Peoples League, Prof. Kim Kiu-sok, its president in Chungking, with Kil So Haan, Senate Hotel, 101 D Street NE, Washington, its spokesman in this country and Dr. D. Chung, his representative.
5. Korean Independence League (doubtful)
6. Korean Student Federation of North America, non-political and well endowed.
7. Korean Women's Societies of California.
8. Korean Christian Student Association, nonpolitical and with missionary support.

The Sino Korean Peoples League is the disturbing factor in this group which otherwise is united in support of the Korean Provisional government with possible minor differences over Dr. Rhee's ability which are natural regarding any leader after so many years of activity. As far as the United States is concerned, this so called "league", instead of being a group, appears to be a clique of a few energetic Koreans. An organization under this name existed in Shanghai in 1931, but eventually became defunct. About 1940, a few Koreans in Honolulu revived the name. Chinese in the United States say no Chinese are in it, as the name indicates, and Koreans say its only Koreans in the United States are about 40 in Honolulu, of whom only 15 are adults. Even if no more than a nominal organization in this country, this group may have extensive following in Asia and be a valuable factor, helpful for the present and dangerous for the future, through support by the USSR.

This league's spokesmen do not want diplomatic recognition by the United States of any government for a future independent Korea, explaining "that would spoil everything", with which we can agree but which also may indicate that they have

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in mind a Communist government which will not have our approval. Nor do they want financial and material assistance from us for their uniformed forces in China, making the logical explanation that such help could not reach them though another explanation may be that the USSR can be depended on for what is needed.

The league does not disclose an exile government organization, similar to the Provisional government, but is connected with the Korean Volunteer army, commanded by Gen. Kim Yak-san. It is under Generalissimo Chang Kai-shok to the same extent as the Chinese Communist armies. As far as can be ascertained here, this army does not consist of distinctive Korean units but consists of individual Koreans in the Chinese Communist 18th army and a much larger number of Koreans not in uniform, including Gen. Kim for most of his time, who rove the country inflicting damage on the Japanese, organizing and gathering information.

Those who speak for the league and by inference for the Volunteer army say they are ready to start sabotage and terrorism among the Japanese in China, Manchukuo, Korea and even Japan at anytime when our War department gives the word. They say plans and maps already have been furnished to our War Department.

While Kil Soo Haan nominally represents the Sino Korean Peoples league, a better explanation may be that the league, so far as this country is concerned, is merely a front for the active and volatile Kil Soo Haan. He was sent to Washington in June 1941, by the United Korean committee in Los Angeles and given a letter to the State department to cooperate with the United States in what then was called defense activity. The committee cancelled the appointment in December as he insisted on being its sole representative in Washington, Supplant-

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ing Dr. Rhee.

Kil Soo Haan's present activity is known to the War department but that Chinese and Koreans, not associated with him, say that he is doing espionage work variously for War, Navy and State departments and the FBI would indicate that either he or his friends are talking too much in an effort to show his important connections. His friends credit him with placing Dr. Cho Seung-hak and another Korean in G-2, FES, and indicate that he located Whang Sung-soo (Sei Shu Coe in English and Sei Shu Kohara in Japanese) in the FBI. Hahn Soon-kyo, a business man, 900 South Wabash Avenue, Chicago, and Room 210, 245 5th Avenue, N.Y. on whom our reports are not good, is another in the circle and reported to be its financial backer.

Whether Haan's self-advertising and craving for publicity, affects his value as an agent can be decided by those using him. Koreans say he is as much "undercover" as a circus band. They quote him with, "I hear from the White House," and broad hints of secret connections with other government departments. On my first call at his hotel, his representative, before conversation started, handed me three stereotypes of newspaper clippings favorably mentioning Haan and friends and criticising Dr. Rhee and Sam King, Hawaiian representative in Congress.

Haan broke into American print in 1939, when he appeared before a US senate committee in Honolulu with information which he had secured while an employee of the Japanese consulate general. After Pearl Harbor, he received extensive publicity as having informed the President and Department heads in detail of the intended attack. The Dies committee affirms this without using his name. His latest warning through the newspapers is of a coming Japanese raid on California.

Haan's friends repeat a fanciful story of how, two

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weeks before the treaty was signed in Berlin, he advised the State Department that Japan would join the Axis. Sumner Welles laughed at this and, according to the story, offered to bet \$25, that it would not happen. Later, as the version goes, he met Haan on the Street in Washington, insisted on paying the \$25, and remarked "I should have had my ass kicked."

Aside from the probability of higher political strategy by other powers, it appears that the personalities involved prevent Haan and his associates from cooperating with other Koreans in the United States.. Consequently we must handle them separately.

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No. 195

A telegram of March 7, 1942, from the American Ambassador at Chungking reads substantially as follows:

If viewed with a sympathetic understanding of the Chinese and if limitations on what may reasonably be expected from China are borne in mind, the situation in that country is not necessarily discouraging, although it is not bright. There is no doubt but that support is being afforded by the continued reverses suffered by the United Nations in the Pacific to those persons who desire to reach an understanding with the Japanese. It is conceivable that there might develop in China a passive attitude of wait and see if the Japanese should capture Burma and China should become isolated. This would be especially true if Japan did not again exert military pressure on China. A possibility which should not be overlooked is that of an undeclared peace involving a practical stoppage of hostilities and a gradual breakdown of various barriers, including trade barriers, between occupied and unoccupied China. At the present time China is a minor asset to us, and to keep China from becoming a liability and to increase so far as possible the value of the asset, to increase resistance and to increase the effectiveness of the resistance, is our task. We should try to keep the Chinese confident of our final victory and to cultivate in the Chinese a realization that in our common victory lies their national interest and a consciousness of the position as co-equal partners in the war.

If used properly the recent American loan made to China can strengthen the financial and economic structure of that country. The more widely scattered are the benefits from the loan,

the more stable will the desired effect be. Perhaps the psychological effect of military assistance, especially in aviation, would be greater than the military benefit. It is not sufficient that there be an American Military Mission in China. American air forces, even though small in number, would afford positive evidence to the Chinese that we are fighting together for them as well as for ourselves. The effect on Chinese morale of the successes in Yunnan and Burma of the American volunteer group has been excellent and the effect on the morale in Chungking will be greatly benefited if this volunteer group later moves to Chungking where, in the opinion of many observers, morale is at a lower ebb than in any other part of unoccupied China. The equipment and personnel of American volunteer forces should be kept at its present strength and whether or not the group is incorporated into the American Army, it should be gradually increased. Although we should continue to attempt to send supplies to the Chinese armies, we should not expect the Chinese armies under present conditions to carry out offensives on a major scale. The fact that Chinese military prowess and activity has recently been over-played by various publicity organs, including the press, has been unfortunate. To exaggerate the military strength of China invites detrimental and ill-founded comparison with other military forces and encourages complacency. However, the Chinese armies have a very definite use which should be encouraged by practical operations within the scope of the armies capabilities, and when credit is due full credit should be given. Contribution can be made by the Program of the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department toward encouraging in special groups, especially the educational group, a friendly relationship. Contribution can be made also by the Information Service of the Coordinator of Information. The Ambassador suggests that a first objective

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of the Coordinator's Office should be disseminating promptly news of a straightforward factual nature without obvious propaganda. This suggestion applies to the selection of printed material for distribution in China as well as news services and radio broadcasts. Since the withdrawal of the Chinese to western China there has been a very great shortage of those American publications and periodicals by means of which intelligent Chinese kept informed of American activity and opinion. The non-receipt at the present time of any type of American mail aggravates this situation. The Ambassador urges that propaganda material for China be given **no transport priority** over regular mail and periodicals, and that emphasis be placed on the transmission of periodicals as a major effort of the Information Service to supply to the Chinese not propaganda material but the publications to which they have looked for some years to keep them in contact with life and opinion in the United States. It would be most useful to have, for distribution to the groups which form or influence to a great extent such public opinion as exists in China, copies of such magazines as Reader's Digest, Time, The New Republic, Life, Foreign Affairs, News Week, and the weekly news summary sections found in such papers as the New York Times and the Chicago Daily News.

The Ambassador believes that basically most intelligent Chinese are confident of American victory and of China's interest to assist in such victory. The best way to neutralize doubting and dissenting elements and to encourage those desiring sincerely to cooperate fully in the war is by making it clear continuously that defeat of Japanese ambitions is a common objective having positive value and worth fighting for -- a Far East free from Japanese domination and

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give assistance in a social organization that, while respecting integrities of nations, stipulates and expects collaboration in the interest of the peoples of all nations.

COPY NO. 14

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J.P.W.C. 1

MARCH 16, 1942.

JOINT PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE COMMITTEE

MEMORANDUM ON PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Note by the Secretary

The enclosure, prepared by the Psychological Warfare Branch, Military Intelligence Service, G-2, is circulated for consideration by the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee.

A. H. ONTHANK
Secretary

SECRETENCLOSURE

Military operations, economic blockade and psychological warfare are the three weapons used to win a war.

Total war involves the coordination of military, economic and psychological warfare. Modern war strategy must include psychological warfare plans.

Psychological means may be used to produce submission. Psychological operations are directed toward the creation of confusion, discouragement, mutual distrust, suspicion of leaders, defeatism and a desire for an end to hostilities. The use of agents and organizations within the enemy country and among neutrals, the control and creation of news, sabotage, propaganda and numerous other devices to achieve these objectives constitutes psychological warfare.

War is not made solely on matter. Warfare on the intelligence that gives life to matter is a large part of the role of psychological warfare.

Since the final defeat of the enemy arises from moral as well as material factors, military operations and psychological warfare cannot be separated but must be closely integrated.

Psychological warfare includes propaganda, subversive activities and all forms of activities outside of organized military action calculated to cause a deterioration of the enemy's morale and effectiveness, or to improve the morale and positions of non-belligerent countries to the United Nations.

Nazi psychological warfare reduced Austria to such a state that when the German army marched in there was no need for shooting. This was true in Czechoslovakia. France was so confused and full of panic spread by Nazi propaganda and its fifth columns that the German military operations were made comparatively easy.

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Propaganda is either defensive, intended to preserve and strengthen our own morale and that of our allies, or offensive, intended to win new allies or to weaken and destroy the enemy's morale and will to resist.

Psychological warfare, in a general sense, should be based on our war aims and peace aims as laid down in the Atlantic Charter, but more definitely it must be closely adjusted to and integrated with military policy and plans.

Psychological warfare is based on intelligence, but the directives that will definitely orient its activities must come from war plans.

Since psychological warfare must be in step with military plans and policy, the directives for its activities must come from army and navy war plans divisions. Such directives, in order to safeguard military information, should flow through the regular channels of the Joint Chiefs of Staff organization to other government agencies involved in the implementation of psychological warfare activities.

All propaganda should, directly or indirectly, cooperate with and give aid to our military policy. Military Psychological Warfare must therefore, to a certain degree, orient other propaganda since military operations are the conclusive attack upon the enemy that must be driven to the climax of victory. All offensive propaganda should, to a certain degree, be given its general orientation by our military plans, but must as well be coordinated with our own defensive propaganda or public relations. Propaganda should precede plans where possible, but should also be flexible enough so that advantage can be taken of the progress of military operations.

Certain weak links in the enemy's military, psychological, political, economic, social and morale chain are selected for vulnerability and played up by the Military Psychological Warfare

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continuously to increase these weaknesses to the desired military ends of destroying the morale of the enemy peoples and armed forces, inciting trouble and sabotage in occupied countries, and fostering friendship and help of neutral nations to our own cause.

The morale of civilians (including soldiers at home) in the rear areas is less durable than that of the armed forces actually fighting. The allies did not completely defeat the German Army in 1918 -- it was the morale back home that broke. Disastrous effects of low morale among the home folks passes directly to the fighting forces. A collapse of morale on the home front not only slackens the war effort but it is almost certain to presage defeat in the combat zone.

Propaganda to be effective must be based on truth and deal with conditions and events. Falsehoods when eventually proven discredit subsequent statements. Often you "state the truth but interpret it as you wish."

In the relations of a government to its enemies in wartime there are three entirely related and inter-dependent functions; intelligence, censorship and propaganda. Military censorship should be at the source. Without intelligence you cannot have a base for propaganda. Psychological Warfare must not only be founded on basic intelligence and military intelligence but more accurately on how this intelligence is applied to military strategy by the War Plans Division. Propaganda against an enemy should, when possible, be planned, budgeted and timed into phases, each of which accomplishes a certain objective.

Irrespective of the number of phases and the time factor of each, basic psychological surveys must be made of the enemy, occupied and neutral countries for propaganda purposes. On these as a background are planned current military and other intelligence. Such surveys must set down the enemy's propaganda situation, both offensive and defensive measures; information on elements, groups

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and leaders in power, on minorities, political, espionage, religious and economic groups, submerged classes, subject peoples hostile to the regime (hostilities against people and groups in power); estimates of the morale in the armed forces and in the civil population; historical, racial, religious, economic, social, military, etc., differences between enemy allies and between enemy and neutral countries that can be exploited for military purposes.

In conclusion of the survey there should be enumerated the vulnerabilities and the offensive measures that can be taken to weaken the enemy situation. These psychological surveys should be valuable to military plans, and the conclusions, in turn, should be checked and agreed on by those responsible for military plans before being used for propaganda. Psychological warfare is warfare for psychological effect.

If possible, weekly graphs of the enemy civilian morale, based on information from G-2 and all possible sources, should be kept to show up and down trends - also curves of the enemy military, political, food and economic situations.

For a solid military propaganda front against the enemy (and with neutrals) the proper coordination and cooperation must be established with our allies. This is a delicate task as the number of secondary war aims and peace aspirations depend usually upon the number of allies.

Neutral countries are of major importance from a military point of view and the propaganda effort with them should be carefully planned so that their course of operation should be helpful and not harmful to our cause.

Brundage in speaking of allied propaganda, especially of the Wartheloffs, Crowe House work, in the last World War, says "Good propaganda saved a year of war, and this meant the saving of thousands of millions of money, and probably at least a million lives."

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Military operations are planned and controlled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and carried out in the field by theatre commanders. Military psychological warfare in the field is a function of command and its purpose is to attack the enemy's army at its base, to stop the flow of reinforcements, supplies, equipment, food, comforts, and above all, to weaken the enemy's morale. Within his own sphere of responsibilities the theater commander must exercise control of psychological warfare which, in turn, is based on intelligence and espionage and war plans, with whatever cooperation is necessary and possible from the home base.

REPORT TO SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ARMY AND NAVAIR FORCE OPERATIONS

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. According to reports from eye witnesses, German losses in the paratroop regiment during the invasion of Sicily probably ran as high as 50% of the troops involved. Destruction of practically entire units in the initial stages of the operations were frequent.
 2. Allied losses during the Mignano Gommato raid are now revealed to have been around 50% of the troops involved.
 3. The heavy casualties above mentioned raise a serious psychological problem, and in order to avoid the criticism that followed a much lower percentage of losses at Fredericksburg and Cold Harbor, it would seem that the American public should be prepared at this time for acceptance of heavy casualties in any invasion of European soil, especially during the initial stages.
 4. In this connection the resentment of Australia at British failure to furnish air and tank protection to Australian troops in North Africa, in spite of the fact that American industry had been supplying the very equipment that was lacking in Libya, furnishes an illuminating parallel.
- RECOMMENDATIONS:**
1. That assurance be given the American public that all practicable steps are being taken to reduce such losses to a minimum by providing adequate air support at first and tank support later.
 2. That the American public be educated to the imperative necessity of accepting such losses as an indispensable prerequisite to securing the necessary footholds in enemy territory.
 3. That reasonable assurance be given the American public that heavy commitments to the ones involved in the initial stages of any invasion need not necessarily be expected beyond these initial operations.

Cairo, June 26, 1942

My dear Louis

I have just received a letter from Colonel Andojleitch, our Military Attache in Washington, dated the 20th of April, 1942. From this letter I learned two things, one of which gave me great pleasure, the other which rather distressed me.

The first was that you now occupy a position where you will really be able to use your talents, and the "vieux jeu" (Mecle de guerre expression) for the good of your country and for that of the Allies. It also gave me great pleasure that you should not have forgotten your old friend Jaros, whose views on the present war and the status of his country in the present conflict were never held secret from you.

The second thing is that you had lost sight of us and that unfortunately, I had to recall myself to your memory, with an SOS, a cry of distress, not personal but general, for my poor country and for those people who have placed it on the side of the Allies.

Although my English is very much improved over what it was in Belgrade, I remember that you never considered it adequate. For this reason and because you knew French perfectly I shall explain in this letter language the tragedy which is stalking the remnants of the Yugoslav Army at present.

I hope that you have not forgotten our meetings with "Mecle" (Mecle Mihailovitch) and General Mirovitch Mirkovitch at the same airport and at the houses of our friends. Perhaps you did not know then and I did not have time to tell you before my departure in Moscow that these reunions were not to be held but were held for a definite purpose which was to bring you and to Charlie Clark (British Military Attache) those persons who were essential to play an historical role in Yugoslavia. It is true that you knew General Mirkovitch who planned and carried out the coup d'etat of March 2, 1941, and that you were able to appreciate the moral issue and the character of our brave "Mecle", now directing the struggle in occupied Yugoslavia.

On the other hand you saw particularly Mr. Milet Lane and how much more, I am sure of the corruption of our politicians. Now the tragic situation of our beloved country has not been made by the hands of these infamous individuals. Now when there should be the most strenuous collaboration with those who were fighting about the war in 1941 since 1939 and since 1941, these individuals are working for it (such as General Mirkovitch, Mirovitch and myself) the Yugoslav Government in London has undertaken the most infamous struggle to keep itself out of the control of the country. With this end in view it has decided to put out its own army and its chiefs fearing its influence in the country.

These remarks are necessary in order that you might understand the actual situation. The facts are the following:

1. On the 11th of April, 1941, the Yugoslav Government ordered the capitulation of all the armed forces. On the following day it secretly left the country for the Middle East leaving behind General B. Mirkovitch alone at the Nikositch airport to get along as best he could with the Army and other politicians who also wished to escape. Express orders had been given to him to evacuate no military personnel, which can be considered as foreshadowing the events which were later to materialize. Thereupon General B. Mirkovitch feeling that the activities of Draja and other patriots had no chance of succeeding without appropriate aid from the outside caused the evacuation of as many aviators as possible and he himself also left the country. Mirkovitch, however, he met with an accident (the second one during his life) and as a result suffered two broken arms and a broken leg. By pure chance he finally arrived in Egypt due to the good graces of friends who had made all arrangements for him, and where he remained in bed for over six weeks.

2. From the very moment of the arrival of the Government in Jerusalem there was intrigue both in the very heart of the Government and in the entourage of the child-king. This intrigue was begun by the brothers Knejevitch, one of which Kadya, ex-professor of law, had been named Minister of the Court on the 12th of March. The other brother, Major Jirka (Jirka) had played a modest role in the carrying out of the coup d'etat. In their plans there was included a third brother, Nicolas, Legation Secretary, later named through the influence of his brother, Head of Intelligence Service of the Government in London.

The activities of these brothers developed along three lines:

- a) To surround the king with their own partisans.
- b) To secure as accomplices certain members of the Government.
- c) To create a clique in the Army and among the civilian emigrants.

As a). Through the influence of the brother who was Minister of the Court they succeeded in placing as aides to the king, three majors of low morals and little character attracted solely by the attraction of court life.

As b). They were successful in attracting to their cause the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Statchich, former president of the Supreme Yugoslav League, and a great admirer of Vladimir Il'ich. Also an ex-professor of law, Shobaden Knejevitch, Prime Minister, and probably other Cabinet members.

As c). From approximately 100 officers then in exile the brothers Knejevitch were able to bribe with money, with promises of a career, or similar tactics, less than a dozen of these officers, the majority of whom were classmates (Caucasian Military Academy) of Major Knejevitch.

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3. Due to the weakness of General D. Simovitch in political matters during that time when he occupied the position of Prime Minister and due also to the incompetency of General B. Ilitch in his capacity as commander of Yugoslav forces in the Middle East, the Knejevitch clique was not only able to be successful in those instances sighted as a, b, c, but later were also successful in completely dominating the Government and even the King.

4. Having done this the directors of the clique, in the early part of January, were able to bring the downfall of the Prime Minister, General Simovitch, and replace him by an old professor, 74 years old, totally ignorant of military matters as well as political. Two days later, on the 15th of January, 1942, the Yugoslav U.M.C. in Cairo received a series of telegrams in which, under the pretense of putting "new life into the cadres" the Yugoslav Government was relieving or forcing to the background almost all the officers ranking Major Knejevitch. To replace General Ilitch who unquestionably was not fit for his job was appointed a Lieutenant Colonel, (M. Lositch) known for his questionable morals and his military incapacity, but a personal friend of Major Knejevitch and a member of the clique from the outset.

Not realizing at first the real import of these changes the ranking officers thought them due to some misunderstanding and loyally and innocently asked their Government to establish a Board of Inquiry at once in the Middle East in order to establish the real causes for the inefficiency of the army if such was the case of these changes. However, the immediate tone of the telegrams which were received in answer to this inquiry and the insistence of the Government on the immediate putting into effect of these changes, especially the personal wish of the supreme Commander, the King, whom we knew to be an inexperienced young man of 18, gave ground for suspicion to certain better informed officers that it was not merely a question of military changes but it also involved political intrigue.

In these changes I was personally favored, having been named delegate to the British U.M.C. in the Middle East. It is in this capacity therefore that I approached the British authorities in the hope of reaching some amicable solution through their good offices as representatives of the country whose hospitality we were enjoying.

This intervention as well as that of General Mirkovitch led to my dismissal as well as to his; we were both retired without benefit of inquiry or forthcoming explanation.

All this took place between January 15 and April 15, 1942. During that period besides General Ilitch and General Mirkovitch and myself about ten other high ranking officers were gotten rid of; all these who had raised their voice in protest against the dictatorial acts of the Yugoslav Government.

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5. Meanwhile by a lucky break a number of documents fell into our hands. For three months the Army leaders had been in the dark for the reasons behind the persecution of the army, but through these documents they learned that at the root of the trouble were Major Knejevitch and his brother, Minister of the Court.

To be noted is the fact that when Major Knejevitch and his brother Nicolas had decided their preparations in the Middle East completed, they went to England and arrived in London December 19, 1941. The above mentioned documents represented a series of reports which Major Knejevitch had given to the Prime Minister in his capacity as Chief of Military Cabinet of the President of the Council, a position which he had acquired after his arrival in London due to his brother, the Minister of the Court. In these reports he made accusations against all the military leaders, including General Simovitch, and based his accusation on calumnies and lies purely of his own invention. Thus he became absolute master of the Yugoslav Army, due to the incompetence of the new Prime Minister and the lack of contact with Mihailavitch, new Minister of War in order that the dishonest intentions of the clique might be covered by his glorious name.

6. Persisting in his dictatorial attitude, Major Knejevitch depicted the resistance of the Yugoslav forces to the British Government as mutiny against the King and Government. On the other hand the Yugoslav Government explained its refusal of all inquiry or contact with the Army as a measure of self-defense in order to prevent a scandalous trial. In reality it wished to force the British Government to liquidate the army's officers by secret and illegal methods, alleging political expediency.

7. From the documents which happened to fall into our possession, which threw some light on these secret accusations against the officers--conducted without hearing or reference to the officers--concerned without hearing the King, residing in Cairo. These false accusations show that the claims attributed to the relieved officers their own intentions were already done by members of the clique themselves, namely, the desire to acquire complete ascendancy over the King, to have dictatorial power by forming a military government, to refuse to fight, etc.

8. The attitude of the British authorities in this general affair was as follows:

a) Middle East

In compliance with the orders received from London, the British Commander in the Middle East, General Auchinleck, ordered General Lovitch to leave his functions to Lt. Col. M. Lovitch after the departure of General Lovitch. Lovitch took over his functions to Lt. Col. M. Lovitch. Lovitch was a large majority of officers and soldiers to Lovitch, and being convinced that Lovitch was Lovitch, the British Commander in Chief, General Auchinleck

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relieved him of his command on the very day following his acquiring it, March 5th, and named as temporary commander, General Gerasim, Commander of British troops in Egypt.

During this time the British authorities had occasion to study the question thoroughly, also to learn the true sentiments and necessary requirements of the Yugoslav forces. The result was that the only possible solution as seen by the British authorities was to make General Mirkovitch Commander in Chief.

In the face of the categorical and persistent refusal of the London British authorities to accept one single suggestion their administration in the Middle East, and under pressure of the clique in London, the British commander suggested to General Mirkovitch, to myself and to a Major of Aviation, one of the most brilliant Yugoslav pilots of Yugoslavia, that we consent to being reported from Cairo. I positively refused to go except by force, while General Mirkovitch and the Major whom I have mentioned were literally prevented from leaving the station at Cairo, by about 40 Yugoslav officers who had come to this station for this very purpose of restraint. Thus we remained in Cairo. Shortly afterwards the authorities of the Middle East were obliged to transmit another order from the British Government, given under the pressure from the clique and from our Government, to the effect that we should accept as Commander, a Colonel (M. Makitch) sent by the clique supposedly to institute an inquiry but in reality to ensure the speedy execution of the clique program. This mission, having been opposed from the very start by us and the truth involuntarily admitted by Colonel Makitch, the army's resistance continued unabated.

Colonel Makitch besides the attitude which he manifested in Cairo and his doubtful morale, had a bad reputation in the army because of his activities in favor of Prince Paul at the time of the coup d'etat of March 7, 1941. He had even been arrested by order of General Mirkovitch when he was preparing to warn Prince Paul of the coup d'etat in order that the latter might escape.

All this justified resistance as well as the well known agitation of the British authorities in the Middle East remained unavailing. It is evident that the authorities of the Middle East were not able to oppose their government because in spite of the fact that they saw things in their own light they were forced to recognize Colonel Makitch as Commander, even if he were, according to an expression of a British Colonel, "a command empty space". Under these circumstances the majority of the officers and Yugoslav soldiers were interned in a camp located on the outskirts of Cairo where they still are, and have been ever since the 15th of April, 1942.

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After the internment the matter was transferred from the military authorities to the Minister of State, this latter has not ceased in his efforts to institute an investigation by the Yugoslav Government and to bring about the release of the interned forces whose only wish is in this time of supreme efforts to fight on the side of the Allies.

b). London

We understand perfectly that the British Government has other things to do than bother about the troubles of the Yugoslav "forces" which at first glance were one to consider only their strength, could not even be considered as forces. But I can assure you, Louis, that such is not the case.

First, the interned forces represent in reality all the combatant personnel that came directly from Yugoslavia after the capitulation. There are among them over 100 good pilots; there are the complete crew and officer personnel of a submarine; finally, there are those who enjoy an enviable reputation in their own country--such as General Mirkovitch. There are also among these forces experienced intelligence personnel and through them it would be possible to organize a network of communication in the Balkans for the Allies.

To put it briefly, wrongly or rightly, London is completely subservient to our Government which is itself completely dominated by the nefarious influence of the Tchejevitch clique.

According to what we have learned all the misunderstanding on the British side seems traceable to Ambassador Russell who is reputedly lacking in diplomatic ability, recently shown by his failure as Minister at Sofia. On account of his suggestion, the War Cabinet recently ordered the Minister of State to depart to London by force if necessary, leaving high ranking officers among which was my own British self. This done the understanding was that the affair would then be considered settled. According to the latest advice the Minister of State replied by proposing to depart all the interned personnel together with the seven officers in question to Macedonia. He is now awaiting an answer from his Government.

I am sure that such a move will not be a solution, but the present situation does seem the result of a spontaneous action and not of a plot. It is a spontaneous result of fear of a race which has been told nothing more than that above all, not one of these should be allowed to leave the order of the London Government and any further action would simply cause an anti-British movement in Yugoslavia after the War--could throw Yugoslavia into the hands of the Germans, and would serve as a precedent for the suppression of the guerrillas in our own country.

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I can assure you that it is not a question of my personal safety or of that of Boris Nirkovitch, whom you have known, nor is it any personal interest which motivates us. The matter is thus:

a) General Nirkovitch, Dr. J. Mikhailovitch and I had prepared our army from the very beginning of this war to take its place at the side of the Allies.

b) Beside personal friendship, by putting you and Charlie Clark in contact with our group I always had in mind our collaboration which I had thought would be in such tragic circumstances and within, by absence from Belgrade.

c) One of the two close friends on whom I had counted, Charlie Clark, has failed. Therefore there is no one now but you. Neither is this a sentimental affair. As I have already told you we have magnificent possibilities of organizing fruitful work in the Balkans. It is our duty to do everything possible to help Dr. J. who is fighting under desperate conditions.

d) During the month of February we signed an agreement along these lines with Mr. Frank Mauran, representing Colonel Domovan.

As I have just learned from Micojeitch, you are with Inter-Ally Intelligence. You are therefore fully justified in interesting yourself in people whose only desire is to be of service to the common cause of the Allies. I have collaborated here in such as possible with your Military Attache, Colonel James Fellows, who can give you information in regard to my activities in the Middle East and on the activities of those who cause I am now planning.

I am not addressing myself solely to my friend Louis Fortier because our former friendship to obtain special favors. I am proposing to an Allied officer, sympathetic to the mentality and to the real situation in Yugoslavia, to contribute to and to do his possible to strengthen the activity of the Allied forces in the Balkans.

To be concrete this is what I think you could do:

1) Find out yourself or collect information on the Yugoslav question from your representative in Cairo.

2) Once convinced that the right is on the side of the Allies, submit the question to the proper authorities in order to obtain:

a) The immediate liberation of the forces at present interned, the arming of them for liaison, for use in military intelligence, as guerrillas in Yugoslavia or if necessary as volunteers in the army of the United States.

- 3 -

We are ready to furnish all the guarantees necessary that there never has been political ambition among us, and that never until the end of the War do we have any other intention than that of fighting the common enemy of the United Nations.

- b) The opening of an impartial inquiry with the view of establishing the origin of the Yugoslav crisis and the historical responsibility before our Government and the Allies for the inactivity of the Yugoslav army, that is for the weakening of the War effort detrimental to all United Nations.

I am enclosing herewith two copies of a letter which General M. Birkovitch has written to your President, Mr. Roosevelt. It is to be understood that this is the last means to which we would like to resort in the impossible situation in which we have been placed by the bad faith of our Government and the formality of the British Government. If you find any means by which you can transmit this letter to the White House we shall be infinitely grateful to you. I beg of you to try to have it clearly understood that we are not attempting to cause dissension among the Allies, but that this is a desperate cry of real pain, to whom has been refused decent treatment, that which is accorded every one, even to the worst criminals. These words cannot remain inactive at a time when their comrade Draja Mihailovitch is maintaining an unequal struggle in a country and where the Allies are going through a crisis unparalleled in the history of the world.

I trust that you have sufficiently known my character in Belgrade that you will not hold against me the military character in which I have shown you these matters. Once again I repeat that I would not have permitted myself to trouble you in this affair, did it not affect a people and a country who consider you a real friend.

My regards to Mrs. Fortier

Very sincerely yours,

s/ Jarka

I join Jarka in sending my very best wishes.

s/ Gen. M. Birkovitch

Since I do not know the proper heading to put on a letter addressed to the President, I beg you to fill in the proper heading at the beginning of the letter if you should think it wise to send this letter on.

Thank you. Jarka

The situation in Yugoslavia is much better today than anyone could have hoped for in view of the lack of support General Mihailovich has received. He has successfully withstood the spring drive of the Partisan forces. At the present time he has most of his army concentrated in the mountains of Herzegovina. From there his forces are conducting a series of effective sorties against the enemy.

General Mihailovich, although the General is somewhat (1) disillusioned with the situation, is receiving from the outside world.

There are several patriot groups operating against the enemy. These groups range from thirty guerrillas to three.

There are also various political factions ranging from the extreme right to the extreme left. In a sort of "democratic

front" they are all working for a very small part in operations. Some of these groups have recently escaped to the

mountains to support the Partisan forces. The Partisan forces are also receiving from the outside world.

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SECRET

1. The purpose of A.S.S. in the Middle East is to support the efforts of guerrilla bands and insurgent groups in the enemy occupied countries of Eastern Europe; to prepare for possible Axis occupation of the Near East by laying down secret stores of arms, money, radio sets; to establish a clandestine subversive organization; to carry on subversive work against the Germans in Turkey; to establish contact with agents inside Italy and Rumania; to carry on a systematic campaign of subversive propaganda against the enemy in neutral and occupied countries; in general, to strike at the enemy's political, military, economic, communications, transportation, morale and morale. Finally, create revolt.

In carrying out this work, the following are absolutely essential: transportation and communications. If we are provided with them we can carry out the scope of successful operations we shall be able to carry out. If we are not provided with them, our chances are almost nil.

Secondly, the financial position, which is a serious one. The financial position is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of money to carry out the work. The financial position is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of money to carry out the work. The financial position is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of money to carry out the work.

Thirdly, the personnel. It is necessary to have a certain amount of personnel to carry out the work. The personnel is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of personnel to carry out the work. The personnel is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of personnel to carry out the work.

Fourthly, the equipment. It is necessary to have a certain amount of equipment to carry out the work. The equipment is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of equipment to carry out the work. The equipment is extremely poor. It is necessary to have a certain amount of equipment to carry out the work.

...received from General Mihailovitch in Yugoslavia
 ...Guerrilla leaders, the following items are urgently
 ...in order of priority:

MEDICAL SUPPLIES (emphasis on first aid kits but
 all other types of drugs and
 medicines and instruments as well)

PLASTIC (Plastic is obviously indicated
 for this purpose.)

(The Greeks have been particularly
 successful with limpets - and we should
 make every effort to rush out this
 type of device, as well as any others
 that are available.)

LIGHT WEAPONS (This type of weapon is asked for
 repeatedly.)

(Guns can be purchased locally in
 sufficient quantities if you will
 set up dollar credits in the
 banks here.)

(Guns shipped out here recently
 by you will be very welcome this
 winter. Similar shipments should
 be made immediately.)

ARMY (Some of the court-alky-talky
 would have invaluable for short
 range radio communications between
 guerrilla bases - particularly for
 keeping track of enemy movements.)

(Guns can be purchased locally on
 credit from banks if funds are
 made available. Mihailovitch has
 been repeatedly for these.)

(The government agencies
 are not very good at this kind
 of work. They have a number of
 men who are shipped here. The guerrilla
 units have a large quantity
 of equipment, weapons and supplies
 and are largely with them.)

(The standard U.S. may
 be particularly effective
 in the winter and they are
 very good.)

(The "B" ration
 is very good.)

- As mentioned before both gold and certain types of supplies can
be bought here in Cairo. In order to save air and shipping space
we should take as much advantage of this fact as possible.
Therefore, I recommend that for a start two hundred thousand
dollars be made available in the National Bank of Egypt for these
purpose. This should be done immediately.
5. In addition to my mission which is established here in Cairo
we should take steps immediately to ~~open~~ operate in Turkey.
This is of vital importance because of the land communications
which exist from there into Europe and the possibilities of bribing
neutral diplomatic couriers or others to take radio sets into
areas where it is otherwise impossible to open contact. Also, there
is still a certain amount of sea traffic between Greece and Turkey
through which we might infiltrate agents and supplies. For this
purpose I require an American diplomatic passport. The special
passport I have states clearly that I am a Captain in the United
States Army on active duty. If I attempted to go to Turkey on this
passport I would ~~immediately~~ be interned for the rest of the War/
the moment I crossed the frontier. It would be best if I were
appointed Press Attache to the Embassy. Calling that assistant
air or military attache, or even just special ~~diplomatic~~ courier
carrying messages for the Military and Naval attachees between
Turkey & the Middle East. Recently, we require a man in Baghdad
which is the port where the trucks will put in. There is an
American consulate there and I would strongly recommend that
~~Smith~~ and ~~Smith~~ have finished his training by now he is pointed
to work in Baghdad. If not Smithy, it should be someone who
understands the situation and can speak Greek. Can you have the
one who was in the Ministry here, to figure out
the address of the British office.

6. There are two separate phases of this S.O.S. work and they should be kept apart at all times. The military side deals with actual operations, the maintenance of communications, running of transport, and all other matters affecting military personnel. The political side handles the contacts with political groups both inside and outside the various occupied countries, the bribing of police and military personnel, the establishment of a network of informants, the running of a secret press, and the various other matters which are necessary for the maintenance of the S.O.S. work.

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